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STANDARDS/CONVENTIONS
THEMSELVES, THEM, THEY, THEIR
These conventio ns  w i l l  be used when the terms 
individuals, nurses, patients, c lien ts , are referred to 
and denotes an indefin ite  expression of gender, or 
mixed groups (Oxford Miniguide to English Usage 1984: 
248-251).
VOCABULARY
Oxford English Dictionary spellings are u t i l is e d  except 
when North American terminology is used or authors are 
quoted.
COPYRIGHT
All trademarks and copyrights acknowledged.
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OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS
MORALS AND ETHICS
In everyday usage the terms 'morals' and 'e th ics ' are 
used synonymously and for the purposes of th is thesis, moral, 
from the Latin work 'm o ra l i s '  meaning custom or manners, is 
taken to mean something which is r ig h t ,  wrong, good, or bad and 
refers to standards of behaviour held or followed by individuals  
or groups (Dictionary of Philosophy 1984: 112). Ethics, from 
the Greek word ' e t h o s '  meaning ch arac te r , in th is  thesis 
dictates the meaning or use of words or concepts, such as r ig h t ,  
wrong, good or bad, and refers to the science or study of morals 
(Hare 1972: 45-46). As a philosophical term ethics is concerned, 
t h e r e f o r e ,  w ith  the " i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i n t o  the fundamenta l  
p r in c ip le s  and basic concepts that are , or  ought to be, found in 
a given f i e l d  o f  human thought and a c t i v i t y "  (Dictionary of 
Philosophy 1984: 112).
Two important distinctions may be made between the 
meanings of the words ethics and morals. F irs t ly ,  ethics are 
formal, theoretical statements which in te l le c tu a lis e  morals and 
involve professional values, such as those seen in Codes, 
th e o r ie s ,  research or enquiry. Secondly, morals re fe r  to 
values or principles which are less formal, and more personal or 
subjective, and to which the individual is committed, that is the 
individual follows and defends these morals in th e ir  da ily  lives
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(Jameton 1984: 4 -5 ). Thus, morality is concerned with the 
conduct men ought to fo l lo w . Though these two concepts 
overlap in the language and subject-matter and very broadly are 
taken to mean philosophical enquiry about norms, values and what 
ought and ought not to be done (Raphael 1981: 1 -8 ), they are not 
used interchangeably in this thesis.
PATIENT/CLIENT
The term patient refers mainly to those individuals  
requiring care in a c lin ica l or hospital setting, and the term 
c l i e n t  r e fe r s  to  those in d iv id u a ls  in  the  community 
s e t t in g .  In some instances p a t ie n t  and c lien t are used 
equivalently as the discussion may incorporate both settings.
CLINICAL/COMMUNITY
The term c l in ic a l  in th is  thes is  re fe rs  to the 
delivery of care at the bedside or in the hospital setting, and 
community refers to the delivery of care in the home.
HEALTH CARE/MULTI-DISCIPLINARY TEAM
Health care team or m ulti-d isc ip linary  team in this  
thesis is taken to mean a ll  the members of the nursing, medical 
and paramedical or a l l ie d  disciplines who are concerned with the 
care  o f  the  p a t i e n t / c l i e n t ,  such as nurses, doctors, 
physiotherapists, d ietic ians, occupational therapists, social 
workers, community nurses, specia list nurses and chaplains.
NURSING MODEL
A nursing model is a symbolic representation of a 
perceptual phenomena which is based on a theory and must include 
the essential physical and philosophical elements of nursing.
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SUMMARY/ABSTRACT
SUHMARY/ABSTRACT
This thesis presents an ethical model to guide the 
nurse in the application of moral standards or principles in the 
c lin ica l and community setting. The study is concerned with 
looking at e th ics  primarily in terms of p a t ie n ts ' /d ie n ts '  
rights, not ethics in general. The contribution of contemporary 
nurse theorists and philosophers in the international arena are 
considered to see how th e ir  contributions re la te  to the present 
and future developments and trends in the f ie ld  of nursing, and 
how they may be translated into action in the da ily  care of 
patients /c lients  in the c lin ica l and community setting.
The research methods include an historical review of 
l o c a l ,  n a t io n a l  and in t e r n a t io n a l  nurse e d u c a t io n a l ,  
philosophical and ethical l i te ra tu re .
The central theme investigates the caring roles of 
nurses and the commitment to p a t ie n t /c l ie n t  care which are the 
basis o f the ethical perspective of nursing. The ethical 
p r in c ip le s  inherent in the nursing d is c ip l in e ,  such as 
p a tie n ts '/c l ie n ts ' rights and autonomy are examined, to see how 
these principles may be applied at the bedside and in the 
community.
Validation c r i te r ia  are adapted and th is  validation  
too l, together with the ethical constructs/components, are used 
as a framework to ensure that an ethical perspective is included 
and u t i l is e d  in a l l  nursing models.
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As e th ic s  is  concerned w ith  human conduct and 
relationships, the author concludes that an ethical model is 
v i t a l  and may be used with a ll models which guide nursing 
practice currently in use and in future developments.
An Eth ica l Analysis Framework and Model has been 
developed by the author, to serve as a tool for the inclusion of 
ethical constructs/components in models which guide the practice 
of nursing in the c lin ica l and community setting. I t  also aids 
in the application of ethical principles. The Ethical Analysis 
Model w il l  hopefully contribute to the theoretical framework of 
curriculum development as curriculum is concerned with shaping 
attitudes towards knowledge and creating a forum for discussion 
and c r i t ic is m .  Ethical knowledge is part of that subject 
matter. Through deliberation and judgement the d e fin it io n  and 
solution of curriculum and ethical problems may be effected as 
curriculum development, l ik e  ethics, is concerned with what is ,  
and what might be. An example is presented of how the Framework 
and Model can be used, and is strongly recommended for use with 
any model which guides the practice of nursing.
The f in d in g s , t h e i r  l im i ta t io n s  and the re le va n t  
discussions and recommendations are highlighted, and areas for  
further research are id en tif ied .
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PREFACE
PREFACE
P rio r  to this study the author presented a Masters
Degree (MSc) dissertation (Rodmell 1985) in which the present
nurse education syllabus and curriculum were examined, the 
ra t io n a le  for ethics education was explored, and the author 
concluded th a t  e th ics  education was not e x p l ic i t ly  stated
(Rodmell 1985: 4 ). The potential implications and relevance to 
nurse educators of implementing an ethics education programme 
were o u tl in ed  with implementation guidelines as a separate 
academic disc ip line  (Rodmell 1985: 119-131).
Contained within this separate academic d isc ip line  the 
author presented a module which was subsequently implemented in 
nursing c u r r ic u la e  in the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, and 
recommended t h a t  n u rs in g  s tu d e n ts  engage in e t h ic a l  
decision-making in the fina l year of th e ir  tra in ing (Rodmell
1985: 121, 130-131). The specific objectives presented at this  
stage were aimed at the a p p lic a t io n  of fundamental moral 
principles to ethical issues and dilemmas; the assessment of 
whether the e th ic a l  decisions were reached and whether the 
consequent actions reflected the stated values; a s e n s it iv ity  to 
and awareness of the s k i l ls  required, such as communication and 
counselling. To th is  end the author suggested the application of 
ethical decision-making, to cope with the ethical issues and 
dilemmas which arise for nurses, f i r s t l y  using hypothetical 
c r i t ic a l  incident techniques (Rodmell 1985: 114) and then real
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l i f e  experiences in c lin ica l practice (Rodmell 1985: 125, Stage 
3, Level 6 ). Crisham (1981: 104) has demonstrated that reasoning 
in real l i f e  situations is similar to reasoning in hypothetical 
s itu a t io n s  using c r i t i c a l  incident techniques, a method of 
obtaining data from study participants by in-depth exploration of 
specific incidents and behaviours related to the matter under 
investigation (P o lit  and Hungler 1983: 612). Certain real events 
were used as a focus of discussion with the participants in the 
incident, and was designed to stimulate more complex reasoning 
(C la y  e t  al 1983: 300). B r ie f l y ,  Crisham (1981: 104)
investigated a selection of one-hundred and ninety four (194) 
nurses o f varying grades, and th i r ty  eight (38) non-nurses using 
an instrument designed to measure th e ir  hypothetical responses 
and compared them with the moral judgements taken in real l i f e  
nursing dilemmas.
Having ascertained the need for an ethics education 
programme in the nurse education curriculum, and the need for  
nurses to engage in ethical decision-making in c lin ic a l practice, 
th is study seeks to present an ethical model which w i l l  enable 
the nurse to translate ethical theory into practice, by offering  
clear guidelines for the application of ethical princip les, in 
addition to those techniques mentioned above. Nursing practice  
is generally guided by the u t i l is a t io n  of nursing models, so i t  
was decided to commence by examining these nursing models to 
assess whether the e th ic a l  princip les  or concepts such as
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rights and autonomy are e x p lic i t ly  stated. The author examined 
current nursing models and established that other than the study 
done by Mooney (1980: 7 -9) and the models advocated by
Weidenbach (1964: 16), King (1981: 143-144 ; 1986: 102), Levine 
(1986: 130), and the work done by Wright (1986: 22) there was 
l i t t l e  e x p lic i t  mention of ethics in current nursing models.
This thesis then aims to present an ethical model which 
w il l  include ethical principles with validation c r i te r ia  which 
may be applied in the c lin ica l and community setting. This w ill  
enable nurses and nurse educators to put into practice the means 
of coping with conflicting ethical principles, and u t i l is in g  
ethical theories and debate to ju s t i fy  the ethical decisions 
that have to be made at the bedside and in the community. For 
example, the rights of the patients /c lients  and nurse w i l l  be 
one of the foci of discussion, as this w ill  serve to highlight  
the co n fl ic t  in principles that may arise and the process of 
ju s t i fy in g  these decisions.
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C H A P T E R  O N E
" A l l  tha t is  said and done, w i l l  be sa id  and 
done w i th  a view to what is  good f o r  those on 
whom he p rac t ices  h is  a r t , so every a r t  seeks 
not i t s  own advantage, but the wel lbe ing  o f  
the subject on whom i t  i s  exercised or ,  put  
more b lu n t l y  or  less e loquent ly ;  ' t h a t  the 
p a t ie n t  takes no harm', we sha l l  not go f a r  
wrong. "
Plato,
On the professional man, 
427-347 B.C.
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C H A P T E R  O N E
INTRODUCTION
This thesis presents an investigation of the ethical 
perspectives of nursing practice, with the aim of presenting an 
e t h ic a l  model to f a c i l i t a t e  the a p p lic a t io n  o f e th ic a l  
principles in the c lin ica l and community setting. I t  raises 
questions about the nature, significance and appropriateness of 
currently used nursing models, on which nursing practice is 
reputed to be based, as to th e ir  ethical content.
The author has examined in depth the scant empirical 
data, and studies on some nursing models in current use, and on 
which nursing p rac tice  is reputed to be based, appear to 
demonstrate that ethical principles and guidelines for practice  
are not e x p l ic i t ly  stated. This was demonstrated by nurse 
theorists such as Weidenbach (1964: 16), King (1981: 143-144; 
1986: 102), Levine (1986: 130), and Wright (1986: 22), who a ll  
showed a concern for ethical standards in nursing practice. 
Weidenbach (1964: 16) id en tif ies  three essential components of a 
nursing philosophy which demonstrates some consideration for  
ethics, however, no guidelines for practice are offered as to 
how this  philosophy may be realised. Weidenbach's (1964: 16) 
components include a reverence for the g i f t  of l i f e ,  a respect 
for  the d ign ity , worth, autonomy and in d iv id ua lity  of each human 
being; and, the resolution to act in re la tion  to one's b e l ie f .
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King (1 9 81 : 143-144; 1986: 102) maintains th a t
individuals have a right to knowledge about themselves; the 
r igh t to partic ipate  in decisions that influence th e ir  l ives ,  
health and community services; the right to accept or re ject  
health care; and insistence on consideration of the c lien ts '  
p e rc e p t io n  o f  a s i t u a t i o n  and t h e i r  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in 
g o a l - s e t t in g . Again no guidelines for practice have been 
generalised.
Levine (1986: 130) also demonstrates a concern for the 
individual person, re flecting  the ethical standards of nursing, 
evidenced by her b e lie f  that "nurs ing in te rven t io n  must deal 
w ith  the r i g h t s  and p r i v i l e g e s  o f  the in d iv idu a l  in  tang ib le
ways ............   and the recogn i t ion  o f  the i n d i v i d u a l ' s  r i g h t s  to be
ass is ted in  understanding the im p l ica t ions  o f  h is  disease , h is  
t reatment and h is  care".  These beliefs of Levine (1986: 130) 
are features of a model rather than a model i t s e l f .  Levine's 
"model" does not advocate guidelines for practising these 
ethical standards, nor is i t  clear whether her concern for the 
" r i g h t s  and p r i v i l e g e s  o f  the i n d i v i d u a l "  includes the  
nurse.
A recent B ritish  text makes one reference to nursing 
ethics (Wright 1986: 22) and though i t  c learly  outlines how to 
build and use a model of nursing, no further mention is made of 
e th ic s .  I t  may be that Wright's (1986: 22) reference to
" e th ic s " ,  though e x p l i c i t l y  s ta te d , is meant to set the
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framework for practice, and i t  is up to the nurse to e x p lic i t ly  
deta il the content of the subject, where, how and when i t  must 
be incorporated in programme/curriculum development, and so the 
ethical model to be proposed w ill  provide these guidelines for 
practice.
CONTEXT OF THE STUDY AND CONTRIBUTION
The author has recently returned from the Commonwealth 
of the Bahamas where she was employed with the Ministry of 
Health as a Curriculum Specialist on special projects with the 
World Health Organisation/Pan American Health Organisation 
(WHO/PAHO) and World Bank. The author's post was aimed at 
in i t ia t in g ,  developing and maintaining the work of curriculum 
development within the pre-registration and post-registration  
nurse education departments. The post also included conducting 
special projects/workshops such as the implementation of the 
Nursing Process* and the Role-Based Training Course^ for  
Senior Nurse Managers within the hospital and community setting.
In January 1989 the author hopes to commence a new post 
with the World Health Organisation and Pan American Health 
Organisation (WHO/PAHO) as a f u l l - t im e  Nurse Educational 
Consultant/Advisor based in the Commonwealth of the Bahamas and 
serving the Americas and Caribbean basin countries. The issues 
raised from this thesis w il l  hopefully make a contribution to 
the practice and theory of ethics education in the developed and 
developing countries, and in particu lar in the author's country, 
Jamaica, West Indies, where because of the recent hurricane
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disaster a l l  medical and nurse educational f a c i l i t i e s  require
re-building and re-development.
Further to th is , the author hopes that the issues 
raised from the study w il l  be submitted to the appropriate
nursing research groups, such as Nursing Research Abstracts
(DHSS Index of Nursing Research 1988) from which nurse
theorists , educators and eth ic is ts  creating nursing models draw 
some of th e ir  data.
The author hopes that the results of this thesis w il l  
make an important contribution to the debate about the emerging 
professional status of nurses. The development of a recognised, 
e f f e c t i v e ,  operational Code of P ractice  is one of the  
established features of a developing profession and though the 
existing United Kingdom Code of Professional Conduct (Appendix 
1) is based on ethical concepts i t  does not address i t s e l f  to 
certain ethical issues and i t  assumes that nurses are experts in 
ethical decision-making. I t  is also hoped that this thesis w il l  
help to c la r i fy  some of the concepts and terms which people use 
in th is  emerging "profession".
The a u th o r  r e fe r s  to  n u rs in g  as an academic  
discip line  as opposed to an academic profession, on the grounds 
that the author believes that nursing has not yet attained  
status as a profession, as i t  does not meet a ll  the c r i te r ia  
afforded the status of a "profession". Two of the main c r i te r ia  
not yet attained is that f i r s t l y ,  nursing practice is rare ly  
based on research; and secondly, "autonomy" is not possible as
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nursing is an interdependent and dependent d isc ip line , with no
real decision-making powers, as to date, doctors are lega lly
ultim ately responsible for patien ts /c lien ts . However, nurses 
can assume a professional manner which is an a tt itud ina l  
attr ib u te  and nothing to do with being or not being part of a 
profession. This professionalism assumes the individual to be 
an expert in inter-personal situations with the s k i l l  and 
knowledge to undertake the nurses' ro le  with competence. 
Dingwall (1986:27-28) and Clark (1986:28) suggest that whether
nursing is a subordinate, that is to doctors, occupation, or an 
"autonomous" profession determines the indiv idual's  perspective 
of nursing, and the " i n t e rp re ta t io n  o f  h i s t o r y  and o f  the 
changes tha t  have taken place in nurs ing over the past 25
years" (Clark 1986:28). Earlier to th is , Segal (1985:43) had 
pointed out that the legal system in America does not accept 
nursing as a profession. This is grounded in the b e l ie f  that 
the "educat iona l paths"  to being considered a profession are 
doubtful, nursing being viewed mainly as a tra in ing as opposed 
to an education. The same could be echoed in the English legal 
system. However, nurses have the same moral responsib ilit ies  as 
every other human being, regardless of whether nursing is a 
profession or not, as nursing ethics is no d if fe re n t  to any 
other ethical relationship.
IDEA FOR THESIS/RESEARCH
The idea for th is thesis was f i r s t  developed during the 
la s t  year of the author's post as Curriculum Specialist with the
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Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. During the 
special projects/workshops run by the author and described 
e a r l ie r  (page 20) i t  became increasingly a concern for course 
partic ipants, and for the author to see how the nursing models 
being u t i l ise d  and the ethics education model (Rodmell 1985) 
being taught as a co-requisite of the courses (page 20) could be 
e ffec t ive ly  incorporated. This was not because there was an 
in a b i l i ty  to see the importance of an ethical framework but 
rather that there seemed no easy way to incorporate the ethical 
components/aspects when deciding which particu lar nursing model 
was to be used for each area of spec ia lity , especially as no 
clear guidelines for practice were offered. The d i f f ic u l ty  
seemed to l i e  in the translation of ethical principles into 
practice. These ethical principles include the r igh t to l i f e ,  
in d iv id u a l  freedom, respect fo r  persons, t ru th  t e l l i n g ,  
justice /fa irness  and beneficence and non-maleficence.
A review of the current l i te ra tu re  revealed that there 
has been an increasing reference to nursing models and 
th e o re t ic a l  frameworks and an "extensive blanket adopt ion"  
of these nursing models in nursing (Hardy 1986: 103). Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that many Schools of Nursing and hospitals 
purport to be using a nursing model as a basis for nursing 
pra c tice . Furthermore, anecdotal evidence by nursing peers 
suggest that many Schools of Nursing incorporate the use of 
nursing models within th e ir  Curriculum just because i t  is part 
of the local School of Nursing policy, not because of the use
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that can be made of nursing models and th e ir  effectiveness. In 
addition, readings of certain authors do not c la r i fy  the intent  
of th e ir  papers about nursing models. This lack of cr it ic ism  
and comment may be "damning evidence to the t rue  s ta te  o f  
nurs ing"  (Hardy 1986: 103) which is reputed to be emerging as 
a "profession". This is an assumed state as according to Pyne 
(1981: 4-7) nursing meets a ll  the c r i te r ia  that he has la id  down 
for a "profession". In spite of the d i f f ic u l t ie s  nurses appear 
to encounter with the interpretation of models, the author 
believes that i t  is the translation of theory to practice which 
is the d i f f ic u l ty .  This may be due to an underlying lack of 
ethics education, a lack of some validation c r i te r ia ,  a lack of 
ethical principles in nursing models, compounded by the lack of 
guidelines for practice. To this end, the author hopes to 
present an e th ic a l  model which may aid the nurse in the 
application of ethical principles into practice, thus enhancing 
active partic ipation of patients /c lients  in health care.
The advantage of the author's model is that i t  includes 
specific validation c r i te r ia  and clear guidelines for practice. 
The impact of the model w ill  be enhanced by congenial conditions 
charac te r ised  by an appropriate environment and a ttitudes,  
though the author is appreciative of the fact that th is  may be 
d i f f i c u l t  to achieve in l ig h t  of the problems nurses appear to 
be having with nursing models.
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AIM/PURPOSE OF THE THESIS
The aim of this thesis is to present an ethical model 
to aid the nurse in the application of ethical principles (page 
23) in the c lin ica l and community setting. The author's model 
may be used independently as an ethics education model, or i t  
may be used in conjunction with other models which guide nursing 
practice.
This in ves tig a tion  c r i t i c a l l y  examines the use of 
ethical principles in an e ffo rt  to draw attention to what could 
be considered as the ethical aspects of nursing, as d istinct  
from the technical aspects of nursing. I t  can be argued that 
nursing is not only concerned with te c h n ic a l,  th a t  is ,  
sc ien tif ic  s k il ls ,  and mechanical s k i l ls ,  but with personal and 
social relationships and policy. When attempting to make an 
ethical decision individuals often confuse technical arguments 
with ethical and/or legal arguments. This would indicate that 
nurses need to be shown how the arguments d i f fe r ,  and need to be 
skilled at distinguishing these arguments before they can become 
competent ethical decision-makers (Rodmell 1985: 120). Clearly, 
the need to identify  the implications that may arise for nursing 
practitioners, nurse educators and nurse ethicists in curriculum 
planning or programme development and design is paramount, and 
thus the target population for this thesis includes these groups 
specifica lly .
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Levine (1 9 77 : 845) suggested th a t  the personal
philosophies of individual nurses, combined with relig ious and 
cultural expectations, are serving as the foundation of nursing 
ethics rather than e x p lic it  ethical theory as a part of nursing 
theories. This interpretation by Levine (1977) means that the 
e th ic a l  perspective  in nursing p ra c t ic e  is  derived from 
in d iv id u a l nurses' subjective  be lie fs , the mores of th e ir  
groups, or the socialising influences. These moral views appear 
to arise from religious and cultural influences, rather than 
from an ethical perspective in a theory of nursing, which guides 
the practice of nursing. Nurses therefore need to be encouraged 
to understand how th e ir  b e lie f  systems may be in te l lec tua lised ,  
how dilemmas arise, how ethical judgements are arrived a t, and 
how ethical decisions are made. In order to do th is  then the 
ethical principles in a theory of nursing, for example, Orem's 
(1985) self-care theory which is 11the p ra c t ice  o f  a c t i v i t i e s  
tha t  in d iv id u a ls  i n i t i a t e  and perform on t h e i r  own beha l f  in  
main ta in ing  l i f e , heal th  and wel l -be ing"  (Orem 1985:84) need 
to be examined. So, in order to try  and achieve the aims (page 
25), the author w il l  examine in more detail the issues which 
contribute to the ethical model proposed by the author, such as 
the p a t ie n ts ' /c l ie n ts '  r ight to partic ipation in and knowledge 
about th e ir  health care.
F ina lly , the author feels that th is  investigation is 
"worthy o f  urgent p u rs u i t "  (Cormack 1984: 7) part ly  due to 
the fact that i f  patients /c lients  are treated in an ethical
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manner, and become active participants in th e ir  own care, then 
i t  may be that the ethical problems, such as the paterna lis tic  
a t t i t u d e s  o f  s t a f f  towards p a t ie n t s /c l ie n t s ,  could be 
e f f e c t i v e ly  reduced. Paternalism is acting in another's 
in te r e s t  without consulting them. I t  may be that greater 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  d e c is io n -m a k in g  may p ro v id e  a more
cost-effective  health care system, as in some instances, such as
in surgical procedures which enable a quicker recovery from 
i l l -h e a l th ,  reduces the cost to the consumer, and ultim ately the 
costs to the Health Service.
Research studies (Wilson-Barnet et al 1983: 37) already 
outline an appraisal of what patients /c lients  can expect. These 
studies demonstrate th a t coping strategies are thought to 
co n tr ib u te  towards more rapid m o b il is a t io n , reduction in 
c o m p lic a t io n s , and e a r ly  discharge from h o s p i ta l . The
u n d e r ly in g  assumption is th a t  p a t ie n ts /c l ie n ts  who can 
partic ipate  actively in th e ir  health care should be considered 
as rational human beings who can share in the responsib ility  for 
th e ir  own care, or vice versa. This partic ipa tion , however,
does not appear to be the case at the moment in health care. In 
viewing patients /c lients  as active participants in th e ir  care, 
according to W ilie r  and M il le r  (1976: 687-690), nurses would be 
taking an ethical stance and this may well have some therapeutic 
benefit for the p a t ie n t /c l ie n t .  Clearly i t  is the nurse who is 
taking the ethical stance, not the p a t ie n t /c l ie n t ,  and in taking 
th is  ethical stance the nurse is demonstrating a proper respect 
for human beings. However, an ethical stance is a requirement
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in in te r -p e rs o n a l re la t io n s h ip s  whether or not i t  has a 
therapeutic benefit.
In order fo r  the p a t ie n t /c l ie n t  to be an active 
partic ipant in health care, i t  is hoped that an assessment of
the p a t ie n t /c l ie n t  may be made by nurse and p a t ie n t /c l ie n t  where 
possible, a nursing model is selected which is understood and 
appropriate to meet the p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  needs and discussions 
held to decide whether the p a t i e n t 's / c l i e n t 's  goals are 
r e a l is t ic  and e th ica l. I t  is the relationship between carer and 
care-recipient that needs to be an ethical one. The goal for  
the care-recipients is a return to being "autonomous"^, where 
possible, and a regaining of th e ir  self-respect, assuming these 
characteristics were there o r ig in a lly , and they are able to
recall them. I f  these characteristics are absent then the nurse 
must s t i l l  be guided by the principle of "autonomy", and 
continue to trea t the patients /c lients  according to th e ir  needs 
and p o t e n t i a l .  The p r a c t ic a l  problem of guiding the 
c a re - re c ip ie n ts  toward se lf-su ffic iency  and a regaining of 
self-respect is daunting for individuals who have to cope with 
being cared for and the d i f f ic u l ty  of developing responsib ility  
for th e ir  own lives . I t  may be that some patien ts /c lien ts
actively  enjoy being cared fo r, or may have no choice, as in
high dependency units or long-term care in s titu tion s . In the 
case of planning goals i f  nurses and patien ts /c lien ts  hope to 
bring about a good, they would need to take steps to bring about 
good resu lts . To act ra tio n a lly  means not only w il l in g  an end 
but taking the steps to bring about that end.
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RATIONALE
There are f ive clear reasons for enabling the practice 
of ethical principles in the c l in ica l  and community setting.
F i rs t ly ,  i t  is important that the nurse has a good 
knowledge of ethics, that is,  knowledge which may be applied or 
t ra n s la te d  into p ra c t ic e ,  which could be the r e s u l t  of  
research/enquiry. E l l is  (1983: 211) believes that the knowledge 
base for nursing practice includes empirical science, and that 
the purpose of s c i e n t i f i c  enquiry is to search for "new
fo rm u la t io n s "  (E l l is  1983:212) arising from a need for new 
knowledge or to c la r i fy  the inadequacies in knowledge^. As
she views philosophic enquiry as c la r i f y in g  meanings and 
" a r t i c u l a t e s  the p e r s p e c t i v e s , b e l i e f s , concep tua l isa t ions , 
and methods tha t  character ise a f i e l d "  (E l l is  1983: 212), then 
for E l l is  (1983) nursing models would be s c ie n t i f ic .  Ear l ier  
Silva (1977:58-63) had advocated that ult imately a l l  nursing 
theory and research is derived from, or leads to, philosophy 
which is  in i t s e l f  a l e g i t i m a t e  method of s c i e n t i f i c  
enquiry^. Silva (1977) exposed the l imitat ions for nursing of 
overemphasis on sc ient i f ic  method before a philosophical stance 
is es tab l ished ,  as she believed that "cur ren t  a c t i v i t y  in  
model b u i l d i n g  and grand theor ies o f  nurs ing p ra c t i c e  are 
searchings f o r  meanings and ph i losoph ic  stances".  Clearly,
Silva (1977) had conflicting views but this is re f le c t ive  of
current publications. Some knowledge of how nurses' perceive 
health  care may be important in ascertaining whether these
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perceptions influence, or are influenced by, the environment in 
which nurses work. An ethical model for practice requires an 
ethical knowledge base, and so i t  is paramount to examine the 
e x p l ic i t  knowledge required to ensure that i t  is incorporated 
into the ethical model.
Secondly, i t  has been proposed that nursing is or 
should be a s c ien t i f ic  research-based profession (McFarlane 
1980: 13; Sheehan 1982: 17; Kratz 1982: 128; Hawthorne 1983: 
41-43).  I t  may be considered s c ien t i f ic ,  that is ,  ju s t i f i e d  by 
s c ie n t i f ic  theory, because of i ts  technological concerns, such 
as the concept of asepsis. However, i t  is not a research-based 
profession, as anecdotal evidence by colleagues suggest, as 
nurses rare ly  practice the current research done in c l in ica l  
areas and continue to practice t rad i t io na l ,  or even out-dated 
methods of care. This may be due to a number of reasons such as 
not knowing how to do a l i te ra tu re  search, fa i lu re  to understand 
the research conclusions, a d isbel ie f  in the findings of the 
research, an in a b i l i t y  to translate the research into practice,  
or not being allowed to use the research because of lack of  
funding or poor attitudes (Hunt 1981: 189-194). For example, 
research conducted in the use of sa l ine /sa l t  baths** in wound 
healing (Watson 1984:57-59) demonstrates just  th is ,  and this may 
be due to a lack of information and understanding of the 
research findings, or a lack of time to do a l i t e r a tu r e  search 
on the research appropriate to that c l in ica l  setting.  Nursing 
may also be considered a craft  and i ts  practices may be based on
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custom, and i t  could of course be the case that i ts  practices, 
although purporting to be sc ien t i f ic ,  are based on out of date 
sc ie n t i f ic  theories. The author is concerned with the reliance  
on the claims made on nursing being a s c ien t i f ic  and a 
research-based profession, and would advocate that nursing may 
be viewed from di f fe r ing stances, the ethical stance being 
complementary^, rather than an alternative.
Ultimately, when nursing defines e x p l ic i t ly  i ts  unique 
or specific body of nursing knowledge, and this knowledge can be 
contested and corroborated then this unique body of nursing 
knowledge must be based on sc ient i f ic  principles concerned with 
the observation and classif icat ion of facts and establishing 
t e s t i f ia b le  theories which are well corroborated. However, to 
know s c ie n t i f ic a l ly  that asepsis wi l l  reduce infection does not 
necessarily mean that the practice of asepsis w i l l  follow; hence 
the difference between the science of nursing and the practice 
of nursing based on sc ient i f ic  and researched facts presents the 
r e a l i t y  gap between what ought to happen and what does happen. 
Certainly, the body of research in nursing is being treated as 
"sacrosanct and beyond c r i t i c i s m "  (Johnson 1985:42) and the 
uncrit ical acceptance by nurse practit ioners, on the occasions 
i t  is u t i l is e d ,  appears to be the trend. However, i f  nurses 
have a good ethical knowledge base then they would be able to 
cr i t ique  the research being produced.
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At a seminar conducted by Bond (1978) at the Northern 
Regional Health Authority seminar in re lat ion to developments in 
nursing, Bond (1978) stated that theorists and academics may 
conduct research, but the relevance of i t  to nursing may be lost  
i f  those in practice see i t  as a product of the ivory tower, 
useless to them in the real world. Thus, i f  research is to have
an impact on nursing, i t  must be put over in a way the
p r a c t i t i o n e r  can understand providing simple, re levan t  
e x p l a n a t i o n s ,  and not c on f ined  to an academic e l i t e .  
Practit ioners need to be involved in negotiating the programme 
of the research and in the monitoring of that research. Also, 
there needs to be an active exchange between those generating 
the research and those using the research, and the author's 
Model is a clear example of an attempt to bridge this gap, by 
generating research which w i l l  subsequently be u t i l ised  by the 
author.  So, i f  nursing is to become a s c i e n t i f i c  and
research-based profession then nursing research must be 
assimilated and the ethical aspects of the "profession" need to 
be included in the research.
T h i r d l y ,  nursing as a moral a r t ,  tha t  i s ,  the 
" seek ing  o f  a good" (Curtin and Flaherty 1982:86) embodies 
the principles of ethics, such as pa t ien t /c l ien t  r ights, and
therefore a l l  curriculum/programme development may require the 
inclusion of ethical principles to meet the p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  
needs. Therefore, i t  is important to ascertain i f  these ethical 
principles (page 23) are being practiced in nursing, and to
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examine the parameters for that practice. I t  is the case that 
ethical principles do change, are not measurable, or are they 
absolute meaning that one ethical principle may be overridden by 
a n o th er  e t h i c a l  p r in c ip le  (Jameton 1984:139) .  Eth ical  
principles are d i f f i c u l t  to measure because they are re la t ive  to 
a s i tua t io n  and so constantly changing, and the underlying 
reason f o r  ra t io n a l  behaviour cannot be c l a r i f i e d  with 
assessment techniques. As nursing is a moral art  then the 
practice of acting morally, that is,  of doing that which is 
r igh t ,  of being good, is not measureable, although the phenomena 
of morality could be studied s c ie n t i f ic a l ly .  The most the 
author can hope fo r  is fo r  in d iv id ua ls  to appear to be 
undertaking an ac t iv i ty  which is moral and ethica l ,  especially  
i f  the a c t iv i ty  seems to be following certain rules of conduct, 
and individuals are not acting out of se l f - in te re s t .
Fourth ly ,  in a l l  nurse-patient relationships i t  is 
important that certain r ights, to be discussed la te r ,  of both 
p a t ie n t /c l ie n t  and nurse are respected, as individual rights  
impose an obligation on another individual to recognise and in 
some cases e f f e c t  those r ig h t s ,  as in the case of  the 
p a t ie n ts ' /c l ie n ts '  r ight to know. I t  would depend, however, on 
the indiv idual's  interpretat ion of rights and an examination of 
these  r ig h ts  w i l l  be d e ta i le d  l a t e r .  I f  these mutual 
expectations are not met, then there is dissonance between the 
views of the pa t ien t /c l ien t  and the nurse, and conf l ic t  in care 
w i l l  emerge. Thus, i t  w i l l  be important to examine the
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potential sources of the conf l ic t  when there is dissonance in 
expectations.
Finally , the Royal College of Nursing (RCN) set up i ts  
own Ethics Advisory Committee in 1984, and is a sub-committee of 
the Professional Services Committee. Much of the work by the 
Committee has been devoted to the RCN's response to the Warnock 
Report (1984). The RCN Ethics Advisory Committee was disbanded 
in July 1986 and reformed in November 1986, and has ad hoc 
meetings to discuss ethical issues as they ar ise. In October 
1988 the Committee inaugurated a Special Interest Group from the 
RCN membership, who w i l l  then act as a resource to the Ethics 
Advisory Committee.
More recently, the UKCC (1988a/b: 9) has set up a new 
Standards and Ethics Group, comprising six Council members to 
look at qual ity  of care and ethical issues, and the ir  f i r s t  
meeting was held in July 1988 and subsequently in August 1988. 
At these meetings the Group recommended the formation of a 
Committee and put forward draft  terms of reference for the 
consideration of the Council. I t  is hoped that the Committee 
appointments and the terms of reference w i l l  be formalised by 
November 1988. I t  could be that an ethical model for  practice 
may contribute to the work being done by these organisations and 
ul t im ate ly  contribute to the educational framework in which 
nurses are trained. I t  may also contribute to the theoretical  
framework of curriculum development which is concerned with the 
shaping of atti tudes which aids in guiding nursing practice.
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RESEARCH METHODS
The areas fo r  investigation and reference in this  
t h e s i s  are drawn from l o c a l ,  n a t i o n a l ,  r e g io n a l  and 
international l i te ra tu re .  Use has been made of the h istor ica l ,  
sociological,  anthropological, psychological and health policy 
research in health care, in the analysis of broad principles in 
the observation of ethical practice.
Primary sources, capable of transmitting a f i r s t  hand 
account of events, and which provides sound evidence of the past 
in the  h i s t o r i c a l  research includes anecdotal or oral  
testimonies provided by actual participants of events; policy 
documents; l e t t e r s  and o r ig in a l  manuscripts; minutes of  
m e et in g s ;  memoranda; o f f i c i a l  pu b l ica t io ns ;  newspapers; 
professional, general and nurse education journals/periodicals;  
diagrams; f i lms; recordings; transcriptions and published and 
unpublished research reports (Cohen and Manion 1982: 39; Madge 
1965: 91, 96). These original sources w i l l  be used to build up 
a d e t a i le d  picture of the factors relating to the ethical  
concepts and nursing models.
The secondary sources are discussions of events written  
by in d iv id u a ls  who are summarising or interpreting primary 
source material (Pol i t  and Hungler 1983: 204) and as such are 
second or third hand accounts of events. The secondary sources 
w i l l  include textbooks in general and nursing education; medical 
and nursing ethics; philosophy; and research.
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The author has l imited the use of secondary sources on the 
grounds that the ir  worth is reduced because of the errors that  
may result in the transmission and interpretation of information 
(Cohen and Manion 1982: 39; Madge 1965: 91, 96). Further to 
t h i s ,  secondary sources reduces o b j e c t i v i t y  and may 
introduce bias, (Po l i t  and Hungler 1983:83,204) and though every 
e f fo r t  w i l l  be made to avoid th is ,  i t  does make secondary 
sources less re l iab le  and comprehensive.
CHAPTER PREVIEWS
Chapter  Two e x p lo re s  the is s u e s ,  such as the
ethical knowledge base, which may have to be considered in the
development of an ethical model for practice. These issues may 
serve to influence the application of ethical principles in the 
c l in ica l  and community setting.
Chapter Three examines in deta i l  the conf l ic t  in 
ethical principles and the resulting ethical dilemmas that may 
confront nurses and patients /c l ients  da i ly .  These ethical
p r in c ip le s  may need to be considered for inclusion in the 
ethical model.
C h a p t e r  Four  p r e s e n t s  an E t h i c a l  A n a l y s i s  
Framework and Model which includes curriculum considerations and 
implementation g u id e l in e s .  The chapter also examines the 
nat iona l  and local implications for research, practice and
education.
Chapter  F iv e  e x p lo re s  the  f ind ings  and ra ises  
discussion and recommendations for the thesis.
The author now considers issues in developing an 
ethical model.
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ENDNOTES (C hap te r One)
1 NURSING PROCESS
The Nursing Process workshops involved the author and a 
team of. f a c i l i ta to rs  running theory and practice orientated,  
externally based workshops for all  nurses at a ll  levels of the 
Ministry of Health, twice a week for a period of eight months. 
This was supplemented by in-house, that is, within the hospital 
setting, workshops. These workshops served to further reinforce  
the Nursing Process which is a systematic, ra t ional ,  logical,  
problem-orientated, dynamic approach to nursing care in i t ia te d  
by Henderson (1980: 905-907) whereby the p a t ien t /c l ien t  is 
assessed by the nurse, care is planned and implemented, and 
review and evaluation of the patient and the care delivered is 
carried out. The Nursing Process further emphasises clearly  
seven themes v i z .  the nurse is accountable to individual  
patients /c l ients ,  the public and the discipline, for the care 
she del ivers; the purpose and direction of nursing is decided by 
the use of a nursing model; the patient is treated as a unique 
individual;  the preventive/health educational, collaborative and 
cu ra t iv e  ro le  is h igh l igh ted;  emphasis is placed on the 
problem-orientated approach to care, the nurse being fu l ly  
cognisant of the fact that not all  problems have solutions; the 
process is practised amicably within a mult i -discip l inary team; 
and the relationship of the nurse and patient is unique by the 
inter-personal relationships and active partnership that needs 
to be developed (Open University 1985: 8-26).
2 ROLE-BASED TRAINING COURSE
The Role-Based Tra in ing Course fo r  Senior Nurse 
Managers that is ,  Ward Sisters and above, is a management course 
which emphasises on -the- job  t r a in in g ,  complemented by the 
relevant theoretical framework within a specified time.
The Role-Based course was run over twenty week periods 
with units of training and practical application under the 
supervision of the author as Course Tutor/Speaker, and a team of  
trained fa c i l i ta to r s  who worked with the senior nurse managers 
both in the classroom and cl in ica l  setting to ensure correlation  
or l inking of theory and practice.
3 Autonomy in the true sense is a state which cannot be 
achieved except in a noumenal world or in the world of angels. 
In this context i t  is taken to mean taking the responsibil i ty  
for one's decision, and to a certain extent one's care.
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4 E l l i s '  (1983: 211) view of philosophy is a common and 
acceptable view, though the author believes that E l l i s '  (1983) 
view of philosophy is simplistic as i t  concerns i t s e l f  only with 
the c lar i fy ing  of concepts and meanings, and is secondary or 
supportive of science, that is,  i t  is a second order a c t iv i ty .  
I t  could be argued that in order to engage in philosophic 
enquiry the individual is required to go one step further and to 
examine values and goals which is a t radit ional view of 
philosophy, but is coming back into fashion (See for instance, 
O'Hear 1981).
5 I t  is the author's view that Silva (1977: 58-63) is 
suspect in arguing that philosophy is part of the method of 
science. Science looks at things under the category of quantity 
and is concerned with prediction, whereas i t  has been argued 
already that philosophy is concerned with the c la r i f ic a t io n  of 
concepts and meanings (# 4).  A scient ist may, of course, act as 
a philosopher in preparing the ground for the sc ien t i f ic  
endeavour. Scient i f ic  enquiry requires facts to be collected 
with reference to some hypothesis.
6. WATSON, M. " S a l t  i n  t he  b a t h "  Nursing Times
Occasional Paper 8 0 (1 9 ) ,  Nursing Times, 80(46),  57-59, 14
November 1984.
This study revealed that the only ju s t i f ic a t io n  for  
placing salt  in the bath of patients/c l ients with wounds was 
possibly the psychological benefits, and even this benefit  has 
yet to be proved.
7 Nursing makes use of sc ient i f ic  research, fo lk  memory,
personal experiences, but ethics is not a component to be added 
to this l i s t .  Rather i t  looks at the ent ire practice from the 
point  of  view of ethics and asks whether the relationship  
between nurse and pat ient /c l ient  is e th ica l ly  correct.
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C H A P T E R  T W O
" Mo r a l  p o s i t i o n s  must be a rg u e d  f o r  and 
j u s t i f i e d .  In  any case o ften we w i l l  not know 
whether we have taken the r i g h t  dec is ion"
Melia, 
1987.
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C H A P  T E R  T W O
INTRODUCTION
This Chapter w i l l  examine further the issues which may 
be considered in the development of an ethical model for nursing 
practice.
Based on the author's rationale for undertaking the
study (page 29), the issues to be considered in enabling the
nurse to apply the ethical principles in the clinical/community 
setting are centred around a good knowledge base which w i l l  
enhance active partic ipation for the pat ien t /c l ien t  in health 
care. I t  is arguable that i f  pat ients/c l ients are fu l ly
informed then they may participate actively in the planning of 
t h e i r  care . This knowledge base is concerned with an
understanding of what ethics is and the ethical principles; an 
understanding of what ethical dilemmas are or the nature of 
e t h i c a l  problems and how they a r is e ;  how to cope with  
c o n f l i c t in g  ethical principles, and how to ju s t i f y  ethical
decisions; and the structure of ethical enquiry. Implementation 
of an e th ic a l  model requires enquiry, principled thinking,
s t r a t e g i e s  f o r  a c t i o n ,  and an u n de rs ta nd ing  o f  the  
characteristics of nursing. I t  would also be important to 
understand how nurses perceive health care as i t  may be arguable 
th a t  t h e i r  d i f f i c u l t y  in the app l ica t ion  o f  the ethical
principles may be posit ively influenced by the environment in 
which they are working, and/or the ir  perceptions of that
e n v i r o n m e n t ;  o r ,  i t  c o u ld  c o n c e iv a b ly  be t h a t  the
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application of the ethical principles may be hindered by the
environment in which they are working, and/or the ir  perceptions 
of that environment. I t  may also be the case that the ir  ethical  
views may influence the ir  perceptions of the environment in
which they work.
As nursing is a moral art (page 32),  then the main
c h a r a c te r is t ic s  of  caring and commitment are examined to 
ascertain i f  these characteristics could affect how nurses apply 
e t h ic a l  p r in c ip le s  and t h e i r  e th ica l  decision-making in 
f u l f i l l i n g  the social contract. Social contract is taken to 
mean the contribution that nurses make to individuals in society 
in helping them to maximise the ir  health potentia l.
The r ig h ts  of  pat ients /c l ients  and nurses w i l l  be 
examined to see what are the major p r in c ip le s  that are 
applicable to nursing and may need to be included in the ethical  
model.
For convenience, sub-headings wi l l  be used.
1. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
(a) Ethical knowledge base
I t  is generally acceptable in any f ie ld  of enquiry that  
a body of knowledge which serves as the rationale for  the 
d i s c i p l i n e  may need to be established, and nursing is no
exception. This identif ied body of knowledge serves as form, 
structure or direction to f a c i l i t a t e  understanding for those 
teaching and learning nursing, in this context.
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Carper (1978: 13-14) has identif ied four perspectives 
for viewing nursing knowledge, that is,  empirics or the science 
of nursing; aesthetics or the art of nursing; personal knowledge 
in nursing; and ethical knowledge. I t  is these last  two 
perspectives with which the author is primarily concerned.
The ethical pattern of nursing knowledge requires an 
understanding of varying philosophical stances regarding what is 
good, what is r ight ,  what ought to be done or the nature of 
ethical problems; an understanding of ethical dilemmas and an 
understanding of the complexity of how ethical judgements are 
arrived at or ju s t i f ie d  and the resulting action achieved; and 
the structure of ethical enquiry.
The Code of Professional Conduct (Appendix 1) which 
purports to guide the ethical conduct of nurses is based on the 
primary pr inciple of obligation (Carper 1978: 20) of what ought 
to be done. This is embodied in the concept of service to human 
beings and respect for human l i f e .  Though the United Kingdom 
Central Council * has recently offered guidelines for practice 
on the Code (Appendix 1) i t  does not advocate a knowledge of 
ethics to complement the Code.
Ethical knowledge w i l l  not provide answers to moral 
questions, or w i l l  i t  avoid having to make ethical choices, but 
i t  w i l l  at the very least provide the basis for making decisions 
about ethical problems and engender the individual 's interest in 
the process of just i fy ing  ethical actions.
The nature of ethical problems
An ethical problem is to question whether an action is 
of a type which is governed by an accepted ethical standard. In
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order to resolve an ethical problem i t  requires making an
ethical judgement as to whether a particular action is r ight or 
wrong, and th is  requires the individual to apply ethical 
s ta n d a r d s .  The acceptance of  these standards implies  
universabi  1 i t y , that is,  that an individual "always should 
choose to act as a l l  human beings should choose to act in  a
s i m i l a r  s i t u a t i o n " (Curt in  and Flaherty  1982:49) .  The 
standard accepted must apply to all  similar cases or all  
relevant cases be treated in a similar way. For example, i f  the 
ethical standard is that "k i l l ing  is wrong" then the course of 
action such as one taken in euthanasia is also wrong, as i t
f a l l s  within the ethical standards set. When there is no
apparent relationship to any ethical standard the question of 
rightness or wrongness does not arise.
I f  an individual is concerned about whether something
is r ight or wrong then there may be some reason for saying i t  is 
r ight  or wrong and individuals would need to know what this  
reason is . Usually when individuals are concerned whether an
action is r ight  or wrong i t  is because i t  is of a type which is
allowed or forbidden by the ir  own moral standards. I f  an
individual has no moral standards then there would be no moral 
problems for that individual. For example, an individual who 
does not believe that k i l l in g  is wrong would have no problem in 
commiting murder or in participating in euthanasia. Thus, there 
are no solutions to ethical problems unless there are some 
ethical concepts, and no hope of an ethical enquiry, as without 
these ethical concepts the facts are meaningless.
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The ju s t i f ic a t io n  of ethical actions 
The formal ju s t i f ica t ion  of ethical actions requires 
in d iv id u a ls  to fol low a certain procedure, and the author 
proposes using the process adopted by Taylor (1961:68-106; 
125-188). Taylor's (1961) four stages include ver i f ica t ion ,  
validation, vindication, and rational choice. The author w i l l  
include one further stage which is called confirmation, on the 
grounds that i t  appears that the standards used in Taylor's 
(1961) process does not include confirming that the appropriate 
value system is u t i l ised .
These f ive stages are now detailed.
Stage 1. Verif icat ion  
Stage 2. Validation 
Stage 3. Confirmation 
Stage 4. Vindication 
Stage 5. Rational choice
An attempt may be made to veri fy  value judgements by 
showing that they are consistent with the standards adopted by 
individuals. These standards are validated by showing that they 
are consistent with higher standards. These standards are 
confirmed by reference to the value system appropriate to the 
s tandards  being used. A va lue  system is a " s e t  o f  
standards and ru les  o f  a ce r ta in  kind arranged according to the 
place they have in  the v e r i f i c a t i o n  and v a l id a t io n  o f  value 
judgements  o f  t h a t  k i n d ” ; and a moral value system is a
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"set o f  moral standards and moral ru les  tha t  are appealed to
in  v e r i f y in g  moral judgements.    and that are arranged in  an
o rd e r  o f  r e la t i v e  precedence corresponding to the h ie rarchy  
i m p l i c i t  in  t h e i r  va l id a t io n "  (Taylor 1961: 107). The value
system is then vindicated by showing that i t  is part of the
form/way of l i f e .  A form/way of l i f e  is an organisation of
d i f fe rent  sets of standards, rules and the individual's  set of 
value systems, rel igious, moral or otherwise, which makes up
what that individual is.  The final stage in the procedure is 
to demonstrate that a rational choice has been made between 
possible alternative forms/ways of l i f e .  In practice this would 
be extremely d i f f i c u l t  to do as to some degree there w i l l  have 
been socialising influences which wi l l  guide the choice in a
certain direction. To the extent that individuals are not able
to show that a rational choice has been made, an arbitrary
element may be the basis for  the j u s t i f i c a t i o n  offered.
However, as Aris tot le  (384-322BC) pointed out individuals cannot 
be any more accurate than the subject matter allows.
The process of j u s t i f i c a t i o n  is examined in more
d e ta i l :
1.Verif icat ion
The statement and action are given meaning by applying 
a standard, and f u l f i l l s  or not the standard applied. Are the 
beliefs  about the action under the appropriate standard?
2 .Validation
In this stage the standard is challenged as to whether 
i t  is the appropriate one in the circumstances. I t  must
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therefore be relevant, and show that no confl ic t  exists with 
other standards or rules being applied. One way of doing this  
is to show the standard used is derived from a higher standard, 
unti l  the appropriate standard is confirmed.
3 . Confirmation
This is a confirmation that the standards used are part 
of the appropriate value system, and whether the value system is 
the appropriate one to use in the circumstances. The standard 
is accepted as correct i f  i t  reflects the framework of values 
that individuals have from a moral point of view.
4 .Vindication
This stage asks whether the value system used is
appropriate, and provides the right point of view. This is done 
by looking at the forms/ways of l i f e  which contain the set of
persona l  va lue systems which make up the character  of  
i n d iv id u a ls .  These value systems re f lec t  the individual's  
outlook on l i f e .  Ideal ly , i f  an individual 's form/way of l i f e  
is known then individuals would know which value system would
take precedence in a conf l ic t .  Thus the rule would be derived 
from the moral nature of the general form/way of l i f e .  I f  the 
action/event is viewed from a moral point of view then the 
in d iv id ua l 's  moral value system takes precedence over other 
points of view. This stage also requires individuals to commit 
themselves to the standard or rules of conduct which make up the 
value system; to freely choose to adopt the system; and the
value system must be experienced by the individual adopting i t .
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5 .Justif icat ion of rational choice
This stage is an attempt to show that the form/way of 
l i f e  chosen, which includes ethical and religious value systems, 
have been rat ional ly  chosen out of the alternative sets of value 
systems. These values have been determined by preference or 
f r e e l y  chosen, without coercion, unbiased, objectively and 
i m p a r t i a l l y ,  and a f t e r  thoughtful considerat ion of  the 
consequences of each alternative or each form/way of l i f e .
Dworkin (1978: 71-80; 1979: 43-49) argues that there is 
a d i s t i n c t i o n  between rules and p r in c ip le s .  Rules are 
actions which individuals ought/ought not to do because they are 
right/wrong and apply in an 'a l l  or nothing' fashion. For 
example, a rule may state that two witnesses are needed for a 
wil l  to be valid , and i f  there is only one witness, the w i l l  
wil l  not be valid . Principles state social goals such as 
the respect an individual ought to have for another individual 
and are taken into account in giving a decision. For example, 
people should t e l l  the truth.
In choosing an e th ica l  theory to ju s t i f y  ethical 
a c t ion ,  there is a contrast between ethical theories that 
emphasise individual rights and "autonomy", and ethical theories 
that emphasise the total good that might be achieved.
T a y l o r ' s  (1961)  process o f  moral reasoning by 
deliberat ion and ju s t i f ica t ion  may be viewed in hierarchical  
levels (Figure 2a). According to this, judgements about what 
ought to be done in a particular dilemma are ju s t i f ie d  or
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supported by ethical rules (ver i f icat ion and validation) which 
in  tu r n  are j u s t i f i e d  by p r in c ip le s  (conf irmation and 
vindication) , which ultimately are ju s t i f ie d  by ethical theories 
( ju s t i f ic a t io n  of rational choice).
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ETHICAL THEORIES
Second order principles 
e.g. U t i l i t a r ia n ,  Deontology 
A
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
e.g. Truth te l l ing
Respect for persons
A
RULES
actions individuals ought/ought not 
to do because they are right/wrong 
e.g. I t  is wrong to l i e  to 
a pat ient /c l ient
A
JUDGEMENTS AND ACTIONS
judgements are decisions or 
conclusions about an action
Figure 2a: Rules and Principles in 
the process of ethical  
ju s t i f ica t ion
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The structure of ethical enquiry
In ethical enquiry the hypothesis is that the course of  
action under discussion is right or wrong because i t  is a member 
of a class of actions governed by an ethical concept. I t  points 
to the type of method which is appropriate for conducting
ethical arguments, and therefore for testing proposed solutions 
to ethical problems.
In cases where there is a doubt about the ethical
action, three outcomes are possible. The individual may c la r i fy  
the e x is t in g  ethical standard, modify the existing ethical  
standard, or a new ethical standard is created. A legal analogy 
is u t i l ised  to demonstrate these outcomes. In a legal procedure 
of a murder t r i a l  the law is presented and the judge determines 
what is to count as murder, what evidence is admissible and what 
facts are relevant. I t  is the function of the jury to consider 
t h e  f a c t u a l  e v id e n c e ,  and in the l i g h t  o f  j u d i c i a l  
interpretation to pronounce the verdict. I f  a question arises,  
not about what the facts are, but what the facts amount to, i t
is referred to the judge for c la r i f i c a t io n . The facts are
examined for relevance and significance, and the sanction sought 
depends on the place of those facts in relationship to the 
charge against the accused. For example, i f  the facts show that 
a murder was committed, then the verdict would re f le c t  some
sanction on the person committing the murder in relation to the 
circumstances of the case. I f  the facts of the case are such 
th a t  the e x is t in g  law cannot deal with them, then some
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modification of the law is required, or a new law may have to be 
developed, creating judic ia l precedence. In the future a ll  l ike  
cases are judged by this "new" law.
In the p r in c ip le  of t ru th  t e l l i n g ,  fo r  example, 
individuals are expected to te l l  the truth. An individual may 
deliberately  deceive because of the effect i t  may have on the 
l is tener ,  such as the pain or anxiety i t  may cause. So, the 
individual may c la r i fy  or ju s t i fy  not te l l ing  the truth on the 
grounds that i t  may cause suffering. A modification of this  
principle may lead an individual to withhold some information, 
or only give some of the information. A new ethical standard 
may be created in situations where i t  becomes acceptable to 
deceive, or withhold the truth, provided there is good reason.
(b) Nurses' perceptions of health care or "mind-sets"
The nurses' perceptions of health care, or "mind-sets", 
is a useful framework for deciding whether nurses' perceptions 
influence, d irect ly  or indirectly , the ethical decisions that  
nurses make in the cl in ical  and community setting. Aroskar's 
(1982: 24-32) theory is presented as i t  appears to pervade
current nursing l i te ra tu re .
Aroskar (1982: 24-32) identi f ied four mind-sets, or 
characterist ics, that is the way in which nurses perceive health 
care as an a c t iv i ty  and i ts  role in society, and how they affect  
th e i r  ethical views, and vice versa. Aroskar (1982: 24-32) does 
not make clear from where these mind-sets are derived, except to
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say that they are her views of how nurses perceive health care 
and are views adapted from an a r t ic le  written by a philosopher 
(Newton 1979: 7-9) .  Her statements were based on the be l ie f  
that nurses react according to the ir  internal environment and 
the external environment in which they are placed. The internal  
environment is the nurse's characterisation or mind-set about 
the system in which nursing and health care is delivered. The 
external environment is the larger social system, such as 
family, or the hierarchical bureaucratic organisation in which 
care is delivered. How nurses deal with the ethical dimension 
of prac t ice  depends on the interaction between these two 
environments.
F i rs t ly ,  health care is viewed as a sc ien t i f ic  project 
in which cure of diseases is the main objective. According to 
Murphy (1978: 313-320) a study in the 1970's of one unnamed 
hospital in America on nurses and their  supervisors suggested 
that most of the nurses who were at a conventional level of 
reasoning, that is individuals who are able to think in concrete 
ways, and able to reason (Appendix 2),  subscribe to this  
mind-set. Another more recent study done in America in 1981 
(Simmons and Rosenthal 1981: 371-375) of twenty-eight (28) nurse 
pract i t ioner interviews demonstrated that " these p ro fess iona ls  
t e n d e d  t o  d e f e r  c o n v e n t i o n a l l y  t o  t he  a u t h o r i t y  o f  
p h y s i c i a n s " . The focus in this mind-set is of the nurse 
f o l l o w i n g  the d o c t o r 's  orders and fe e l in g  tha t  i t  is 
inappropriate to question or challenge the doctor, and ethical
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practice is equated to following instructions. Though nurse 
practit ioners are legal ly  accountable for the ir  own practice, 
they do appear to prefer obedience to authority in order to
maintain harmonious relationships and avoid blame as exhibited
in the ir  statements which re f lect  following hospital rules or
doctor's orders.
Secondly, according to Aroskar (1982: 25-26) health
care is viewed as a commodity, that is, the hospital is seen as 
s e l l in g  health care to consumers. This mind-set is often
accompanied by a u t i l i t a r ia n  perspective, that is ,  maximising 
happiness for the greatest number of people, as the nurses tend 
to defer to the goals of the insti tut ion and the administrative 
hierarchy. This view of health care confl icts with the current 
patient-centred ethic which commits nurses to meeting individual 
needs. In this mind-set the nurse may not question what is 
r ig h t  or wrong as long as i t  appears congruent with the 
inst i tu t iona l  goals.
The third  mind-set Aroskar (1982: 26) contends is that 
health care is seen as a patient's right to r e l i e f  from pain or 
from a deb i l i ta t ing  condition. The nurses' primary obligation  
is to meet needs and wants as identif ied by pat ients /c l ients ,  
and the p a t i e n t s ' / c l i e n t s '  in te re s ts  are paramount. For 
example, a patient may identify a preference for a nurse to care 
fo r  him/her s p e c i f ic a l ly ,  and the nurse may consider this  
dependency on a nurse inappropriate, as a higher level of 
p a t ie n t  independency may be more therapeutic. Because the
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p a t ie n t 's  in terests  are paramount, the nurse is overruled. 
Thus, the identi f ied needs of patients/clients are not congruent 
with the nurse, there may be a confl ic t  between real wants and 
expressed wants, the i n t e g r i t y  o f  the nurse becomes 
questionable, and consumers appear to control the health care 
system, as the patients' values predominate. Nurses may be 
viewed as instruments to carry out pa t ien ts ' /c l ien ts '  wishes and 
not as advocates. I t  may of course be argued that a Patients 
Bil l  of Rights seems to suggest more consumer control of the 
health care system.
These f i r s t  three  mind-sets make nurses and/or  
patients/c l ients  primarily the means to the ends of others. In 
the f i r s t  mind-set the nurse is used as a means to an end for  
the doctor in achieving the goals of the doctor, which is to 
cure the pa t ien t /c l ien t .  The nurse of course has made the 
choice to be a nurse and has the choice of refusing to follow 
the  d o cto r 's  orders. In the second mind-set both the 
p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  and nurse are used as means to an end in 
achieving other peoples' goals. I t  may also mean that nurses 
use other individuals and other nurses to the ir  own ends in 
meeting the insti tu t ional goals or pa t ient /c l ient  goals. The 
p a t ie n t /c l ie n t  is also used as a means to an end to see the 
do cto r 's  in s truc t io ns  are carr ied  out and to serve the 
in s t i tu t ion .  In the third mind-set the nurse is used as a means 
to the ends of patients/c lients  as only the pa t ie n ts ' /c l ie n ts '  
wishes and values are important, and the nurse is an instrument 
in carrying out the wishes of patients/c l ients .
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These three mind-sets, held consciously or otherwise by 
nurses, have certain consequences for nurses. They confl ic t  
with the Nurses Code of Professional Conduct (Appendix 1) by 
which the discipline abides, on the grounds that the standards 
of practice are developed by the nursing community, and not by 
doctors or in s t i t u t io n s  to which nurses sometimes defer.  
Because nurses appear to accept the doctor's authority and/or 
that of the goals of the inst i tu t ion ,  they may not always act in 
the p a t ien ts ' /c l ien ts '  "best interests", as shown in the example 
in the third mind-set previously (page 53). Their ethical  
responsibil i ty  is clearly primarily to the pa t ie n t /c l ie n t ,  as 
expressed in the United  Kingdom Central Council Code 
(Appendix 1), and in the American Code of Ethics (Appendix 3).
The American Code of Ethics (Appendix 3) developed by 
the American Nurses Association^ in no way condones eth ica l ly  
p a s s i v e  b e h a v i o u r ,  and suggests " t h e  n u r s e  assumes  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  n u r s in g  
judgements and act ions"  (American Code of Ethics 1976: Item
4) .  Because these codes have some legal significance the nurses 
who d i re c t ly  or indirectly  subscribe to these mind-sets ought to 
be questioning the appropriateness of these mind-sets for nurses 
and nursing. However, both these Codes would f i r s t  have to 
accept the legitimacy of Aroskar's (1982) theory of mind-sets.
Both the Brit ish and American Codes demand excellence 
in the c ra f t ,  or at least i ts  pursuits, and both suggest that 
"a p ro fess ion  must subject i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  to c r i t i c a l  analys is
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and modify these a c t i v i t i e s  in the l i g h t  o f  ana lys is"  (Rule 
1978: 5).  This is emphasised by Rule (1978) who believes that:
" A l l  o f  us, who wish to act r i g h t l y ,  are 
a l a r m i n g l y  v u l ne r ab l e  unl ess we g i ve  
thought  to  f i n d i n g  out what i t  is  we 
should be doing and committing ourselves  
to performing i t "
(Rule 1978: 6)
The fourth mind-set according to Aroskar (1982: 24, 
28-29) is viewed as the co-operative promotion of well-being.  
This view asserts tha t  decision-making is in teractive and 
respects the values and incorporates the view of a ll  members of 
the heal th care transaction in maximising the individual's
optimum health status, rather than the means to the ends of 
others, as in the f i r s t  three mind-sets. This mind-set does 
however raise questions in regard to what constitutes ethical
nursing practice. For example, are nurses required to be 
accountable and responsible for enabling active part ic ipation in 
decisions in the ir  health care? Aroskar (1982) suggests that 
any or a ll  of the elements of such mind-sets can be found in the 
process of decision-making for nurses at any time, given the 
transient or constantly changing nature of the ir  jobs.
The ways nurses identify or not, in terpret and judge
e th ic a l  issues and dilemmas in the c l in ica l  and community 
setting has implications for each of the four mind-sets. In
other words, depending on the nurse's view of what ethics is ,  
and how these ethical issues are interpreted may influence th e ir
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perceptions or mind-sets of health care. For example, i f  the 
nurse's view of  ethics equated wi th a n o n -p a te rn a l is t ic  
att i tude,  that is that the nurse ought not to act on behalf of,  
or make decisions for pat ients/clients without consulting them, 
then an ethical issue such as deciding whether to prolong l i f e  
may cause the nurse to believe that the fourth mind-set (page 
56) is an appropriate perception of health care to have. I t  is 
arguable that the f i r s t  three mind-sets in which nurses defer to 
the goals of the inst i tut ion and doctors that they may not be 
acting e th ica l ly ,  as individuals are used as means to the ends 
of others.
The claim of nursing as a moral art wi l l  now be
discussed, and sub-headings wi l l  be used for convenience.
(c) The moral art  and perspective of Nursing
The main characteristics of the moral art  of nursing 
w i l l  be exami ned more f u l l y  to a s c e r t a i n  i f  these
characterist ics could effect how ethical principles are applied, 
and how ethical decisions are made in the c l in ica l  and community 
setting.
The claim has been made by Englehardt and Spicker
(1975 : 101); Englehardt and Callahan (1976: xiv) ;  and Cassell 
( 1978 :  91,  99)  t h a t  medi ci ne is " i n h e r e n t l y  a moral
p ro fess ion "  on the grounds that the claim to be a profession 
involves the claim to be the guardian of certain values. Curtin 
and Flaherty (1982: 86, 95) contend that this claim can be made,
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and val id ly  so by nursing, on the grounds that the end or 
purpose of nursing is the well-being of other people, and this  
end is a moral one as i t  involves inter-personal relationships 
and the seeking of good with other individuals. This def in it ion  
of a moral art  can also apply to other professions such as 
p o l i t i c s  and economics. However, nursing is part icu lar ly  
concerned with the well-being of the individual to do what is
technically right  and ethically  right, and these rights can
often conf l ic t .  The application of this knowledge and sk i l l  
comprise the art of nursing. Therefore, nursing is both a moral 
art  and can be viewed from an ethical perspective. In other 
words, because nursing comprises three essential domains, that
is , the cognitive/knowledge domain, the a f fec t ive /a t t i tu d in a l  
domain, and the e f fe c t iv e /s k i l ls  domain (Figure 2b) which are
specific to nursing, then nursing can therefore be viewed as a 
moral a r t  with sc ient i f ic  and technological aspects. This 
ethical perspective has been emphasised in the English National 
Board^ (ENB 1 9 8 5 / 1 9 / ERDB) po l icy  document which states  
e x p l ic i t ly  the need for ethics education and practice in the 
curriculum, and this has been strongly advocated for by the 
author in an unpublished Masters Degree (MSc) dissertation  
(Rodmell 1985).
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AFFECTIVE
DOMAIN
ATTITUDES
*Nursing
*Man as an individual 
and the ir  reaction to 
health, i l lness,  care 
in hospital or community\ 
environment \
*Nurses' perceptions of 
health care
PRACTICE
EFFECTIVE
DOMAIN
NURSING GOALS
Congruence with 
pat ient /c l ient  
goals in preven­
t ion,  health, 
education, curing 
and caring 
Protect ion of nurses 
rights
COGNITIVE DOMAIN
PHILOSOPHY
*Knowledge base required to 
practice e f fect ive ly  and
competently
Figure 2b: The essential domains in Nursing,
Adapted from D.Rei l ly ,  ed.,
Teaching and evaluating the 
affective domain in Nursing Programs, 
New Jersey: Charles B. Slack, 1978.
Nursing as a moral ar t ,  requires the special s k i l ls  of 
caring and commitment for and to other individuals. This moral 
art  claim, raises the question: what does a nurse practit ioner  
have to do to practice this moral art? The answer to the 
question would entail  detailed explanations about the character, 
behaviour, role, and the promises inherent in this discipline of 
nursing, and clearly  these are essential for an appropriate 
nursing model.
Nursing as a moral art also embodies the notion that 
e t h i c a l  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  j u s t i c e ,  p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  autonomy, 
non-maleficence and beneficence are an integral part of the 
nature and purpose of nursing. As in any art  then due attention 
may be paid to the selection and the arrangement of these 
p r i n c i p l e s  so that  they may be u t i l i s e d  e f f e c t i v e l y  or 
operationally. These principles wi l l  be discussed in detail  in 
Chapter Three.
In addition, an awareness of the goal to be achieved as 
far  as the ethical requirements are concerned is needed by the
nurse, and this achievement may require following a Code of
Ethics. However, blind obedience to a Code of Ethics is not
morally acceptable, at the expense of the moral obligation to the
p a t ie n t /c l ie n t .  An ethical act must be done for i ts  own sake. 
As a case in point, i f  the nurse respects the p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  
r ights, and fa c i l i ta te s  these rights, such as in a request from a 
p a t ie n t /c l ie n t  to be allowed to die, then the nurse is at r isk  of 
violating the Code of Nursing Ethics (ICN 1973). The Code of
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Nursing E th ic s  (ICN 1973)^ states tha t  nurses "have a 
fundamenta l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  promot ing h ea l t h", and on the 
strength of th is  the nurse may refuse to comply with the 
p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  request. Three notions arise out of this  
c o n f l i c t  fo r  the nurse and the p a t i e n t / c l i e n t .  F i rs t ly ,  
p at ien t /c l ien t  "autonomy" is not recognised i f  the request is 
refused; secondly, great unhappiness could be created for the 
pat ien t /c l ien t ;  and th i rd ly ,  the pat ient /c l ient  has been treated 
as a means to an end. However, the nurse has carried out the 
obligation to the Code, but the obligation to the pat ien t /c l ien t  
may be forgotten. The dilemma for the nurse is two-fold: 
f i r s t l y ,  non-adherence to the ICN Code (ICN 1973) or the UKCC 
Code (Appendix 1) could be of legal significance in that nurses 
who do not adhere may be disciplined; and, secondly, the possible 
forgotten obligation to the pat ient /c l ient  may challenge the 
n o t io n  o f  nurs ing  being a moral a r t  as the notion of  
obligation/duty is implic it  in ethical principles. I t  is also 
interesting to note that nurses automatically obey the Code of 
Nursing Ethics, yet do not use nursing models appropriately.  
This may be due to the fact that disciplinary procedures could 
result  from a violation of the Code.
Another requirement of this moral art  is for the nurse 
to be an expert at casuistry, that is,  the application of 
accepted ethical principles to specific circumstances in which 
e t h ic a l  p r in c ip le s  c o n f l i c t  (G i l lo n  1986:19) .  Casuistry
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embodies some ethics education, and would be essential i f  nurses 
are to be members of Ethical Committees, and to be as objective 
in ethical decision-making as the subject matter allows. To 
date, nurses do not undergo this experience at a c l in ica l  
leve l .  What e f fect ive ly  demonstrates the ethical conf l ic t  that 
nurses face is that the existence of the Code of Nursing Ethics 
(ICN 1973) may bring about the recognition that i f  nurses t ry  to 
set out a Code of Practice then some of the principles used may 
sometimes be in confl ic t .  One of the things nurse education 
is/ought to be concerned with is how to give the nurse the 
s k i l ls  to cope with such a situation. The nurse needs to know 
how to weigh arguments produced in the application of certain  
principles and how eventually to make a decision between the 
diferent principles and arguments. I t  has been seen (page 60) 
that i t  is possible for a Code of Ethics, because of i ts  fa i lu re  
to address certain issues, to lead to a conf l ic t  s ituation.  The 
point is that nurses need to understand that to make an ethical  
decision requires being responsible for that decision, and not 
following Codes bl indly. An ethical Code should provide a 
framework for ethical decision-making rather than be a hand-book 
of rules.
The bases of the ethical perspective of nursing are now
examined.
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( i ) Varying interpretations of caring as a basis of the
moral ar t  and perspective of nursing
The concept of caring in nursing emphasises at least 
two components, those related to medical diagnosis, and not
w i th in  the scope of this discussion, and those related to
meeting the needs of patients/c l ients as individuals.
The understanding of what i t  is to care is of  
importance as i t  is central to the conduct of the moral l ives of 
individuals. Five main concepts of caring (Figure 2c) emerge 
when defin itions of caring are examined. F i rs t ly ,  there appears 
to be an ac t iv i t ie s  aspect (Figure 2c [1 ] ) ,  whereby caring is
expressed in terms of assisting, helping, and serving. However, 
the study done by Morrison (1988: 51) with a sample of
twenty-f ive (25) experienced male and female charge nurses, 
u t i l i s i n g  content analysis of two hundred (200) constructs,
demonstrates tha t  caring as an inter-personal process is
emphasised, with very few constructs relat ing to the physical 
aspects of caring. The sample in this study may be too small to 
generalise conclusions for practice, but i t  does give some 
indication that the concept of caring does appear to contain a 
physical aspect.
Secondly, there appears to be an ethical base for
caring (Figure 2c [ 2 ] ) .  Rogers (1982: 39-58) and Mayeroff 
(1971: 13-28) have outlined some characteristics of a caring
r e la t io n s h ip  such as respect fo r  in d iv id u a ls ,  knowledge, 
patience, humility, hope, courage, honesty, freedom, trust  and
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1. EFFECTIVE 
DOMAIN
2. COGNITIVE 
DOMAIN
3. AFFECTIVE 
DOMAIN
(Sk i l ls )
V
Act iv i t ies  Aspect 
-assisting  
-helpi ng 
-serving
(Know edge)
V
Ethical dimension 
- trust
-respect for 
individuals 
-honesty 
-freedom
Y
(Attitudes)
V
a)Protective  
Compassion/Empathy
b) Long term emotional 
state
c) Caring as a value
Figure 2c : Interpretations of Caring in relation
to the essential domains of nursing
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compassion and th is  seems to be the ethical dimension of
car ing .  These are comparable to the Principles of Ethics
advocated by Thiroux (1986: 124-137) which embodies the value of 
l i f e ,  goodness or rightness, just ice or fairness, t ru th te l l ing  
or honesty, and individual freedom. These principles, which 
w i l l  be discussed la te r  in de ta i l ,  may be applied to the 
individuals daily  l i f e ,  as they provide direction for what the 
individual "ought" to do.
Th ird ly ,  caring is interpreted as the attitudes or 
feelings underlying these a c t iv i t ie s ,  expressed as protective, 
compassionate or empathic (Figure 2c [3a]) .
Fourthly, caring may also be viewed (Figure 2c [3b]) as
a long term emotional state, as opposed to a temporary state of
an emotion, and may afford individuals such as nurses the 
opportunity of portraying the ir  a l t r u is t ic  qual i t ies .  This 
caring involves a personal commitment by the nurse, which is in 
addition to the caring requirement demanded in a professional 
contract. This caring is in response to the bio-psychosocial 
needs c r e a te d  by the p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  on the basis tha t
" human i t y "  (Curt in  and Flaherty  1982: 87) is the common
factor.
All these caring views appear to complement each other
as they a l l  embody knowledge, s k i l ls ,  att itude, and ethics.
I f  nursing is to emerge as an academic "profession" 
with s c ie n t i f ic ,  technological and ethical perspectives, then 
the basis of caring ought to become one of active partnership
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(page 28). This active partnership is demonstrated by nurses
who are already using the Nursing Process (page 37), in which 
the health care r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  are shared by nurse and 
p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  by f a c i l i t a t i n g  decision-making by the
pa t ie n t /c l ie n t .  In order to achieve the potential in this
relationship the nurse is required to provide information, and 
encourage pat ients /c l ients  to assume the responsibil i ty  for  
the ir  own health status, either by fa c i l i ta t in g  them to make
informed decisions about the ir  health, or, with the aid of the ir
appointed advocate or trustee, to arrive at decisions in the ir
own "best interests". This may be achieved by u t i l is in g  an 
e th ic a l  model which incorporates e th ica l  pr incip les  with
guidelines for practice.
Thus c a r in g  in t h i s  t h e s is  is  taken to  mean
" a t t r i b u t e s  which embody the c h ar ac te r i s t i e s  o f  knowledge, 
p a t i e n c e , h o n e s t y , t r u s t , h u m i l i t y ,  hope and courage"  
(Tschudin 1986: 17-18) .  This caring concept implies that
a s s i s t i n g  p a t i e n t s / c l i e n t s  in such a manner requires  
" e m p a t h e t i  c , s u p p o r t i v e ,  c o m p a s s i o n a t e ,  p r o t e c t i v e ,  
s u c c o u r a n t , e d u c a t i o n a l " behavioural a t t r ibu tes  (Leininger 
1984: 4).
The f i f t h  concept of caring (Figure 2c [3c]) is now
examined.
Caring as a value
Ethical dilemmas arise for the nurse when technical 
developments occur, such as the use of l i fe-support  machines,
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when the principles of ethics which have to be taken into 
account when arriving at ethical decisions conf l ic t ,  or when 
ethical principles are valued d i f fe re n t ly  by other individuals. 
Value  in t h i s  t h e s is  is  taken to mean "an a f f e c t i v e  
d i s p o s i t i o n  towards a person, o b j ec t , or  idea and i s  expressed 
t h rough b e h a v i o u r s , f e e l i n g s , i m a g i n a t i o n , knowledge and 
a c t i o n s "  (S tee le  and Harmon 1983:1). This interpretation  
implies that values are personal beliefs and attitudes which are 
put in to  ac t ion ,  and are i n t r i n s i c a l l y  or e x t r i n s i c a l l y  
desirable and rated highly or valued by the individual.
Thus, values guide individual action, that is,  they 
deal w i th  modes of  conduct ,  and once e x terna l ised  or 
internalised may become a standard or cr i ter ion for guiding 
ac t ion .  Arguably, the nurse who makes a decision in a 
part icu lar  situation may well apply these values in a d i f ferent  
s i tu a t io n  which may or may not be appropriate to the new 
situation.
Caring may be seen as a value (Figure 2c [3c ] ) ,  based 
on the def in i t ion above, part ly based on emotion, and not an 
inst inct ive  qual ity , then by i ts  very nature nurses may or may 
not have chosen the nursing discipline to act out th e ir  beliefs  
about caring. Thus, each nurse wi l l  express caring d i f fe re n t ly ,  
according to, or based on, the moral values and beliefs that are 
held and therefore the standards which arise are re la t ive  in 
nature. Bel ie f  in this thesis is taken to mean "a special  
k ind o f  a t t i t u d e  which i s  based more on f a i t h  than on f a c t "  
(Steele and Harmon 1983:3).
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Values are interpreted d i f fe rent ly  by each person, and 
though they may be shared by others, individuals may d i f fe r  in 
how they apply them. As a case in point, two nurses may both 
value the sanctity of l i f e ,  but they may both be in confl ic t  i f  
they were placed in a situation in aiding to make a decision of 
removing a patient from a l ife-support machine. I t  is the case 
that the facts or knowledge about a particular situation are 
independent of the values that wi l l  be manifested. The nurse 
cannot derive morals from facts but ethical standards can give 
certain facts meaning. For example, i f  a judgement is to be 
made about a situation then i t  has to be viewed in a d ist inct  
way and then standards are applied to the dist inct  point of view 
to give i t  meaning. As a case in point, a nurse carrying out a 
procedure/treatment may harm the patient in so doing. Viewed 
from a technical point of view the sk i l l  and expertise with 
which the procedure/treatment is performed may be considered 
e f f i c i e n t  and the nurse seen as te c h n ic a l ly  p r o f ic ie n t .  
However, viewed from an ethical point of view, the proficiency  
of the nurse becomes irrelevant, and the harm caused the patient  
becomes another point of view to which di f ferent  standards are 
applied. From an ethical point of view because the nurse fa i led  
to follow an appropriate Code of Conduct, the nurse may be seen 
as acting unethically.
Nurses accept the responsibil i ty of caring and the 
extent to which they accept this responsibil i ty depends on the ir  
philosophy, that is,  the ir  personal values, ideals and beliefs
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about the nature of man and nursing. This philosophy wi l l  be 
reflected in the care the nurse delivers.
Thus, i t  appears tha t  e th ic a l  standards may be 
based on emotion and are re la t ive  to the situat ion.  However, a 
conscious attempt may be made to in te l lec tua l ise  the situat ion,  
to move from this emotive stance by not basing actions on 
emotions but on rational rigorous debate and in universalising 
standards (page 43) .  The pract ical  problem in universal 
standards is that the application of appropriate standards in 
each situation is d i f f i c u l t .
I t  is important to subtantiate the claim that ethics is 
not based on emotion. I f  ethics, as a form of knowledge, 
comprises personal beliefs and is not based on reasoning, then 
arguably Ethical Committees are simply making decisions which 
are prejudicial and not within the "best interests" of the 
p a t ie n t /c l ie n t .  However, individuals who do not live/conform to 
the conventional ethical beliefs are s t i l l  l iv ing according to 
ethical standards provided they can defend and ju s t i fy  what they 
do, but a ju s t i f ic a t io n  must not be in the ir  own s e l f - in te re s t .
The author there fo re  argues that ethical decision 
making must be ob jec t ive  and may be reached by c r i t ic a l  
re f le c t ive  argument/debate and reason. An attempt must be made 
to universalise or go beyond personal interests, l ikes and 
disl ikes (Singer 1982: 10,11).
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This does not imply that a part icular decision must be 
appl ied u n iv e r s a l ly ,  but tha t  in making decisions in the 
interests of pa t ien t /c l ien t ,  or nurse, that the decision-maker 
goes beyond the ir  personal beliefs and preferences and assumes 
the role of impartial spectator. The ethical nurse is rea l ly  
making the claim that in the present circumstances the action 
taken is the r ight one. This is making a universal claim, but 
this claim is open to crit ic ism and argument. The claim is put 
into the public arena and in that sense ob ject iv i ty  may be 
achieved as i t  opens the claim to assessment and judgement by 
others.
I f  e thics education is to take place, and to be 
included in nursing curriculae, then individuals are required to 
recognise basic rules and p ra c t ic es ,  and that these, in 
p r in c i p le ,  should be u n iv e rs a l ly  recognised. Otherwise, 
education becomes the inculcation of prejudices and therefore 
indoctrination.
A number of modern philosophers (Ayer 1949; Stevenson 
1937), argue that moral statements such as " k i l l in g  is wrong", 
are expressions of the individuals feelings or attitudes towards 
that a c t iv i ty .  Moral statements merely refer  to emotions and 
fe e l in g s  and are not in the domain of rational argument. 
However, i t  is also true that moral statements often do refer  to 
feelings, and in this sense morality can only be re la t ive .
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The author wishes to argue that there is a distinct ion  
between m o ra l i ty  and ethics. Ethical statements evaluate, 
instruct,  recommend, prescribe and advise, but in doing this a
claim is also being made that they are ra t iona l ly  ju s t i f ie d  or
j u s t i f i a b l e ,  which expressions of emotion cannot be. The 
question arises as to how they can be ju s t i f ia b le .
In making ethical statements individuals are attempting 
to ensure that the same conclusions wi l l  be reached by other 
individuals, i f  viewed from an ethical point of view. For
example, "I believe k i l l in g  is wrong because " Thus,
react ions and reasons are placed in the public arena, and 
claiming that others should agree with the claim. Therefore a 
universal claim is being made which must be examined and 
cr i t ised  by other people. I t  is here the autonomy of the moral 
agent is seen, as the moral agent has to assume the ethical  
point of view and agree with others who do the same, whilst
retaining individual judgement. Thus, individuals are acting on 
principle and are wi l l ing  to universalise the ir  principles. In 
so doing individuals are considering the good of everyone and
acting object ively.
( i i )  Commitment as a basis of the moral art  and
perspective of nursing
One of  the most d ist inct ive characteristics of the 
nursing discipline is the commitment to the bio-psychosocial 
concerns of  p a t i e n t s / c l i e n t s ,  and this requires a service 
orientat ion, the principles of which are embodied in the Code of
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Professional Conduct (Appendix 1) for the discipline. However, 
commitment does not necessarily create a good nurse, i t  may only 
create a passionate one. The philosophy of care in nursing 
incorporates a set of ideals, such as active part icipation of 
pat ients/c l ients  in the ir  health care, and nurses may, or may 
not, have expectations to exemplify these ideals dependent on 
the ir  degree of commitment. Arguably, this commitment may not 
necessarily reduce disease or prevent dying, but i t  w i l l  go some 
way to affecting the quality of l i f e  for the p a t ien t /c l ien t .
Downie and Caiman (1987: 190) believe that the concept 
of the qual ity  of l i f e  changes with time and is related to all  
aspects of l i f e ,  and they see the process of achieving a good 
q u a l i t y  of  l i f e  as " na r row i ng  the gap between hopes and 
r e a l i t y " .  This implies that personal growth is v i ta l  to 
achieve a good quali ty of l i f e .
Conversely, the philosophy of the discipline is not 
fol lowed i f  there is the lack of moral commitment as the 
declared promises, that is,  the "per format i ve d e c l a r a t i ons" 
(Curtin and Flaherty 1982: 98) inherent in a Code of Ethics is 
not f u l f i l l e d ,  and thus the discipl ine may be discredited. The 
l icence to practice presupposes an obligation to practice well 
(Curtin and Flaherty 1982: 99) and to practice or nurse well 
requires commitment, though commitment does not guarantee good 
nursing. This obligation to practice or nurse well is based on 
a commitment to nursing as a discipline, to certain ethical 
standards, and to acting in an ethical way. Conceivably, they 
may a l l  con f l ic t .
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Thus, nurses are required to develop a pro-active, 
rather than a reactive, approach to ethics, and this logical ly  
e n t a i l s  a commitment to the declared promises professed by 
nurses, the c r i t e r i a  of which are based on humanitarian grounds, 
and the f i d e l i t y  to keep those promises. Without f i d e l i t y  there 
is no trust and without trust the nurse cannot practice this  
moral ar t .
Clearly then, the ethical principles which are subsumed 
in the nursing discipl ine and implic it  in a Code of Ethics are 
based on the concept of human rights and the duties applicable 
to those rights; on the nurses' obligation to promote public 
welfare, that is,  the responsibil ity for the service rendered to 
the public; and, to promote excellence amongst colleagues. I f  
nurses make this moral commitment then according to Levine 
(1977):
" The q u a l i t y  o f  the moral commitment 
i s  a measure o f  the nurses'  excel lence"
(Levine 1977: 845)
Just how Levine (1977: 845) proposes to measure the 
n u r s e s '  commitment and the r e s u l t i n g  e x c e l le n c e  is  
problematical, and as mentioned previously (page 72), the nurse 
could be completely committed and perform poorly as a nurse.
Ethical behaviour is not a display of behaviour in 
times of c r is is ,  such as l i f e  or death, but a daily  expression 
of the nurses' commitment to caring for pat ients/c l ients  and
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respecting the ir  rights. I t  is to these rights the author now 
turns.
(d) Human rights
The claim has already been made (page 33) that there 
are c e r ta in  r igh ts  which may be respected by nurses and 
p a t i e n t s / c l i e n t s .  Rights are moral claims which ent i t les
individuals to be treated in a certain way, and may or may not 
be protected by law. That is, they may be ethical and/or 
legal .  They may be viewed as positive rights or negative 
r ights, and may or may not require action from others.
The author wishes to examine the notions of moral
r ig h t s ,  and more s p e c i f ic a l l y  fundamental/basic rights,  or 
general/universal rights.
Fundamental human rights are rights which individuals  
claim from a moral point of view. They are moral precepts, and 
in claiming them individuals are arguing that even i f  actual 
states do not legis la te  them into effect  then they ought to, or
at least they should not contravene them. This is therefore 
tantamount to a hope that c iv i l ised societies w i l l  recognise 
such r ights, and in declaring this hope, i t  is argued that these 
rights are not just  subjective beliefs or prejudices, but are 
objective and claim universal v a l id i ty .
Fundamental human rights arise from essential human
needs and the a b i l i t y  to perceive these needs, though not a ll  
human needs translate into human rights. Fundamental rights are
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not dependent on some other moral r ight,  that is ,  they are 
in t r ins ic  entit lements.
These fundamental human rights need to be recognised 
and taken into account in nursing pratice. The existence of 
these human r igh ts  cannot be realised simply by examining 
legis lat ion and universal declarations, as such investigations 
wi l l  only reveal the positive rights part icular individuals have 
in a s pec i f ied  s ta te .  Pos i t ive  rights are those rights  
which are given to people by the law, and which are posit ively  
enacted by the legitimate authority.
General or universal r igh ts  which is often used 
interchangeably in the l i te ra tu re  with fundamental r ights, are 
those rights such as the right to l i f e  or l ib e r ty  which are 
unconditional, may or may not be restr icted in scope and based 
simply on the individual being a person. They are unconditional 
in that they are attributable or apply to everyone, and may or 
may not impose obligation or duties between the individual who 
has the r ight and those who have the corresponding obligation to 
respect that r ight (Benjamin and Curtis 1986: 158; Gi l l  on 1986: 
56 ) .  G i l lo n  (1986) argues that though i t  is clear that 
g e n e ra l /u n iv e rs a l  r igh ts  may impose a moral obligation on 
everyone to refrain  from certain acts, i t  is debatable whether 
they impose moral obligations on everyone to act, and is not 
persuaded that these rights require anyone to act. As a case in 
point, an individual's  right to l i f e  may impose a duty on one 
individual not to k i l l  another individual, but not necessarily 
to save them.
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Because some individuals have a special relationship,  
further rights may emerge and these may be considered as special 
or reciprocal rights as is inherent in the special relationship 
between nurse and pat ient /c l ient .  I t  may be argued that the 
relation between society and nursing is such that a duty of 
indebtedness does occur. In other words, as nursing is in 
concept a social contract (page 41), and patients/c l ients  are 
"party" to that contract, then duty is part of that social 
contract, and nursing care is part of that duty. Society has a 
r ight to nursing care, or at the very least society may claim a 
r ight to that care on the grounds that nurses have an obligation  
to f u l f i l  that care as part of the ir  duty. However, this is not 
always so. Formalising rights in order to protect individuals 
is an attempt to make a claim or demand on other individuals 
which may then be enforced by law. But moral rights do not 
become law unless the legitimate authority enacts them.
Special moral or reciprocal rights are conditional,  
l imited in scope and grounded in special relationships, such as 
the r ight  to the repayment of a debt, or the keeping of a 
promise, or those rights arising from social relationships, as 
in the rights of children to be cared for by the ir  parents. 
These rights are conditional in that they are l imited to the 
individuals concerned, and they depend on the nature of the 
special relationship between the individuals concerned (Benjamin 
and Curtis 1986: 158; Gillon 1986: 57). I t  has been argued by 
Hart (1970: 61-75) that the whole network of our sociopoli t ical
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relationships is a source of special rights of which legal and 
inst i tut ional  rights are examples. Both of these examples refer  
to rights that may be created and abolished by decisions made by 
the appropriate people such as parliament (Gillon 1985a: 1890) 
or the legitimate authority (Dworkin 1979: 40 cit ing Hart) .
U t i l i ta r ia n s  or consequentialists view the concept of
rights as a "convenient f i c t i o n , general  acceptance o f  which
w i l l  tend to maximise w e l f a r e  and i s  t h e r e f o r e  m o r a l l y
j u s t i f i e d "  (Gillon 1985a: 1890; Gillon 1986: 56). Arguably, 
how can u t i l i t a r i a n s  j u s t i f y  r i g h t s  when they are a
" convenient  f i c t i o n "  and so do not exist .  Non-ut i l i tar ian  
opponents of rights such as non-consequentialists however, tend 
to accept the moral obligations that human rights e n ta i l ,  but 
deny the need to debate them, on the grounds that the "dut i es
are s u f f i c i e n t  on t h e i r  own " and tha t  "emphasis on
r i g h t s  tends to encourage people to pursue moral demands on 
t h e i r  own beha l f  at the cost o f  neglect ing t h e i r  moral du t i es "  
(Gil lon 1985a: 1890; 1986: 56). Conceivably, i f  an individual 
does not have a r ight ,  then they cannot have a duty.
SUMMARY
This Chapter sought to examine some of the issues which 
may be considered in enabling the application of ethical 
principles and which may have to be included when developing an 
ethical model for nursing practice.
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I t  demonstrated that nursing knowledge involves ethical  
knowledge as i t  f a c i l i ta te s  nursing as a moral ar t ,  but i t  is 
d i f f i c u l t  to establish the parameters for practice. The nurses' 
perceptions of health care varies according to the context in 
which nursing is being practised, and as nursing practice 
c l e a r l y  has a e th ic a l  perspective may incorporate ethical 
principles such as rights, and these rights were examined.
In the next chapter the ethical principles which may be 
relevant to nursing practice wi l l  be examined to highlight the 
dilemmas which present for nurse and pat ient /c l ient  a l ike.
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ENDNOTES (Chapter Two)
1 The United Kingdom Central Council (UKCC) for Nursing,
Midwifery and Health Vis it ing was set up in 1980 as a result of 
the passing of the Nurses, Midwives and Health Visitors Act of 
1979. The principle function of the UKCC is to establish and
improve standards of training and professional conduct for  
nurses, midwives and health v is i tors .  The UKCC comprises 
f o r t y - f i v e  (45) members including the chair-person. Twenty 
eight (28) members are nominated by the National Boards of
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; and seventeen 
(17) members are appointed by the Secretary of State, Department 
of Health and Social Security (DHSS).
2 The American Nurses' Association (ANA) based in
Missouri, is the professional association for registered nurses 
in the United States.  Organized in 1896 as the Nurses' 
Association Alumnae of the United States, ANA is a federation of
constituent nurses' associations in each of the 50 states and in
the D i s t r i c t  of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin  Islands. 
Membership in constituent state nurses' associations is open to 
any individual licensed to practice as a registered nurse, 
u n re s t r ic te d  by consideration of nationali ty , race, creed, 
l i f e s t y le ,  colour, sex or age.
The purposes of ANA are to work for the improvement of 
health standards and the a v a i la b i l i ty  of health care services 
for a l l  people, to foster high standards of nursing, and to 
stimulate and promote the professional development of nurses and 
advance the ir  economic and general welfare.
ANA establishes a code of ethics for nurses and speaks 
for nursing with other health care organizations, governmental 
bodies, and the public. ANA also represents American nurses in 
i n te r n a t io n a l  nursing matters as the U.S. member of the 
International Council of Nurses.
The governing body of ANA is the House of Delegates, 
which is composed of representatives of each of the constituent 
s ta te  nurses' associations. The House of Delegates meets 
annually. In the intervals between meetings of the house, the 
association is governed by the Board of Directors, the corporate 
body, composed of off icers and directors elected by the House of 
Delegates. Accountable to the Board are cabinets and councils. 
The association is administered by an executive director and a 
professional  s t a f f ,  which manages and executes association 
programs and operations.
3 The English National Board (ENB) is one of four 
National Boards, one for each nation in the United Kingdom which 
was established under the United Kingdom Central Council (UKCC) 
as a result  of the Nurses, Midwives and Health Visitors Act 
(1979 ) .  The fo r ty - f iv e  members of the ENB hold executive
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functions in transmitting the UKCC policies into action. Twenty 
(20) of these ENB off icers are nurses, f ive (5) midwives and 
f ive  (5) health v is i tors ,  p a r t ia l ly  elected by Registered Nurses 
in England and f i f t e e n  (15) are Minister ial  appointments. 
Eventually a ll  English off icers w i l l  be appointed by election by 
a l l  Registered Nurses, such as Nurses, Midwives and Health 
Visitors  of England.
4 The International Council of Nurses (ICN), founded in
1899, is a federation of national nurses associations which 
includes Bri ta in, with a current membership of over eighty-seven 
countries in 1988 representing close to a mill ion nurses. The 
organisation provides a medium through which members can share 
the ir  common interests in nursing; serves as the authori tat ive  
voice in that i t  acts as a pressure group for nurses and nursing 
in ternat ionally;  and has consultative and o f f ic ia l  relationships 
with organisations such as World Health Organisation (WHO); the 
Economic and Social Council which l ia ises with the United 
Nations; the In te rn a t io n a l  Labour Organisation ( ILO); the 
International Hospital Federation; the Council of Europe; the 
Red Cross; United Nations International Children's Emergency 
Fund (UNICEF); and the United Nations Educational, Sc ient i f ic  
and Cultural Organisations (UNESCO).
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C H A P T E R  T H R E E
"To e n j o y  y o u r s e l f  and make o t he rs  
e n j o y  t h e m s e l v e s ,  w i t h o u t  h a r m i n g  
y ou rs e l f  or  any other ;  that ,  to my mind, 
i s  the whole o f  eth ics"
Chamfort, /
Maximes et pensees, 
1805.
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C H A P  T E R T H R E E
INTRODUCTION
Ethical pr inc ip les  and rules are applicable to all  
nurses and the ac t iv i ty  of nursing, as nursing is, in part, 
concerned with relationships between people. From an ethical  
point of view questions about "autonomy", l ibe r ty  of individuals, 
honesty, just ice and equality arise, and are part of the concern 
of nurses as fa c i l i ta to rs  of "autonomy" and acting as advocates 
or trustees for patients/clients and their  rights.
This chapter w i l l  examine the e th ica l  p r in c ip le s
concerned with the rights of patients/clients and nurses and 
present some examples of the ethical dilemmas which arise, in 
order to see what specific ethical principles inherent in these
dilemmas need to be taken into account for the development of an
ethical model for nursing practice. The notion of paternalism 
related to nursing practice wi l l  also be discussed, as how nurses 
apply ethical principles may be influenced by the attitudes of 
nurses to pat ients/c l ients.
In  t h i s  t h e s i s  d i lemm a is  t a k e n  to  mean a
" s i t u a t i o n  req u i r i ng  a choice between what seem to be equal l y  
d e s i r a b l e  o r  u n d e s i r a b l e  a l t e r na t i ves "  (Benjamin and Curtis 
1986:4). Not every ethical problem is a dilemma. I f  the choice 
is between what the individual "ought" to do, and what the
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individual wants, then this constitutes a problem for which an 
answer exists. However, in a dilemma any action taken may 
result in an unfavourable outcome and/or may constitute a breach 
of an individual's  duty to another.
The author now examines some of the confl icts which 
arise when ethical principles are applied, and the resulting  
ethical dilemmas that confront nurses and patients/c l ients in 
the c l in ica l  and community setting.
- 83 -
CONFLICTING ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND THE RESULTING
ETHICAL DILEMMAS FACED BY NURSES.
(a) The Principle of the value of, or r ight to l i f e  (the
Sanctity of Life)
The ethical dilemma that arises for the nurse and 
pat ien t /c l ien t  alike is what ethical principles are acceptable, 
and how they may be applied, when issues of the sanctity of l i f e  
arise.
Most known systems of morality such as Judeo-Christian 
ethics, Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam, profess to have a doctrine 
against k i l l in g ,  or a doctrine for preserving l i f e ,  or valuing 
l i f e ,  or a r ig h t  to l i f e *  and th is  is deemed the most 
important principle on the grounds that i f  there is no l i f e  then 
there is no morality or ethics.
The p r in c ip le  seems relevant when the dilemmas of 
abort ion ,  euthanasia,  and suicide are examined, and such 
dilemmas are also a main concern for nurses.
There are clearly two arguments which may be advanced 
fo r  according th is  s ign if icance to human l i f e .  F i rs t ly ,
according to Downie and Telfer (1980: 42) the individual wants 
to stay a l ive,  even i f  the ir  l ives are not threatened, as in
order to pursue the ir  ideals, l i f e  is a necessary condition.
This f i r s t  argument in the sanctity of l i f e  debate is
based on the presumed or actual wish for l i f e ,  and permits 
euthanasia and abortion of those who "have or  w i l l  have a l i f e
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so wretched that  they want to end i t ,  and o f  those who are 
unable and w i l l  never be able to have any wants c o n s t i t u t i n g  
d e s i r e  f o r  or  enjoyment o f  l i f e "  (Downie and Telfer  1980:
48). I t  may be argued that to ju s t i fy  euthanasia on these 
grounds is d i f f i c u l t  though some doctors do support euthanasia 
on the grounds of omission, that is, le t t ing  die or le t t ing  
events take the ir  course. This is evidenced by the many cases 
where doctors and nurses omit to resuscitate or t reat  the
elderly , in inoperable diseased patients, or patients/c l ients  
with malignant disease. However, to support or practice 
euthanasia or abortion, does not necessarily mean that i t  is 
condoned or always permissible, or is i t  moral, or ethical,  so 
to do. Though the motive and the results are the same in
omission and commission, to be discussed la te r ,  the decisions 
are not necessarily premeditated. The question arises as to 
whether these decisions should be premeditated. The moral
dist inction or difference seems to be that intervention does not 
appear to be wrong i f  intervention is beneficial to the family,  
but which cr i ter ion to adopt for act or omission must be l e f t  to 
individual moral judgement, and in this case for the health care 
team to decide in a rational way.
The second reason, according to Downie and Telfer  
(1980: 46) for an individuals right to l i f e  is the special worth 
or value in human l i f e ^  that is,  i ts  in tr ins ic  value, which is 
independent of the possessor wanting i t .  The obligation thus 
rests  on the possessor to cherish this r ight ,  and other
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individuals may not take this l i f e ,  even i f  the possessor wishes 
i t .
The second argument, based on the in tr ins ic  value of 
human l i f e ,  would permit euthanasia or abortion but only of 
sub-human, however that is defined, and a respect for human l i f e  
g e nera l ly  might modify th is  practice. Clearly there are 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  in deciding who defines sub-human l i f e ,  and who 
f a l ls  within the sub-human category.
Those who argue against k i l l in g  would assert that the 
principle of respecting people's desires to l ive  must take into 
consideration the ir  expected future wants, and desires. This 
would mean that the l ives of those "spec ia l " people, such as 
physically handicapped babies, ought to be respected as they 
wil l  in the future, i t  may be assumed, develop the normal desire 
to l iv e  with the capacity to want and form desires. I t  would be 
impossible to judge, therefore, whether these individuals, were 
they to survive the ir  i l lness or handicap, would have any regret 
about being a l ive,  and so their  right to l i f e  must be given 
every consideration, as all  individuals belong to the same 
spec ies  o f  homo sapiens and so must be g iven  equal 
consideration.
Clearly, just  as those "special" individuals then have 
a r ight  to l i f e ,  then other individuals have an obligation to 
give th a t  desire  "paramount importance" (Downie and Telfer  
1980: 45).
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However, the sanc t i ty  of l i f e  p r in c ip le  is not
incompatible with the quality of l i f e ,  and equal consideration 
in both principles are paramount in ethical dilemmas as these
concepts are not independent of each other. For example, 
p r o lo n g a t io n  o f  a p a t i e n t ' s / c l i e n t ' s  l i f e  without due
consideration for the quality of that l i f e  might " v io la te  the
i n t e g r i t y  o f  the person and the sa n c t i t y  o f  l i f e  p r i n c i p le "  
(Roach 1982: 31). For example, i f  a pat ient /c l ient  wishes to
terminate  t h e i r  l i f e  id e a l ly  the health professional in
respecting t h e i r  "autonomy" appears to be duty bound to
f a c i l i t a t e  this wish. However, the health professional is also 
bound by the moral imperative not to k i l l ,  and recognises the
need for increased care in these circumstances especially in 
cases such as the terminally i l l  or handicapped neonates who are 
unable to give the ir  consent. I t  is up to each nurse in the 
exercise of being accountable (UKCC 1984: 2) to have an
understanding of the reverence of l i f e  and the acceptance of 
death. I t  does not mean that no individual may ever be k i l le d ,  
or th a t  l i f e  must be preserved at any cost, or that an 
individual may never be allowed to die, commit suicide or have 
an abortion. I t  is the decision that is made on balance when 
a l l  the facts have been weighed in a rational manner in rigorous 
debate, as a ll  professed "doctr ines"  (page 84) allow k i l l in g  
under certain circumstances, though there are strong convictions 
held against k i l l in g  in general0 .
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What the nurse and health care team must ju s t i fy  is why 
the l i f e  w i l l  be terminated and whether on balance i t  is wrong 
to take that l i f e  without consent of the individuals concerned. 
Also consideration must be given to whether the nurse has the 
r ight  to interfere with their  death or the ir  wish to die.  
P la in ly ,  i f  nurses accept occasions when k i l l in g  is the 
" r i g h t "  thing to do, such as balancing good against harm in 
cases of  f a c i l i t a t i n g  death in emergency resuscitation, or 
u n t r e a te d  pneumonia in the te rm in a l ly  i l l  or severely  
handicapped, then this may undermine the ethical principles  
which protect the right to l i f e .  In rigorous discussion the 
nurse may need to question the difference between k i l l in g  
deliberately , that is active euthanasia, and le t t ing  death take 
i ts  course, that is passive euthanasia.
From the type of arguments presented i t  would seem that 
in preserving l i f e  there is a fu l l  range of options. These 
range from preserving l i f e  at all  costs regardless of the 
qual ity of that l i f e ;  preserving l i f e  at all  costs, though i t  
may be at the expense of another's l i f e ,  as in abortion; to 
preserving l i f e  but only i f  the individual wants that l i f e ,  and 
how is the nurse to know the seriousness of that wish especially  
i f  the pa t ien t /c l ien t  is not rational due to i l lness.
I t  is hard to see how these options may be translated  
into practice for the nurse at the bedside or in the commumity, 
as the ethical dilemma for the nurse is that in following the 
Code of Nursing Ethics (ICN 1973) to preserve l i f e ,  could result
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in act ing u n e th ic a l ly ,  as in cases of not performing an
abortion. Whilst following the Code (ICN 1973) and preserving 
the l i f e  of the unborn child pain and suffering could be caused 
to the mother. Thus, violation of the Code (ICN 1973) may/may 
not result in unethical behaviour and this has already been 
addressed (page 61).
What is significant for the nurse in the practical
setting is that in decisions which concern the preservation of 
l i f e  principle there is not always the time to debate the issues 
at length. By the very nature of the situation, such as an
unborn child and an i l l  mother, i t  would appear to depend on 
when a decision is made.
In summary, the ethical dilemmas appear to be what
c r i t e r i a  ought to exist for omission and commission which would 
ju s t i f y  active and passive euthanasia; who is responsible for  
exercising rights in those "special" people, such as babies or 
the  handicapped, espec ia l ly  as there s t i l l  remains the 
differences in def in i t ion.  In addition, the nurse is faced with 
weighing the potential harm against the benefits in cases of the
prolongation of l i f e  over the preservation of l i f e ,  as both need
to be given equal consideration.
I f ,  however, ethical dilemmas are in tel lectualised and
universal ised (page 69), then the most the author may hope for  
is th a t  a reasoned judgement wi l l  be made, which can be
ju s t i f i e d  in l igh t  of all  the facts and argument, as the Code 
provides moral guidelines and is not law.
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(b) The Principle of the r ight to Liberty or individual
freedom
"Human freedom at i t s  most rad ica l  
means that I  am free  to d ie  f o r  what I  
value more h igh ly  than my own l i f e , or  
f ree  to continue l i v i n g  under execrable 
circumstances f o r  something I  value more 
h ig h ly  than my own su f fe r in g "
(Curtin and Flaherty 1982: 8)
This quotation implies that  the concept of human 
freedom embodies the concept of human values, as individuals 
make choices based on their  values. Flowever, in the nursing 
c o n t e x t  th e s e  v a lu e s  r e q u i r e  i n t e l 1e c t u a l i s i n g  and 
universalising so that reasoned judgements may be made. This 
quotation also implies that there are some values that can be 
valued more importantly than l i f e ,  which is a denial of some 
doctrines. I f  there is such a thing as human freedom then i t  
must include an option, a choice to exercise rights or w i l l ,  or 
to refrain  from exercising them and an individual is only free 
i f  there are no constraints on that freedom.
For nurses the ethical dilemma is how far that freedom 
should be allowed to extend, as human freedom is not an absolute 
r ight  as i t  may confl ic t  with the choice of another individual,  
even i f  the individual is wi l l ing  to "pay the price" for the 
action taken.
However, individuals are not free to choose for other
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individuals as echoed by Curtin and Flaherty (1982: 11):
"Although we are free  to abrogate our 
own r i g h t s , we are not free  to negate 
the r i g h t s  o f  others"
(Curtin and Flaherty 1982:11)
Freedom, though an essential aspect of the exercise of 
r ights, cannot be a precondition to the existence of r ights, as 
some individuals may not be able to excercise the ir  freedom. In 
other words, children, mentally i l l ,  senile elderly people, and 
others, do not lose the ir  rights because they cannot exercise 
them and these rights may be respected and clearly ,  special care 
must be taken to protect these people. I f  an individual has a 
r ig h t  there is no need to insist on i t  for i t  would be
recogni sed.
The freedom to choose what is believed to be wrong or 
r ig h t  needs to be considered in the framework of ethical
judgements, which must be used conscientiously to choose the 
r ight thing to do. To use freedom r ight ly  is to "use i t  f o r  
good, to promote j u s t i c e  and t r u th "  (Tschudin 1986: 41). By 
this Tschudin (1986) means the freedom and individual has to
promote good, such as the promotion of health.
In order to have the capacity for self-determination 
and for the pursuit of ideals, the individual ought to have the 
freedom to pursue those ideals without interference, or to be 
" a l lo w e d  to act as one chooses", that is,  l ib e r ty  (Downie
and Te lfer  1980: 51). Flowever, i t  would depend on what those 
ideals are, and provided i t  can be shown that the action chosen 
w i l l  not in ter fere  with the l iber ty  or interests of others.
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An individual may defend their  l ibe r ty  by claiming a 
r i g h t .  For example, patients/clients may refuse to accept 
analgesia for pain on the grounds that they have the r ight to 
suffer i f  they choose; or patients may discharge themselves from 
h o s p i ta l ,  provided the consequences for discharge does not 
involve anyone else.
However, the defence of l iberty  is not as simple as i t  
appears. F i rs t ly ,  the proximity to one another in society does 
in some way encroach on or affect the interests of others, and 
secondly, freedom is dependent on what is considered to be 
self-regarding or other regarding acts. As a case in point, i f  
individuals discharge themselves from hospital even with a minor 
in fe c t io n ,  that infection may be passed on to others, and 
eventually the individuals may get worse from lack of care and 
require further medical treatment, in addition to those who have 
contracted the infection, thus putting a further strain on 
medical resources. The individuals may consider this is a 
self-regarding act as the ir  freedom to discharge themselves has 
been exercised, though clearly these individuals have a duty to 
preserve the ir  good health. More recently some doctors are 
re fus ing to t r e a t  pa t ients  who smoke, despite the legal 
implications of being sued for non-treatment, on the grounds 
that i t  is not cost-effective to treat  these patients, as the 
results of smoking are self-induced.
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In order for the nurse and the pat ien t /c l ien t  to make 
ethical choices i t  is of paramount importance that both have the 
la t itude so to do. The nurse may be guided by the Code of 
Professional Conduct (Appendix 1) which gives theoretical  
guidel ines in these matters, and the nurse in turn would 
f a c i l i t a t e  the ethical choice for the pat ien t /c l ien t  by giving 
them the information so to do. However, the nurse must be 
cognisant of the fact that freedom l ies  in the poss ib i l i ty  of 
making a choice between the right or wrong decision, as clearly  
i f  there is no freedom there is no choice, and questions of
morality therefore do not arise.
(c) The P r in c ip le  of Respect for  Persons or Patient
Autonomy with notions of Paternalism, Trusteeship and
Advocacy
The principle of respect for persons and "autonomy" is 
widely described as the central p r in c ip le  of the caring 
discipl ine ,  so i t  is assumed that nurses have some regard for  
th is  p r in c i p le ,  as i t  is inherent  in the aims of the ir  
d i s c i p l i n e .  I t  embodies personal l ibe r ty  of action with 
agreement or consent of the health care team, independence, 
freedom of choice and decision-making. The role of the nurse 
has an ethical perspective which requires something intangible,  
such as human values, respect, or compassion, to be real ised, so
the nurse has an obligation on behalf of the pat ients/c l ients to
f a c i l i t a t e  the p a t ien ts ' /c l ien ts '  se l f - in te res t  by helping the
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p a t ie n t s /c l i e n t s  to return to independence, to reduce or 
a l lev ia te  the ir  suffering and promote respect for others.
"Autonomy" is an assumed concept and refers to a state 
that no one can achieve. However, according to Downie and 
Telfer  (1980: 38) the characteristics embodied in this principle  
include a capacity for self-determination and a capacity for  
forming and pursuing ideal values. By self-determination Downie 
and Telfer  (1980: 38) mean "adopting ends and forming p o l i c i e s  
o f  a c t i o n  t o  b r i n g  them a b o u t " .  I n h e r e n t  in t h i s  
self-determination is the exercise of reason and the possession 
of emotions.
These features of self-determination and the pursuit of 
ideals constitute the unique worth of human beings, or the ir  
" d i s t i n c t i v e  endowment" (Mil l  1962: 187), and is central to
the theme of indiv iduali ty , as the capacity for choice and 
commitment is inherent in this notion. However, i t  is not just  
the capacity for choice that is important, but the individual's  
exercise of i t .
The dilemma that may arise is that not all  individuals 
may possess the attributes of self-determination and the a b i l i t y  
to form and pursue id ea ls .  This may be in cases when 
patients /c l ients  refuse treatment and where the ir  capacity or 
a b i l i t y  to make decisions, or the ir  competency or the ir  a b i l i t y  
to perform at some stated level of proficiency, is in question. 
For example, the subnormal, retarded, senile, mentally i l l ,  
infants, or unconscious patients may lack these a ttr ibutes,  by
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the very nature of the ir  stage or condition of l i f e .  However, 
the same respect and rights ought to be accorded them, though i t  
may be d i f f i c u l t  to accede to the wishes of some of the above 
categories of people, on the grounds that in acceding to those 
wishes those categories of people may come to some harm.
The concept of "autonomy" wi l l  be discussed b r ie f ly  to 
d is t in g u is h  i t  from the principle of "autonomy", which is 
essent ia l ly  the moral requirement to respect other peoples' 
"autonomy".
( i ) The Concept of Autonomy
Autonomy, taken from the Greek words "autos"  and 
" n eme i  n "  m e a n in g  " s e l f "  and " t o  t a k e  h o l d  o f "  
t ra n s la te s  in to " s e l f - r u l e " ,  " s e l f -g o v e rn m e n t "  or "making
one's own laws".
A range of def init ions demonstrate similar meanings and 
some of these are now presented.
For M i l l e r  (1981: 21-28) the word means "moral
r e f l e c t i o n  in i t s  widest sense, though t h i s  seems to l i m i t  the 
d e f i n i t i o n  to a cogn i t ive  component on ly " .  This view was 
further developed by Jameton (1984: 21, 50) and Beauchamp and
Childress (1983: 59) who believed that "autonomy" is concerned 
with discretion, control and self-government, and they view
autonomous action as "one which is  ca r r ie d  out because o f  
goals or  values which are attached to i t "  and is supported by 
H a r r i s  ( 1 9 8 5 :  1 9 5 )  who d e f i n e d  a u t o n o m y  as
"sel f-government whereby ind iv idua ls  are able to con t ro l  t h e i r
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own l iveSy and to some extent t h e i r  dest inyy by the exercise o f  
t h e i r  own f a c u l t i e s " . Gillon (1986: 61) and Hostler (1986: 1) 
concede that "autonomy" is the capacity to think, decide and act 
on the bas is  o f  such thought and decision f r e e l y  and 
independently and without le t  or hindrance.
Clearly then these definit ions appear to imply a notion 
of ra t io n a l i ty  or that reasoning has occurred, by the very
nature of the terminology used in the defin it ions.
There are four notions inherent in the concept of
"autonomy". F i rs t ly ,  that the individual is rational therefore, 
they are capable of making rational choices and arriving at 
decisions in the ir  own lives; secondly, that they govern the ir  
own lives in accordance with principled reasoning which they 
accept; th i rd ly ,  acknowledging the ir  right to the ir  own views 
without restra int  on the ir  freedom being imposed by others; and 
fourthly, that "autonomy" is not possible, except for angels in 
the noumenal world, and the individual is merely seeking "a 
measure o f  independence and pe rsona l  management" (Dearden 
1975 : 64).
Thus, an individual who is not "autonomous" is an
individual who is non-rational, or not mature, and cannot be
viewed as a self-determining moral agent. The author has 
previously stated (page 21) that nurses do not have "autonomy" 
in the ir  practice. I t  does not mean however, that they are not 
self-determining, rational individuals able to make choices and 
to arrive at decisions in the ir  personal l ives.
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Before individuals become patients /c l ients individuals 
consider themselves and are considered by the health care team 
to be "autonomous" people, responsible for the ir  own actions and 
with a claim to be treated humanly as ends in themselves, not 
used as means to an end. Those who are not "autonomous", such 
as the mentally subnormal must be protected. On becoming a 
pat ien t /c l ien t  that "autonomy" may be temporarily relinquished 
because of the very nature of the t rad i t iona l ,  bureaucratic 
inst i tut ionalised setting of hospitals, which may lead to loss 
of dignity . The pat ient /c l ient  needs to be recognised for what 
he/she hopes to become prior to the ir  hospitalisation, that is a 
sel f-determining person, assuming he/she was already such a 
person. I t  has already been argued (page 28) th a t  i f  
pat ients/c l ients  do not have certain attributes, such as not 
being self-determining individuals, then the ir  needs must s t i l l  
be met and the ir  potential recognised.
The ind iv idua l  needs to recognise the reasons for
making the decisions they do, and this is not possible i f  there
is a defect in the individuals reasoning; a defect in the
s t a b i l i t y  of the individuals own desires; a defect in the
information available to the individual, upon which choice is
based; or, a defect in the individuals' a b i l i t y  to control
e i ther  the ir  desires or actions or both (Harris 1985: 196),
otherwise th e ir  "automony" is undermined or eroded.
"Perfect autonomy then, decisions taken 
without any defect at all  e ither of 
information or reasoning or of control,  is ,  
l ike  any ideal, unattainable"
(H a r r is  1985: 200)
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I t  becomes paramount then that the individual has an 
advocate or trustee to act in their  "best interests". These 
modes of intervention wi l l  be discussed la te r .
The Principle of Respect for Autonomy
In developing the argument based on the i n i t i a l  
assertion or premise that nurses must respect or value the se l f -  
determination of patients/c l ients, i t  appears that individuals 
l ike  making the ir  own decisions as i t  allows them to exercise
the ir  facult ies as human beings.
Im p l ic i t  in se lf -determinat ion is the capacity to 
reason as self-determination presupposes that the individual is 
capable of rational deliberation in situations. Mil l  (1972: 
198) argued that the capacity to make decisions, and the r ight  
ones, improves not with time but with practice, and that an
individual's  la te r  decisions only have a chance of being more 
self-determined than ea r l ie r  ones i f  the individual is permitted 
to make the e a r l ie r  decisions, and learn from them.
Thus the issue seems to be to achieve the correct
balance of  "autonomy" fo r  decision-making to occur whilst
r e t a i n i n g  the a b i l i t y  to f u n c t io n  e f f e c t i v e l y  in an 
interdependent environment (Curtin 1982: 7-14 and Aroskar 1982: 
22-32).  I t  would appear that this may be overcome by improving 
communication s k i l l s  as advocated by the Royal College of 
Nursing:
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"During episodes o f  i l l n e s s  the autonomy 
o f  p a t ien ts  should be maintained throughout
treatment  ............... and the act ive
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  pa t ien ts  in t h e i r  own 
t reatment should be f a c i l i t a t e d  by means o f  
open and sen s i t ive  communication".
(Royal College of Nursing 1976)
A number of nurse theorists such as Rumbold (1986: 88)
have argued that patient "autonomy" is eroded (page 97) when
patients are admitted to hospital and the selected review which 
follows demonstrates th is.
Schmieding (1968: 205-212) describes the tyranny of
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n  whereby the patient is made to become
dependent on others, the " a n t i th e s is  o f  the behaviours needed 
f o r  c o p i n g  i n  t he  o u t s i d e  w o r l d , where independence , 
a s s e r t i v e n e s s , p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  p r o b l e m s o l v i n g  and 
d e c is io n -m a k in g  and a sense o f  sel f-esteem are among the 
requi rements f o r  fu n c t i o n in g " . Alfano (1975: 1090) concurs
that "hosp i ta ls  deprive people o f  t h e i r  sense o f  humaneness 
[humanness] so that they lose t h e i r  s e l f  image at a time when 
they most need i t  - when they are weakened through sickness" .  
Chapman (1976: 114) maintains that i t  is dependence of the
patient which satis f ies the nurses psychological needs, that is 
t h e i r  need to be depended upon, and i f  not prevented may 
increase or prolong patient dependency. In this view i t  is the 
nurses who encourage patient dependency to sat isfy the ir  own 
needs and though the nurses' needs are important they cannot 
outweigh the pa t ie n ts ' /c l ie n ts '  needs, and thus:
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"The reluctance they show in a l lowing
p a t ien ts  to carry  out s e l f - c a re   i s
probably due to the fa c t  that such behaviour  
deprives the nurse o f  the s a t i s fa c t io n  she 
gains from p a t ie n t  dependency"
(Chapman 1976: 116)
Faugier (1986: 64) concedes that the door of the
hospital ward represents an invis ible  demarcation l ine between 
health and i l lness, and without feeling any d i f ferent /d i f ference  
the individual is expected to assume the "s ick  person" role
on entry to the ward, and become a physically dependent person.
According to Rumbold (1986: 88) patients/c l ients  are 
denied the opportunity of making basic decisions in and out of 
hospitals such as when to get up, or go to bed, when i t  is not 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  necessary or re levant  to th e i r  treatment or
recovery. Chapman (1976: 114) concedes that i t  is the complaint
of many patients in hospital that they are not allowed or given 
the opportunity to carry out normal physical a c t iv i t ie s  as those 
mentioned above which are "wel l  w i th in  t h e i r  a b i l i t i e s , and 
tha t  by both conversation and care they are reduced to the leve l  
o f  c h i l d r e n ", meaning treated l ike  children. Titmus (1970: 
212) ca l le d  th is  dependent* ac t iv i ty  by patients on nurses 
" c r e a t i v e  a l t ru ism " .  By that Titmus (1970) means that i f  
the opportunity is afforded the patient by the nurse then the 
s e l f  is realised with the help of others, which is part ly  what 
nurses are supposedly trying to achieve. I t  is the method of 
achieving i t  that is in question. This again does however
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demonstrate the forced dependence of patients on nurses in order 
to meet the nurses' psychological needs (page 99).
To deny patients/clients the basic opportunities for
personal decision-making serves to increase the ir  dependence and 
decrease "autonomy", so undermining personal dignity. This 
dignity is further undermined i f  the pa t ien t /c l ien t  is in a
paternal ist ic  (page 27) setting, such as a hospital, but i t
would of course depend on at what stage the decision-making 
occurs. This dilemma may be approached by increasing the time 
frame and allowing the pat ient /c l ient  more time for personal
decision-making.
( i i )  Paternalism, Trusteeship and Advocacy
The concepts of paternalism, trusteeship and advocacy 
wil l  now be discussed to see i f  these concepts play a part in 
the way nurses apply ethical principles, or the way in which 
ethical decisions are ju s t i f ie d .
Paternal ism
Curtin (1980: 4-5) contended that the experience of 
i l lness infringes on three basic human rights, that is ,  freedom 
of action, independence, and the a b i l i t y  to choose for oneself. 
Curtin (1980: 4-5) bases her theory on the notion that disease 
damages the humanity of the individual.  Curtin's (1980 : 4-5) 
argument is controversial on the grounds that i l lness does not 
infringe on the basic human rights, i t  simply makes i t  d i f f i c u l t  
to exercise them. Furthermore, she believed that patient  
"autonomy" is a f fec ted  by i l ln e s s  (page 97) and this is
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increased by being placed in a paternalist ic  setting, such as a 
h o s p i ta l .  P a t e r n a l i s t i c  is taken to mean " a c t i n g  upon
on e 's  idea o f  what i s  " b e s t "  f o r  another person without  
consu l t ing  that other  person" (Marchewka 1983: 1072). Such an 
interpretation of paternalism suggests that an individual could 
be expressing the ir  moral beliefs under the guise of acting in 
a n o t h e r 's  i n t e r e s t .  I t  a lso i m p l i c i t l y  assumes that  
patients/c l ients are immature and ir rat ional and unable to make 
decisions because they are i l l ,  and that the care-givers are 
r a t i o n a l ,  m a tu re  and know what is  "best"  f o r  the  
patients /c l ients .  In acting in the pa t ie n ts ' /c l ie n ts '  "best 
interests" does the representative for the pa t ien t /c l ien t  act as 
the pa t ien t /c l ien t  would have acted, should have acted, in the 
interests of the pa t ien t /c l ien t ,  or in the pursuit of the ir  
welfare. How is the nurse or doctor to know especially in cases 
of mental i l lness.
I t  would be reasonable to assume that individuals are 
responsib le  fo r  th e i r  action, and accept them as rational 
creatures who ought to act in accordance with certain ethical  
rules such as te l l in g  the truth.  I f  there is doubt as to the 
p a t i e n t ' s / c l i e n t ' s  a b i l i t y  to understand, and i t  is known 
previously that the pat ient /c l ient  with complete understanding 
would now object to what was being done, then there seems no 
grounds for paternalist ic  action.
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Benoliel  (1983: 212) believes that rights are not
absolute, that is,  they may be overridden by other rights, and 
thus a paternalist ic  health care system may intercede in the 
p a t i e n t s ' / c l i e n t s '  "best in te res ts"  thus deprecating the 
p a t ie n ts ' /c l ie n ts '  r ights. Benoliel (1983) does not state who 
is to decide what those "best interests" are, and whom do those 
"best interests" serve, the pat ient /c l ient  or the health care 
system.
Gadow's (1980: 1-2,6) philosophy of nursing called
" s e l f - c a r e "  incorporates se l f -d e te rm in a t io n  as a centra l  
c onc e pt .  "S e l f - c a r e " has as i t s  primary ideal ac t ive  
assistance to individuals, families, and communities in the 
development and exercise of the ir  decision-making s k i l ls  in 
health matters, resulting in action in the "best interest" of 
the pa t ien t /c l ien t  with the pat ient /c l ient  deciding what those 
"best interests" are. This concept is not new, as i t  may be 
argued that i f  patients/c l ients are self-determining then they 
w i l l  give consideration as to how to determine the ir  own 
actions. Although the health care inst i tut ion is obliged to act 
in the "best in te re s t"  of  the p a t ie n t /c l ie n t ,  i t  is the 
p a t ie n t /c l ie n t ,  or an appointed advocate, or trustee, such as a 
lawyer, who decides what those "best interests" are. I t  is only 
when in d iv id u a ls  are treated as self-determining, rational  
beings with due regard for the ir  fundamental rights and any 
special rights (page 76) to which they are ent i t led  that they 
can be aided in c lar i fy ing  values and beliefs in order:
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"To develop t h e i r  understanding o f  s e l f  
and o f  the s i tua t iony  and to make decis ions  
based on t h e i r  own goals and wishes"
(Benoliel 1983: 213 quoting Gadow 1980)
However, sometimes, patients/c l ients can be helped in 
this but only i f  they choose so to do, as some patients/c l ients  
welcome and expect a p a t e r n a l i s t i c  a t t i t u d e  from t h e i r  
care-givers.
I t  is c r i t i c a l l y  important for  nurses to exhibit  
behaviour which in fe rs  they understand the importance of 
pat ien t /c l ien t  rights and the role that paternalism and truth 
te l l in g  play. Healey (1983: 114) believes that the claims by 
patients/c l ients that they have rights and deserve to be treated 
as active participants in the ir  care "would appear to be qu i te  
removed f r om n u r s i n g ' s  r e - exami na t i on  o f  i t s  pro fess iona l  
i d e n t i t y " .  The concept of pa t ien t /c l ien t  rights is derived 
from the experience of i l lness and disease. Cassell (1978: 
24-46) described the destructive impact of i l lness and disease 
in terms of four losses experienced by the pa t ien t /c l ien t :  the 
loss of a sense of connectedness to the world through our 
senses,  a t t i t u d e s  and i n t e r e s t s ;  loss  of  a sense of  
in d e s tru c t ib i l i ty ,  omnipotence or body image; loss of a sense of 
omniscience or fa i lu re  in understanding and reasoning; and, loss 
of a general sense of independence and control. Cassell (1978: 
41-42) views i l lness and disease as not being healthy with an 
associated disturbance of organ function, and so the losses
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experienced would depend to a great extent on the nature or
degree of the i l lness and disease. I t  follows then, that the 
trad it ional  expectation of paternalist ic  behaviour ensues with 
the provider that is,  the health care team, in a superior role 
to the recipient of care, that is, the pa t ie n t /c l ie n t ,  thus 
encouraging dependence.
I t  may be argued that patients/c l ients must assert 
th e ir  r ights, as health is a shared responsibi l i ty (pages 27,66) 
of the pa t ien t /c l ien t  and of the provider of health care. This 
is a desirable shif t  as nursing is beginning to engage in a 
re-examination of i ts  identity  in becoming a "profession" and 
moving from the tradit ional dominant model to one of active
partnership, as can be seen by the widespread use of the Nursing
Process.
Melia  (1987: 46) believes that the infringement on
pat ients/c l ients l ibe r ty  is in part due to lack of time for  
d e c is io n - m a k in g ,  r e s u l t i n g  in decisions " t aken i n the  
p a t i e n t ' s  best in te re s t  in accordance wi t h the nurses duty to 
c a r e " .  Tschudin (1986: 67) l ike  Marchewka (1983: 1072)
contends that paternalism (pages 27,102) is often not ju s t i f ie d  
and this behaviour is common in nursing. I l lness makes the 
pa t ie n t /c l ie n t  dependent and vulnerable, which in turn lends
credence to the assumption that health care professionals are 
the f inal arbiters of a p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  welfare. Marchewka 
(1983) asserts that when a decision is made on behalf of the 
p a t ie n t /c l ie n t  then that decision is taken in the be l ie f  that
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the pat ien t /c l ien t  requires protection from some harm, and thus 
this act is ju s t i f ie d .
Gert and Culver (1976: 45-57) presented f ive  c r i te r ia  
to enable an evaluation of whether a part icular action is said 
to be p a t e r n a l i s t i c .  A nurse is  sa id  to be acting  
paternal i s t i  cal ly  i f ,  and only i f ,  the nurse's behaviour
indicates that the nurse believes the following. F i rs t ly ,  that
the action to be taken is for the p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  good.
Secondly, that the nurse believes they are qual if ied to act on
the p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  behalf. Thirdly, that the action to be 
taken violates an ethical rule or pr inciple, such as lying,  
breaking a promise, or causing pain. Fourthly, the be l ie f  that  
the  a c t io n  taken on the p a t i e n t ' s / c l i e n t ' s  behalf  is 
j u s t i f i a b l e ,  whether or not the p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  consents. 
F i n a l l y ,  tha t  the nurse believes that  the pa t ien t /c l ien t  
understands what is good for them.
A pure  u t i l i t a r i a n  model would j u s t i f y  most 
paternal is t ic  acts on the grounds that an action is r igh t ,  i f ,  
on balance i t  produces more positive than negative outcomes 
(Beauchamp and Childress 1983: 21), that is ,  i t  produces more 
good than any alternative would. The deontological view rarely  
ju s t i f i e s  paternalism, as deontology is based on a theory of 
moral obligation in which actions are inherently r ight or wrong, 
that is ,  the rightness or wrongness of the act is determined by 
whether they are in accordance with the moral rules and
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independent of the consequences (Gorovitz 1976: 14). Gert and 
Culver (1979: 199-200) claim that in just i fy ing paternalist ic  
action involves two steps: f i r s t l y ,  examining the nature of the 
act, and secondly, evaluating its  consequences. In this way, 
Gert  and C u lver  ( 1979) draw on p r i n c i p l e s  from both 
n o n -c o n s e q u e n t ia l is t  and consequentia l is t  th e o r ie s .  In 
assessing the nature of the act the nurse is required to
ident ify  the ethical rules and principles being violated and 
define how the violation may affect the rational desires of the 
pat ie n t /c l ie n t .  In evaluating the consequences the nurse is 
required to determine whether one would publicly advocate the 
v i o l a t i o n  or i t s  u n iv e r s a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  under s im i la r  
circumstances.
Murphy and Hunter (1983: 43) assert that paternalist ic  
acts and a t t i tu d e s  are "those which l i mi t  the l i b e r t y  or
r i g h t s  o f  ind iv id u a ls  in t h e i r  own i n t e r e s t s " . This notion 
implies that in a p a t ien t /c l ien t 's  interest the nurse may l im i t  
t h e i r  l i b e r t y  or rights. Implic it  in Murphy and Hunter's 
(1983 : 43) interpretation is the element of coercion, as a 
pat ie n t /c l ie n t  who voluntarily submits to a restr ic t ion is in 
fact exercising the ir  l ib e r ty  in that choice, so paternalism is 
more e x p l ic i t ly  the "use o f  coercion to provide a good tha t  is  
not  d e s i r e d  by the one whom i t  is  intended to b e n e f i t " .
Arguably, the underlying assumption appears to be that these 
in d iv id u a ls  do not have the a b i l i t y  to make the decision
themselves.
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C le a r ly  then, there are two principle elements in
paternalism: f i r s t l y ,  the intent, that is obtaining what is in
the best interest of the pat ient /c l ient ;  and, secondly, the
ef fec t ,  v iolating the individual's known wishes in the matter,
though this may not necessarily occur.
However, paternalism can also be viewed from an ethical
egoism stance. This notion is grounded in the be l ie f  that
pat ients/c l ients  ought to act in such a way as to promote the ir
own good, and i f  they are unable to do so, say, due to i l lness,
then the decision should be made by someone capable of knowing
what actions are in the pa t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  in terest,  unti l  such
time as the pat ien t /c l ien t  can resume the ir  own moral duties.
As paternal is t ic  acts are not always a l t r u is t ic ,  i t  could be
advanced that under the ethical egoism notion the health care
worker would act in the pa t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  own interests.
I t  may be argued that this view of paternalism is
simplistic  as i t  equates the meaning with that of advocacy, that
is acting on behalf of another, so that any paternal is t ic  nurse
can also claim to be a pat ient /c l ient  advocate under that
guise. However, paternalism may seek to violate  the rights of
p a t i e n t s / c l i e n t s  and advocacy would seek to act in the
p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  "best interests", though Harris (1985: 200)
believes that:
"The only  th ing  tha t  makes paternal ism  
m ora l ly  respectable is  i t s  cl ai m to be an 
essen t ia l  pa r t  o f  what is  to respect persons".
(H a r r is  1985: 200)
- 108 -
According to Gillon (1986: 63) i t  is an expressed view 
of some philosophers such as Mill (1974) that although respect 
for "autonomy" may be essential, i t  is often important to do the 
best for people and reduce the harm they suffer.  This may mean 
overriding the ir  wishes which means treat ing them as "means to 
an end" , that is a means to the ir  own recovery. For example, 
this situation may be applicable to patients/c l ients who refuse 
to have a blood transfusion 'on religious grounds', but in the 
health care team over-riding their  wishes and treat ing them may 
mean the saving of the ir  l ives. There are two contentions in
this situation.  F i rs t ly ,  how can one individual know what is
best fo r  another in d iv id u a l ,  and secondly, how w i l l  the 
individual prescribing or effecting treatment measure that the 
harm suffered is reduced.
The notion may be advanced, however, that though the 
overriding tenet, is to act in the "best interests" of the 
p a t i e n t / c l i e n t ,  i t  does not mean to do so by means of
paterna l ism, and to do so is suspect, and according to
Kubler-Ross (1970: 32, 149-150) could cause distress for some 
patients /c l ients  and the ir  family.
Buchanan ( 1 9 7 8 :  3 8 0 )  contends t h a t  to make
p a t e r n a l i s t i c  dec is ions  involves making " i n t r a - p e r s o n a l  
comparisons o f  harm and b ene f i t  o f  each member o f  the fa m i ly  i f  
d iv u lg in g  the t r u t h " ;  then estimate the total net harm to the 
family, and compare these intra-personal and inter-personal net 
harm judgments about the results of not divulging the truth,
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compare the totals and determine the course of action. The 
question arises as to how to measure the c r i t e r i a  of harm and 
benefit ,  so measurement is a philosophical problem in i t s e l f .  
Buchanan (1978: 383) concludes that following this analysis i t
is " i mp l a u s i b l e "  to hold that the doctor is in a better  
position to make them [judgements] than the pat ien t /c l ien t  or 
family.
Non-consequentialists, such as Kant (1781), would argue 
t h a t  th e re  are many circumstances in which in d iv id u a ls  
"autonomy must be respected even to do so w i l l  r e s u l t  in an 
obvious ly  worse dec is ion in terms o f  the p a t i e n t , fa m i ly  or
s o c ie t y ' s  happiness" (Gillon 1985b: 1972). This conclusion is
also supported by many u t i l i ta r ia n s  (consequentialists) on the 
grounds that respect for "autonomy" is required i f  human welfare 
is to be maximised.
The case reported by Bayliss (1982: 1824-1825) of the 
Christian Scientist Dallas woman who came to England too la te  to 
seek orthodox treatment for thyroid disease, describes a case 
fo r  paternalism in medicine. She had previously undergone 
t r e a t m e n t  by orthodox measures, re jected  t reatment ,  in 
preference for cult medicine. This fa i l in g ,  she had returned to
orthodox measures again. Those for whom respect for "autonomy" 
is paramount would not deny her the respect of allowing her to 
choose what she wished even though paternalist ic  intervention 
could have saved her l i f e .
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Rights are automatically linked with duties (Tschudin 
1986: 62) and often one person's rights are another person's 
duties. To i l lu s t ra te  this point, professional contracts give 
an employee certain legal rights such as the r ight to receive a
salary, holiday or vacation and sick leave, and in return the
individual is obliged or has a duty to carry out the tasks for  
which they are employed. One of these basic primary duties of 
nurses is beneficence, or a duty to care, which w i l l  be
discussed la te r .  The d i f f i c u l ty  arises when an individual's  
rights confl ic t  with the organisations/institutions rights, or 
when individual and col lect ive duties conf l ic t ,  and the need for  
an advocate, or the l ike ,  may be required to see that f a i r  play 
is carried out.
This could be helped by some rules, such as a B i l l  of 
Rights, and Britain may be hindered by the absence of a B i l l  of 
Rights though this is currently being considered. As a result  
of the low morale and poor self-esteem, arising from the denial 
or contravening of what the students consider to be the ir  
fundamental r ig h ts ,  the Royal College of Nursing (RCN) 
Association of Nursing Students (RCN 1988:10) has drafted a 
ten-point B i l l  of Rights (Appendix 4) and had expected the 
i n i t i a t i v e  to be accepted by the RCN. The Association of 
Nursing Students (ANS) is a part icular ly  vulnerable group by 
vir tue of i ts  employee status with the National Health Service 
(NHS), and the fear of further " e x p lo i t a t io n  and in ju s t i c e s  to 
student nurses" (Seymour 1987: 19), has caused the formation
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of this action. Clearly the underlying Bil l  of Rights (Appendix 
4) giving the student " the r i g h t  to quest ion and the r i g h t  to 
be valued" (Mil ls  1987: 19), is an essential part of patient  
safety and advocacy and the hope was that the Bi l l  would be
adopted in Schools of Nursing and as part of a ll  Health 
Authority policies in England^. Health Authorit ies who have 
already adopted the Bi l l  of Rights, such as Sunderland Health 
Authority, view a B i l l  of Rights as part of the ir  present
philosophy. Arguably the student may not be demanding or 
claiming rights, but rather believe that justice be exercised.
E a r l i e r ,  the American Hospital Associat ion (AHA) 
published the ir  Patients Bil l  of Rights in 1973 (Appendix 5).
According to Davis and Aroskar (1983: 15) and Gaylin (1973: 22) 
the document was " we l l  i n t e n t i o n e d " , though " t i m i d ", as 
they believe that most of these rights (Appendix 5) are already 
fundamental human rights, that is, these rights have already 
been vested in the pa t ien t /c l ien t ,  and so propose that the AHA 
Bil l  (1973) be renamed the "Hosp ita ls  B i l l  o f  Dut ies " .  I t
might be assumed that the Bi l l  (Appendix 5) is necessary as i t  
would cover the rights of children and mentally i l l  or retarded 
patients. The B i l l  (1973) implies that the patient has the 
f i n a l  word in the ir  own care " to  the extent perm i t ted  by 
law" (B i l l  of Rights 1973, Item 4) and "thus paterna l ism in  
hea l th  care is  not on ly unhelpful  but p o s i t i v e l y  u ne th ica l "  
(Tschudin 1986: 67 ) .  This is an exceptional notion as
paterna l is t ic  acts in the short term can sometimes be ju s t i f ie d
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and completely ethical,  as in the case of a trustee, or an 
advocate appointed by a patient.
Trusteeship
The notion of trusteeship implies that an individual 
may act on behalf of another. In this notion the nurse is in 
the position of trustee, who receives a ta c i t  trust or ex p l ic i t  
rem i t ,  such as ensuring that  the p a t ie n t / c l i e n t  receives 
competent care. The pat ient /c l ient  is viewed in the position of 
trustor , having entrusted to the nurse the special remit of 
caring competently. So this is a reciprocal relationship, and 
i f  the implied or e x p l i c i t  t r u s t  is demeaned, then the 
relationship breaks down.
The pat ien t /c l ien t  is in a special position of being 
both trustor and beneficiary, and is able to keep a special 
check on the trustee or nurse to ensure the trust is being 
carried out. This relationship is not considered paterna l is t ic ,  
as the pa t ien t /c l ien t  would be capable of rejecting the nurse.
I f  the pat ient /c l ient  became too i l l  to continue to 
assess the nurse's competence or to maintain the t rus t ,  then a 
more paternal is t ic  situation would then arise. Nevertheless the 
nurse would s t i l l  be e th ica l ly ,  or even legal ly ,  bound by the 
t rus t .
Thus, i t  appears that trust  depends on the agreement 
between trustor  and trustee when the reciprocal relationship  
commences as in the assessment phase of the patient 's  admission 
to hospital.  This agreement would constitute goals, such as
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returning the patient to the ir  maximal health status, and i f  
this were not possible could include a euthanasian clause.
In order to contrast the notion of trusteeship and 
advocacy, a selection of definit ions of advocacy is presented to 
demonstrate the overlap in ideas and varying interpretations  
which occur.
Advocacy and the nurse practit ioner
Advocacy, according to Murphy and Hunter (1983: 55)
is " t he  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  wi t h the p a t ien t  in determining the 
personal meaning which the experience o f  i l l n e s s , s u f fe r in g ,  or  
dying is  to have f o r  that i n d i v i d u a l " . Curtin (1980: 3) bases 
a philosophy of nursing on human advocacy and asserts that  
advocacy is f i r s t  and foremost a person who can and does enter 
into a relationship with another person. I t  is based, thus, on 
our common humanity, needs and rights. By this Curtin (1980) 
means that common humanity implies that all  individuals are 
morally equal and bonded together, including pat ients/c l ients  
and nurses and this results in a recognition of the common needs 
such as protection and a need to express oneself in a climate of 
just ice  and truth. Kohnke (1982: 314-318) views advocacy as a 
way to " in form the c l i e n t  in whatever dec is ion he makes". 
This def in i t ion of Kohnke (1982) seems a simplistic one, on the 
grounds that this pure or idea l is t ic  form of advocacy, given the 
professional - pat ient /c l ient  relationship, is more l i k e ly  to 
provide a benevolent paternalism.
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Brower (1982: 141-143) further states an advocate to be 
"one tha t  defends, pleads the cause o f ,  or  promotes r ig h t s  o f  
o r  changes in  systems on behal f  o f  an ind iv id u a l  o r  group. 
A d v o c a c y  i n v o l v e s  a c t i v i t i e s  t h a t  a r e  a i med a t  t he  
r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  power and resources to the ind iv idu a l  o r  group 
t h a t  has a demonstrated need". This sentiment is further  
echoed by Clark (1982: 6) who states that patient advocacy means 
" i n f o r m i n g  t he  p a t i e n t  o f  h i s  r i g h t s  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  
s i t u a t i o n ,  making sure that he has a l l  the necessary in format ion  
to make an informed decis ion, supporting him in the dec is ion he 
makes, and p ro te c t in g  and safeguarding h is  i n t e r e s t s " .
For Brown (1985: 26-27) advocacy is "a means o f
t r a n s fe r r i n g  power back to the p a t ien t  to enable him to con tro l  
h is  own a f f a i r s ", which is not doing something on behalf of 
the  p a t i e n t  but developing and fos te r ing  a rec iproca l  
relat ionship. The reason why nurses advocate on the patient's  
behalf  is fou r fo ld  according to Brown (1985) and these 
correspond to the f ive principles of ethics viz . the value of 
l i f e ,  goodness or rightness, just ice or fairness, truth te l l in g  
or honesty, and freedom. The definit ions of advocacy seem to 
convey certain common notions such as imforming, promotion of 
r ig h ts ,  ensuring the pat ient /c l ient  has information to make 
decisions, and part ic ipation.
However, Abrams (1978: 258-267) had e a r l ie r  disapproved 
of nurses undertaking the role of advocate on the grounds that 
because of the historical role of the nurse which is rooted in
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hierarchical bureaucracy and dominated by medicine women are 
socialised into stereotypes. This stereotype defines women as 
"emot ional "  beings and relegates them to the caring aspects 
unable to competently advocate. This leaves the curing aspects
to the  " a s s e r t i v e "  men who assume the ro le  of  doctors 
(Trandel-Korenchuk et al 1983a/b: 53-59; 37-42),  and therefore 
able to be pat ient /c l ient  advocates.
I t  would seem therefore that the concept of advocacy 
represents the identif icat ion of a need and an attempt to 
address the need ident if ied. Advocacy involves the intervention 
of the nurse, or others such as the family, in situations where 
the pa t ien t /c l ien t  is vulnerable whether that vulnerabi l i ty  is 
potential,  circumstantial, temporary, episodic, permanent, or 
inevitable.
Conway - Rutowski (1982: 455-456) states that the nurse 
must be a "covert  and overt  advocate f o r  the p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  
and f am i l y  since t h e i r  [ p a t i e n t ' s / c l i e n t ' s ]  lack o f  knowledge 
and understanding of ten places them in a vulnerable p o s i t i o n "  
Those individuals who are vulnerable to advocacy can be viewed 
on a continuum from the potentia lly  vulnerable to the inevitably  
vulnerab le  (Figure 3a on page 119) and these w i l l  now be 
discussed under sub-headings,
a) Potential vu lnerabi l i ty
This area embraces individuals at high r isk ,  such as 
pat ien ts /c l ien ts  who are genetically predisposed to disease; 
mentally, physically, or socially deprived individuals such as
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the  hom eless /neglected;  and the se lf - induced high r is k  
individual such as the substance/solvent abuser.
b) Circumstantial vulnerabi l i ty
These include circumstances invo lv ing previously  
re la t iv e ly  well or coping individuals who by circumstances such 
as in war, famine, poverty or trauma, that is,  physical or 
emotional upheaval, become vulnerable. These circumstances may 
serve to threaten an individual's health or welfare and wi l l  
" h o l d  them c a p t i v e  to c i r cumstances they f i n d  hard to 
understand"  (Copp 1986: 257). Often, an attempt to find a 
solution to one problem will  endanger them in other situations.  
For example, in an attempt to aid i l lega l  immigrants and gain 
social service benefits for them may well place them in jeopardy 
of being deported to a place, possibly more traumatic, even 
p o l i t i c a l l y ,  than the circumstances in which they are now 
placed. Some e f fo r t  could be put toward gaining legal status 
for them, and considering their  mitigating circumstances, could 
mean that they were not deported. However, this case represents 
the essence of the ethical dilemma for which there is no easy 
prescription as there are so many overriding ethical and legal 
considerations.
c) Temporary vulnerabi l i ty
Individuals in this category have experiences of a 
transitory nature, such as depression, disruption in family l i f e  
such as divorce or physical abuse. This disruptive act has a 
short time span, but the exposure to the experience has a long
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term e f f e c t  manifesting in psychological problems such as 
" f l ash-backs"  to the causative agent.
d) Episodic vulnerabi l i ty
This occurs with ind iv idua ls  who have recurrent  
i l lnesses and who can predict and are aware of the onset but are 
unable to control or prevent i t .
e) Permanent vulnerabi l i ty
These ind iv id ua ls  l i v e  with chronic diseases or 
defects, such as birth/genetic defects, hemiplegias, muscular 
d e b i l i t a t i n g  diseases, and are permanently vulnerable. In 
addition to this they may become potentia lly , circumstantially,  
tem porar i ly  and e p is o d ic a l ly  vulnerable, and so are more 
susceptib le  than the average individual. This is further  
compounded by the in e v i ta b le  v u ln e r a b i l i t y  of the aging 
processes and all  i ts  ramifications.
f )  Inevitable vulnerabi l i ty
Th is  v u ln e r a b l e  s i t u a t io n  is one in which a l l  
individuals find inescapable such as old age.
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Figure 3a : Continuum of Vulnerabil i ty ,  
After L.A. Copp,
Journal of Advanced Nursing, 
11(3), 257, May 1986
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Being vulnerable then requires an advocate, or a trustee 
to act in the "best interests" of the pa t ien t /c l ien t  and as 
mentioned e a r l ie r  there are many types of advocates, such as the 
pat ien t /c l ien t  advocacy (page 114) system. Other systems include 
human, individual,  animal, p o l i t ic a l ,  leg is la t ive ,  s p ir i tu a l ,  and 
m o r a l - e th ic a l  advocacy. In a vulnerable  s i t u a t io n ,  the 
p a t i e n t s / c l i e n t s  may "empower" the nurse to act as the ir  
advocate, and this becomes a logical extension of the nurse's
s k i l l .  This w i l l  enable the p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  to endure a 
part icular  situation or circumstance.
The types of advocacy wi ll  now be discussed using 
sub-headings,
i ) Human Advocacy system
This is where an individual is employed specif ical ly  for  
the system or organisation, such as an Ombudsman in the National 
Health Service in England, essentially to react to queries, to
in i t i a t e  advice, and advise patients/clients of the benefits and 
services,
i i ) Individual Advocacy
This  is  the seeking o f  help fo r  an ind iv id ua l
p a t ie n t /c l ie n t ,  with the result that the advocacy may have an 
e f f e c t  on a wider pa t ien t /c l ien t  group than the individual
concerned.
i i i )  Animal Advocacy
This is the concern for humane treatment of animals 
dem onstra ted  by a decrease in the use of  animals fo r
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experimentation and the use of simulation and computer models, 
iv) Pol i t ica l  Advocacy
This involves those decisions which have implications 
for  policy makers and health policy.
v) Legislative Advocacy
This involves maintaining excellence in s k i l ls  and being 
accountable for ensuring that the p a t ien ts ' /c l ien ts '  r ights are 
being upheld, and actively ensuring they gain the benefits and 
services to which the pat ients/clients and the ir  families are 
e nt i t led ,  and who may be uninformed about those r ights. I t  
infers an adversary relationship as i t  may require defending the 
p a t ie n ts ' /c l ie n ts '  legal rights against an inst i tu t ion ,  doctors, 
or the family.
v i)  Spiri tual Advocacy
This is respecting the p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  choice in 
seeking spir itual help, and fa c i l i ta t in g  access, time, space and
privacy to undertake this help; or, conversely, respecting the
p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  choice in not seeking spir itual help, 
v i i )  Moral - ethical Advocacy
This is a consideration for the ethics involved when 
faced with complex options and decision-making, such as the 
appropriateness and intrusiveness of research, 
v i i i )  Patient Advocacy
Advocacy raises certain considerations for the nurse in 
the assessment of a situation, such as what type of advocacy is 
required, when to advocate, how to advocate, the consequences or
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implications for nurse and pat ient /c l ient ,  and what are the 
implications i f  the pat ient /c l ient  does not require an advocate: 
does this leg is la te  for failure?
The author supports Curtin's (1983: 9-10) view that the 
nurse cannot perform all  these advocacy roles, on the grounds 
that some of these roles, such as spir itual and legal advocacy, 
are not within the nurses' remit, and to date there is l i t t l e  
evidence to suggest that the education of nurses incorporates 
this special training.
I t  may be reasonable to suggest that the advocate takes 
a great deal of r isk in advocating for the p a t ien t /c l ien t  and 
this necessitates a fu l l  knowledge of the pa t ie n t /c l ie n t ,  the ir  
background and family, and the consequences of the positive or 
n e g a t i v e  outcomes o f  a d v o c a t in g  on b e h a l f  o f  t h i s  
pat ie n t /c l ie n t .
The implementation of the Nursing Process (page 37) 
w i l l  go some way towards ensuring that in the assessment phase 
the pa t ien t /c l ien t  has a choice of who is to act as advocate, i f  
required, and this role is undertaken within the constraints and 
le g a l i t ie s  of the insti tut ion/organisation.  Until the nurse 
pract i t ioner is tru ly  an independent "autonomous" agent, which 
may be achieved with professional status, then acting as an 
advocate is not an independent role. Pankratz et al (1974: 
211-216) has shown in a nursing attitude scale that nurses who 
had undergone advanced educational courses were more l i k e ly  than 
others to support advocacy as a nurse's role. The survey of
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seven hundred and two (702) nurses' a t t i tu d e s  towards 
professional "autonomy", advocacy, patients' r ights, and the 
rejection of t radit ional role l imitations were measured against 
education, leadership, academic setting, and non-traditional  
social climate.
The bureaucratic nature of health care systems appears 
to inhib it  any assertive stance by the nurse, and thus i t  is 
d i f f i c u l t  f o r  the nurse to defend p a t i e n t s / c l i e n t s .  
Assertive is taken to mean "making one's needs known in a 
s e l f - c o n f i d e n t  way and standing f i r m  in support o f  one's own or  
o t h e r s '  r i g h t s "  (Webb 1987: 41). This lack of assertive
behaviour by the nurse would seem to be due to the hierarchical  
nature of health care systems because given the correct training  
nurses may adopt this stance, which is a requirement i f  advocacy 
is to be part of the nurses' role.
I f  the discipline of nursing is to have a philosophical 
foundation, that is,  to be considered as having an ethical  
perspective (page 57), then i t  must be based on a philosophical 
concept. This is a concept which determines the relationships 
that are to exist between nurse and p a t ien t /c l ien t ,  and the 
common rights that are to be respected in this relationship so 
that strategies and processes that influence decision-making are 
articulated clearly  for the pat ient /c l ient .
I t  is proposed that the philosophical foundation can be 
grounded in the concept of advocacy, whose basic premise 
embraces common humanity, needs and rights, that is human
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advocacy. I f  nurses are to respect the pa t ien t /c l ien t  as an 
individual,  then these needs must be given primacy, i f  the role 
o f  t r u s t e e s h i p  and advocacy are the foundation of  the 
nurse-patient relationship.
P a t i e n t / c l i e n t  advocacy, however, requires special
s k i l ls  and appears to remain the remit of the most junior nurse, 
as senior nurses appear not to have the time to pursue 
pat ien t /c l ien t  contact. Those nurses who do undertake advocacy 
roles do so in a climate of extreme pressure by the daily  
increasing workload, some wary of the advocacy role, as i t  is
rare ly  included in the training.  In addition to including 
advocacy in the curriculum i t  would also mean restructuring the 
patients' day, not only to allow for the effect ive use of the 
chosen ethical model for nursing practice, but to incorporate
the required advocacy role, i f  so necessary. Also, i t  may 
require a policy decision so that the role is undertaken by
senior nurses who have undertaken some training and feel
confident in the advocacy role.
Unlike the lawyer advocate, who pleads the clients  
case, the nurse advocate allows the pat ient /c l ient  to make the 
f inal decision, and the nurse then abides by that decision and
defends the ir  right to make that decision (Melia 1987: 48),
which is in keeping with Clark's (1982: 6) notion of  advocacy
(page 11 5 ).
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Thus the arguments to support the advocacy role of the 
nurse is concerned with rights and obligations (page 74). To 
realise an individual 's rights another individual has a moral 
obligation to ensure this right is recognised and put into
e f fect ,  but who is to ensure this, and who is to have the moral
uncertainty of the decision made in the "best interests" of the 
p a t ie n t /c l ie n t .  As a case in point, a pa t ien t /c l ien t  has a 
legal r ight to treatment and a legal right to refuse treatment, 
and any fa i lu re  to comply with these legal rights violates the 
p a t i e n t s ' / c l i e n t s '  r ig h ts .  There are occasions when the
p a t ie n ts ' /c l ie n ts '  refusal of treatment does become an ethical  
dilemma especially in the mentally i l l  where competence, that  
is ,  ra t io n a l i ty  and capabil i ty , is in question. And, is i t  
r ight to t reat  someone despite their  refusal? Legally, the law 
views an individual as competent or incompetent. However, i t  
does appear that competence may be viewed as a graded or 
continuous concept (Eastman and Hope 1988:51), that is ,  on a
continuum from fu l ly  competent to fu l ly  incompetent.
The author does not advocate for a particular  ethical  
p o s i t io n ,  but ra th er  proposes that i t  may be possible to 
compromise or to give considerat ion on balance^ to the 
p a t ie n t /c l ie n t  who refuses treatment, and the consequences of 
treat ing or not treat ing, by using the re la t ive  benefits as the 
c r i t e r i a  for decision-making. For example, i f  the re la t ive  
benefits of treatment are not great then treatment would not be 
enforced; and, i f  the re la t ive  benefits of treatment are great,
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then the treatment might be enforced, which would in essence be 
paternal ist ic  behaviour. Thus two ethical elements, the degree 
of competence and the consequences are in juxtaposition.
However, nurses have an ob l ig a t io n  to provide 
t r e a t m e n t  e s p e c i a l l y  i f  d isease  i n t e r f e r e s  w i th  the  
decision-making a b i l i t y  of the pa t ient /c l ient .  But who is the 
pat ien t /c l ien t  advocate in situations where the pat ien t /c l ien t  
makes an informed decision to refuse treatment, but the family 
intervene and subject the pat ient /c l ient  to treatment. Is i t  
the nurse who refuses to aid in the administration of the 
treatment in support of the pa t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  rights,  or the 
nurse who advises treatment despite the p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  
w i s h e s ?  The l a t t e r  c o u ld  be s a id  to  be a c t i n g  
p a t  e r n a 1 i s t  i c a 11 y , but i f  i t  m a t e r i a l i s e s  t h a t  the  
pat ien t /c l ien t  made the wrong decision and was la te r  grateful  
f o r  th e  t r e a t m e n t ,  would  the nurse r e s p e c t in g  the  
p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  wishes be said to be acting in the "best 
interests" of the pa t ien t /c l ien t ,  and so ju s t i f ie d .
Clearly then, the concept of advocacy is reduced to two 
main functions: f i r s t l y ,  fu l ly  informing the pa t ie n t /c l ie n t ,  and 
secondly, fu l ly  supporting the decision taken by them, which 
echoes Clark's  (1982: 6) be l ie f  (page 115), but with some
exceptions and who is to decide what these exceptions are? The 
pa t ie n t /c l ie n t  is ent it led to quality of care, access to care, 
to be f u l l y  informed about the care to be received which 
involves information about reasons, effects and side-effects and
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f u l l  understanding of  them, and f i n a l l y  understand the 
a l t e r n a t i v e s  to the care proposed. These a l l  r e la te  
respectively to the principles of ethics.
Curtin (1980: 7) believes that "so of ten by t r y i n g  to 
do what we th i nk  i s r i g h t  by our value system, we trespass upon 
the a u t h e n t i c i t y  o f  the person. The i nd i v i dua l  r a ther  than the 
p r o f e s s i o n a l  should make such value deci  s i ons" . Authentic 
is taken in this context to mean "a way o f  reaching decis ions  
which are t r u l y  one's own decisions that  express a l l  that  one 
bel ieves important  about onesel f  and the wor ld,  and the e n t i r e  
compl e x i  t y  o f  one ' s  values "(Murphy and Hunter 1983: 45).
Clearly nurses can only be advocates when the patients' r ights 
and va lues  are defended, and to do th is  one requires  
self-awareness and a good knowledge of the facts, which may be 
verbal or non-verbal.
"One important  reason, perhaps, f o r  our  
f a i l u r e  to r ea l i se  how much knowing there 
i s  in car ing i s our habi t  sometimes o f  
r e s t r i c t i n g  knowledge a r b i t r a r i l y  to what 
can be verbal i sed"
(Tschudin 1986: 17-18 quoting Mayeroff 1972)
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d) The Principle of Truth Telling/ Honesty or Veracity,
the patients right to know the truth and notions of 
informed consent and confidentiality
As ethics is involved in caring and commitment (pages 
63-74),  and caring and commitment in relationships, then i t  
becomes v ita l  that between individuals honesty in communication 
is fundamental, as trust and respect is more l i k e ly  to thrive in 
an ethical arena, as opposed to a legal one.
The right  to know the truth, that is,  the access to 
accurate information (Oxford English Dictionary 1969: 610) 
involves f i r s t l y  the r ig h t  to know the t ru th  about the 
part icular  situation in which the pat ient /c l ient  is involved, 
the fu tu re  l i f e  s ty le ,  and the diagnosis or prognosis.  
Secondly, i t  involves the right to know the truth about the 
p o s s i b l e  r i s k s  or dangers and b e n e f i t s  o f  proposed  
treatments/procedures, alternat ive treatments, and the option of 
no treatment at a l l ,  or those problems concerned with blind drug 
t r i a l s .  These two areas are primarily concerned with a choice 
between withholding the truth,  deliberate considered deception, 
and non-deception. In the f i r s t  category the main issue is to 
avoid suffering and distress; the second category is one of 
refusing information so a proper choice cannot be made; and the 
th ird  category is one of information giving so an informed 
choice may be made. I t  is in these areas that ethical dilemmas 
arise.
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Clearly withholding knowledge from patients /c l ients can 
lead to the avoidance of suffering and distress for them were 
they to know the truth.  Arguably, this withholding of the 
truth, or possible overt deception, could actually increase the 
distress, as they may 'sense' the truth, or pick up the strain  
from relat ives aware of the truth.
Davidson (1957: 109-119) argues that real harm rarely  
resulted from honesty in response to patients/c l ients who wanted 
re l iab le  information about the ir  condition, on the grounds that  
patients/c l ients may have v i ta l  duties which may be required to 
be carried out, and this can only be done i f  they have access to 
that information. In the long run, withholding the information 
is a " f requent  cause o f  the greatest  d i s t r e s s " .
The withholding of truth,  or deliberate deception also 
reduces the pat ients/c l ients ' chances of sett l ing the ir  a f fa i rs ,  
such as making a w i l l ,  and making informed decisions about the ir  
family and home that they would wish to do. I t  also bears the 
notion of paternalism, and erosion of the p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  
r ig h t s .  Thus i t  appears that to withhold the truth from 
patients/c l ients is far  outweighed by the ir  r ight to know the 
truth on the grounds suggested above, but i t  does not condone 
overt deception. For example, i f  a doctor prescribes a placebo 
for a patient's  headache and the nurse administers i t ,  the nurse 
may be viewed as withholding the truth from the patient ,  but 
cannot be accused of lying to the patient.
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However, i t  is important for nurses when weighing the 
evidence to consider the countervailing considerations in favour 
of te l l in g  the truth, and these include the p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  
desire to know the truth,  which would be discussed in the 
assessment phase of the ir  care, and based on the ir  defence of 
the ir  l ib e r ty  (page 90). Conversely, the ir  desire not to know 
the truth must be equally respected, on the same grounds.
The second considerat ion, according to Downie and 
T e l f e r  (1980: 62) is that doctors have a good history of
" o p t i m i s t i c  pronouncements" , which has led to a lack of
c o n f id e n c e ,  as these w e l l -m e a n t  decept ions  are often
unsuccessful.
The third consideration is the p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  right  
to know the truth, which is d i f ferent  from the ir  wish or desire 
to know the truth.
In the situation of blind drug t r i a ls  the issue of 
deception is paramount to the success of the t r i a l ,  as the 
results depend on patients/c lients not knowing whether they are 
receiving the real drug or a placebo. Campbell (1984: 57,
6 1 - 6 2 )  has o u t l i n e d  the e t h ic s  o f  drug or c l i n i c a l  
t r ia ls /research when the procedures being tested are not related  
to the p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  i l lness, and often exposes them to 
unnecessary treatments. Clear guidelines have been offered by 
the Declaration of Helsinki (1964) which la id  down principles  
for  therapeutic and non-therapeutic research (Appendix 6).
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T h e re  a re  s p e c i a l  c ircum stances  in rese a rch
experimentation which may affect human rights. These include 
those individuals who are mentally i l l ;  those situations in
which i n d i v i d u a l s  fe e l  that  t h e i r  re fusal  w i l l  create  
undesirable consequences, such as in prisoners, members of 
socio-economic groups in deprived situations, or in families 
where one member is already undergoing research experimentation; 
or, in s i tu a t io n s  where f u l l  disclosure would affect the 
research.
The pat ient /c l ient  has the " r i g h t  to know the t r u t h
which i s  not  a b s o l u t e , tha t  i s ,  i t  may be overr idden i f
s u f f i c i e n t  bene f i t  can be gained thereby"  (Downie and Telfer  
1980: 65). The patients/c l ients must therefore be given such 
in formation as the proposed t r i a l  of a drug, consent or 
agreement to partic ipate in the t r i a l ,  and the personal benefits 
to be gained by this part icipation. They must also be told that 
the knowledge of whether the drug on t r i a l  or a placebo is being 
administered w i l l  be withheld, and the reasons for so doing.
Furthermore, patients/c l ients in drug t r i a ls  ought to have a 
hope of something, and nothing to r isk (Mathe^ and Dion 1985:
291).
The claim that i t  is the p a t ie n ts ' /d ie n t s '  r ight to 
know has been ju s t i f ie d  on the grounds suggested. However, 
there is no obligation on behalf of the nurse to t e l l  the truth,
but there is an obligation not to l i e .  One of the bases of
authority is knowledge (Ladd 1980: 160-175) but knowledge does
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not give an individual the authority to decide the actions or 
behaviour of others. According to Webb (1987: 40) "nobody - 
d oc to r , senior  col league or  admin is t ra tor  - has the a u t ho r i t y  to 
i n s t r u c t  another person to l i e  about a p a t i e n t ' s  diagnosis or  
prognosis.  We must a l l  make our own moral dec is ions" .  This 
requires informing the pat ient /c l ient  before a decision is made 
thus i t  is important to examine the notion of informed consent.
Informed Consent and representation
Barker (1979: 23-28) defines informed consent as
" the r i g h t  o f  every human being to determine what sha l l  be 
done to h i s / h e r  body".  I t  is v i ta l  that the pa t ien t /c l ien t
and/or the ir  representative are cognisant of all  the benefits 
and risks.
The issue of the role of the nurse in informed consent 
is an emotive one. In England, informing patients/c l ients of 
the ir  diagnosis is not a legal r ight , and i t  is the treatment
and procedures tha t  are consented to tha t  c o n s t i tu te  a
requirement in law. This consent is designed to protect
hospital s ta f f ,  primarily doctors, and not the pa t ie n t /c l ie n t ,  
though arguably that may be im pl ic i t .  Often the information is 
denied the pa t ien t /c l ien t  on the grounds that the pa t ien t /c l ien t  
does not wish to know, or has not got the a b i l i t y  to 
understand. The classif icat ion of central moral issues, such as 
the l in k in g  of informed consent to autonomy as has been 
suggested by Moros et al (1987: 239), is a way of thinking 
theoret ica l ly  or abstractly about moral issues. I t  f a c i l i ta te s
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the reviewing and revising of actual ethical decision-making, so 
that a ll  expressed moral beliefs viewed as statements of ethical  
principles and claims underpin ju s t i f ia b le  actions, thus ethical  
principles can be congruous with ethical action.
Recently the UKCC has supported all  nurses in informed 
consent and this is evident in Clauses 1, 2 and 5 of the ir  
document (Appendix 1). A recent television debate (K i lroy-S i lk  
1988) added another reason for not giving information to the 
pat ie n t /c l ie n t .  This reason is grounded in the be l ie f  that the 
doctor may be unable to pronounce subjective feelings about the 
pat ien t /c l ien t  i f  the details of the diagnosis and treatment are 
disclosed. I t  may be said that not divulging information may 
serve to reinforce negative attitudes about the i l lness,  but
this has been refuted by some medical e th ic is ts , such as Gi l l  on 
(1985d: 1556) on the grounds that pa t ien ts ' /c l ien ts '  welfare
appear to be improved by honesty.
However, seve ra l  surveys about the wishes of
pat ients /c l ients ,  such as McIntosh (1976: 300-305) show c learly  
that some patients/c l ients do not want to know the ir  medical 
situation and may wish to be treated pa te rna l is t ica l ly ,  but 
doing what the pat ient /c l ient  wants is not, by def in i t ion ,  the 
same as paternal ism. A second l in e  of ju s t i f ic a t io n  of
paternalism is that pat ients/clients are not always capable of 
making medical, that is,  technically correct, decisions either
because they are ignorant of the medical facts, or too part ia l  
to the knowledge they have. Thus, the "wrong" decision may 
well be made based on these facts.
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Gill  on (1985d: 1556) favours not te l l in g  the truth and 
bases his argument on Bok's (1978: 41 -42 ,7 8 -7 9 ,1 67 ,22 3 )
interpretation of lying. F i rs t ly ,  Gil l  on (1985d) argues that  
the Hippocratic Oath (Appendix 7) and i ts  obligation to benefit 
and not harm patients/c l ients  overrides the requirement of not 
deceiving. For example, to t e l l  the truth in the case of a 
seriously i l l  patient might add to the distress of the patient,  
and al l  the consequences of that distress such as the low 
patient morale which results, does ju s t i fy  deception. But who 
is to decide, what is the pat ient /c l ient  to be told, and by 
whom? Yet cannot i t  be argued that the Hippocratic Oath 
(Appendix 7) is not sacrosanct, as i t  makes no mention of 
t r u t h f u l n e s s  to p a t ie n t s /c l i e n t s  about t h e i r  cond it ion ,  
p ro g n o s is ,  or t r e a t m e n t ,  and leaves the informing of  
patients /c l ients  to the doctor. And, the Hippocratic Oath does 
not apply to nurses.
Clearly the principle of beneficence (page 111) and 
non-maleficence or preventing harm, and to be outlined la te r ,  
overrides any requirement of not deceiving individuals, as 
deceiving an individual equates to not being aware of the ir  need 
for "autonomy", which is the underlying principle of informed 
consent, unless there is strong reason to believe that in a 
p a r t i c u l a r  case o v e r a l l  welfare  would be maximised by 
deception. Even though the deception may cause harm the respect 
the nurse has for the pat ient /c l ient  as a person, who ought to 
have the character to cope, w i l l  lead the nurse to t e l l  the
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truth. In addition, welfare may be increased by honesty but
again, is the doctor the best judge of deciding whether the
truth w i l l  or w i l l  not improve their  welfare. All the doctor is
able to do is to make a decision on balance of the facts.
Secondly, Gillon ( 1985d: 1556) argues that doctors can
never be sure of the diagnosis or prognosis, so are not rea l ly
in a position to communicate the truth either  to the nurse or
pa t ie n t /c l ie n t ,  and even i f  they were, adds Gillon (1985d),
" t he  p a t i e n t  may not  be i n  p o s i t i o n  to unders tand i t " .
Furthermore, technical words are often misunderstood by
p a t ie n t s /c l i e n t s .  Flenderson (1935: 819-823) summarised the
argument ably by stating:
" I t  i s  meaningless to speak o f  t e l l i n g  
the t r u t h ,  the whole t r u t h  and nothing  
but the t r u t h  to a p a t i en t .  I t  i s  mean­
ingless because i t  i s  impossible"
(Henderson 1935)
The problem here seems to l i e  in the doctors intention 
and arrogance. That is, does the doctor intend to discover what 
the pat ien t /c l ien t  would wish and is entit led to know; or does 
the doctor intend to deceive the pa t ien t /c l ien t .  I f  the 
pat ie n t /c l ie n t  is a mature, rational "autonomous" agent then the 
doctor ought to know, and thus the intention ought to be clear.
The third argument Gillon (1985d: 1556) offers is that  
patients /c l ients  do not wish to be told the truth when they have 
a par t icu lar ly  dangerous or fatal condition. However, there is 
evidence in several surveys such as Kelly and Friesen (1950:
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822-826); Aitken-Swan and Easson (1959: 779-783); Cassem and 
Stewart (1975: 304); Veatch (1976: 229-238); and McIntosh (1976: 
300-303), to suggest that usually over eighty percent (80%) of 
patients/c l ients would l ike  to be told the truth. McIntosh 
(1976 :  3 0 0 -3 0 3 )  in in t e r v ie w s  w i th  seventy four (74)
p a t i e n t s / c l i e n t s  with diagnosed but undisclosed malignant 
disease, demonstrated that eighty-eight percent (88%) of them 
knew the ir  diagnosis but had no desire for extra knowledge as 
they maintained a hope of cure or a hope that theirs was a wrong 
diagnosis.
Conversely, Oken (1961: 1120-1128) states that American
doctors generally withheld the truth about diagnoses of cancer
from the ir  pat ients/c l ients, but a survey carried out in 1979 by 
Novack et al (1979: 897 - 900) suggested that up to ninety-seven 
p e rc e n t  (97%) o f  responding doctors preferred  to t e l l
patients/c l ients with cancer the ir  diagnosis.
I f  the des irab i l i ty  of what the pat ien t /c l ien t  wants is 
accepted, then the important issue, according to Gillon (1985d: 
1557) is not what the doctor or the pat ient /c l ient  thinks, but 
what the particular pat ient /c l ient  in a part icular circumstance 
wants, so i t  is not clear how Gillon (1985d) can ju s t i f y  his 
three arguments (pages 134-136).
In 1983 the B r i t i s h  Medical Associat ion (BMA) 
campaigned for the rights of every pa t ien t /c l ien t  to "have 
access to a l l  informat ion which i s  held about them on t h e i r  
be ha l f " .  This is seen as a way of encouraging openness and
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improving the quality of record keeping, but coupled with the 
demand from doctors to withhold access where they see f i t .
This broad support for access to records was followed
by the DHSS Consultation Document on health data (DHSS 1985) 
which of fered  two options: " free  access" ,  or ,  "mo di f i ed
access" to records, though the la t t e r  option is yet to be
def ined.  The Royal College of Nursing (RCN) supports the
modified access approach.
By June 1986 the BMA had reversed the ir  policy and
voted that there should be no statutory right of access to
records, on the grounds that i t  would not "be in the p a t i en t s  
best  7n t e r e s t s " , that "people d id  not want to know",  that 
i t  would " i n h i b i t  r e co rd  k e ep i n g " ,  that  " p a t i e n t s  would 
have l i t t l e  understanding o f  the records" ,  and that i t  would 
" i r r e p a r a b l y  harm the doc to r -pa t ien t  r e l a t i o n s h i p " . I t  has 
already been argued (page 134) that doctors who believe that 
fu l l  disclosure is not in the pat ien t /c l ien t  interest may be
said to be act ing paternal i s t i c a l l y  and contravening the 
p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  right  in informed consent. However, there 
are cases where i t  may be ju s t i f ia b le  to withhold access to 
records, such as in the pat ient /c l ient  who may possibly suffer  
harm and distress, or mentally i l l  patients but there is no 
evidence, to date, to demonstrate just  what this harm might be.
The Access to Medical Records B i l l  (1988) which would
give patients /c l ients  the r ight to see the ir  medical references
sent by General P r a c t i t io n e rs  to insurance companies or
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employers, has received an unapposed Second Reading in the House 
of Lords in May 1988, and goes forward to the committee stage in 
June 1988. I f  i t  becomes law i t  wi l l  enable people to correct 
inaccuracies about themselves. This B il l  (1988) was in addition 
to the Access to Personal Files Act (1987) which did not include 
medical records, as the Government claimed i t  would be too 
impracticable and costly to make these records accessible by 
Statutory r ight .  The Government l e f t  the sharing of information 
with patients/c l ients as a matter of c l in ical  judgement to the 
doctor. Therein l ies  the basis of the current problem whereby 
nurses subsume a deferent role to the doctor. The Access to 
Personal Files Act (1987) give doctors primary responsibil i ty  to 
decide whether patients/c l ients  may see the ir  records. Nurses 
may only be consulted i f  the doctor responsible for the 
pat ien t /c l ien t  is not available.
For the nurse the decision to withhold the truth, or 
deceive deliberate ly , or t e l l  the truth,  would in the f inal  
analysis be a decision to te l l  the truth unless lying proved to 
be the lesser of two evi ls ,  and would be the result of reasoned 
rigorous debate. The balance then appears to l i e  between fu l l  
disclosure which is the p a t ie n ts ' /d ie n ts '  r ight ,  and witholding 
information in certain circumstances where i t  appears not to be 
in the pa t ie n ts ' /c l ie n ts '  "best interests", as in f iduciary care 
or r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  where the individual is unable to make 
c h o i c e s / d e c i s i o n s .  The d i f f i c u l t y  in a c t in g  in the 
p a t ie n ts ' /c l ie n ts '  "best interests" has already been highlighted 
(page 102).
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improving the quality of record keeping, but coupled with the 
demand from doctors to withhold access where they see f i t .
This broad support for access to records was followed
by the DHSS Consultation Document on health data (DHSS 1985) 
which of fe red  two options: "f r e e  access" ,  or ,  "mo di f i ed
access" to records, though the la t t e r  option is yet to be
def ined .  The Royal College of Nursing (RCN) supports the
modified access approach.
By June 1986 the BMA had reversed the ir  policy and
voted that there should be no statutory right of access to
records, on the grounds that i t  would not "be in the p a t i en t s  
best  i n t e r e s t s " , that "people d id  not want to know", that 
i t  would " i n h i b i t  r e co rd  k e ep i n g " ,  tha t  "p a t i e n t s  would 
have l i t t l e  understanding o f  the records",  and that i t  would 
" 7 r repa rab ly  harm the doc to r -pa t ien t  r e l a t i o n s h i p " . I t  has 
already been argued (page 134) that doctors who believe that 
fu l l  disclosure is not in the pat ien t /c l ien t  interest may be
said to be act ing paternal i s ' t i c a l l y  and contravening the 
p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  right  in informed consent. However, there 
are cases where i t  may be ju s t i f ia b le  to withhold access to 
records, such as in the pat ient /c l ient  who may possibly suffer  
harm and distress, or mentally i l l  patients but there is no 
evidence, to date, to demonstrate just  what this harm might be.
The Access to Medical Records B i l l  (1988) which would
give patients /c l ients  the r ight to see the ir  medical references
sent by General P r a c t i t io n e rs  to insurance companies or
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Source
Ethical principles of beneficence and autonomy. 
Right to information derived from human rights 
that result from fundamental rights.
Basis of 
providers duty 
to disclose
Establishing of nurse/patient/c lient relationship.
Pr io r i ty  of 
i ssues
Based on pat ient /c l ient  self-determination or 
pat ient /c l ient  best interests.
Judgement 
concerning what 
information is 
provided
Nurse and/or pat ien t /c l ien t .
Enforcement of 
patients rights
Common thread of humanity and conscience.
Purpose of 
di sclosure
To preserve human dignity.
Scope of 
obligation to 
disclose
May cause professional to give more than 
minimum information.
C r i te r ia  for a 
model of 
disclosure
Pure and exacting such that an ideal model 
is approached.
Figure 3b : Disclosure as viewed from a 
moral perspective,
After D.M. Trandel - Korenchuk, 
Nursing Administration Quarterly, 
11(1). 4, Fall 1986
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Confidentiality
Establishing the next-of-kin, or s ignif icant others,
with whom to share information, and to f a c i l i t a t e  the principle
of informed consent (page 132), provides an ethical dilemma in
i t s e l f .  Many next-of-kin are designated by law to be the
n e x t - o f - k in .  This is fu r th e r  compounded by the changing
structure of the nuclear and extended family, the increase in
single parent families, either  by choice or divorce, and the
numbers of the health care team involved in care a ll  make the
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a breach of  confidence g r e a te r .  Often
patients/c l ients wi l l  name the ir  next-of-kin as the individual
they consider to be the ir  closest friend in the ir  social network,
and make no distinct ion between the social,  legal,  and ethical
implications of this choice. Added to th is ,  talking to the
n e x t -o f -k in  before consulting the p a t ie n t /c l ie n t  is common
practice, and is of course in confl ic t  with the pr inciple of
conf ident ia l i ty .  This approach raises a major factor in that
when the doctor speaks f i r s t  to the next-of-kin or family, i t  may
be that both pa t ient /c l ient  and family recognise that the doctor
has a duty or obligation to the next-of-kin or family as well ,
and c le a r l y  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  is needed to establish that the
(Appendix 8)
pa t ie n t /c l ie n t  is the doctors'^ and nurses' prime concern. I t  in 
no way demeans the consideration due to the family as a whole.
Confidentia li ty  is the right of every p a t ien t /c l ien t  and 
not a p r iv i l e g e  afforded nurses, as implied in the United
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Kingdom Central Council (UKCC) Advisory paper on conf ident ia li ty  
(UKCC 1987: 5, Section 5). These guidelines on the disclosure 
of information fu r th e r  implies that nurses are the final
a r b i t e r s ,  as "each n u r s e , mi dwi fe  and h e a l t h  v i s i t o r  i s
accoun t ab l e  f o r  h i s  o r  her  p r a c t i c e  " (UKCC 1984 :
Clause 9 ) ,  and this is an impractical solution to ethical
dilemmas, as increasingly Ethical Committees and care-givers are 
being encouraged to share in the e th ica l  decision-making 
responsibil i ty  at a c l in ical  level and to date the nurse would 
need to have permission so to do. This guideline then is a 
contradiction as la te r  in the document (UKCC 1987, Section D,
Item 5) i t  states " p r a c t i t i o n e r s  should always take the 
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  d i s c u s s  t he  m a t t e r  f u l l y  w i t h  o t h e r  
p r a c t i t i o n e r s   before making a dec is ion" .
Nurses must be careful not to confuse issues of
conf ident ia l i ty  with ethical dilemmas even though sometimes both 
may overlap in some way. Some of the examples given by the UKCC 
(1987) arise from correspondence from nursing s ta f f  in what is 
to be considered as issues of conf ident ia l i ty .  I t  does appear 
however that in some of these cases confident ia l i ty  is not a 
problem. As a case in point, the Nursing Sister who finds a gun 
on the person of an unconscious patient in an Accident and 
Emergency ( C a s u a l t y )  Department, is not breaching any 
conf ident ia l i ty  i f  the gun is put in a place of safety, until  a 
balanced decision can be made when the fu l l  facts about the gun 
are known. This example is rea l ly  an ethical dilemma as to what
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the nurse ought to do with the information about the gun, as 
clearly  no breach of confidentia li ty  has yet occurred, and the 
facts about the gun would be ascertained f i r s t .
The main lawful excuses for breaching conf ident ia l i ty  
are either legal compulsion or patient consent. However, i f  the 
r isk to another individual outweighs the r isk of disclosure, 
then the overwhelming evidence suggests that the confidence be 
breached, and the relevant action taken, provided i t  has been 
substantiated. Thus, the Nursing Sister 's  example, described 
e a r l i e r  (page 142), would clearly fa l l  into this category. 
Other lawful excuses include evidence of child abuse, and breach 
of conf ident ia l i ty  is permitted i f  i t  is in the "best interests"  
of the child being abused. The UKCC document (1987: 7, Section 
B, Item 6) gives examples where "pub l i c  i n t e r es t  except ions"  
as in serious crime, child abuse, and drug tra f f ick ing  outweighs 
the general commitment to confident ia l i ty .
C le a r ly  p a t ie n ts /c l ie n ts  have a r ight to know the 
standards of conf ident ia li ty  during the assessment phase of 
t h e i r  h o s p i t a l i s a t i o n / t r e a t m e n t ,  or "at f i r s t  p o i n t  o f  
con tac t", (UKCC 1987: 7, Section B, Item 2),  and the ir  right  
to privacy of thought, opinion, records, and physical presence. 
I f  they are not aware of these rights then the nurse needs to 
ensure that they are made aware and thus guidelines for practice 
are needed. The author suggests a series of questions may be 
asked to ensure conf ident ia l i ty  and privacy and to f a c i l i t a t e  
understanding of informed consent, and these questions give some
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structure to the interview to aid decision-making. The answers 
and outcomes to these questions would be noted on the Nursing 
Care plan to ensure that some record is kept. For example:
1. (a)
(b)
2. (a)
(b)
3. (a)
(b)
4. (a)
(b)
as part  
essential
Are the p a t ie n ts /c l ie n ts  aware of the ir  rights to 
confident ia l i ty ,  and all  i ts  ramifications?
Are the nurses aware of the ir  duty to discuss with 
patients/c l ients  the ir  rights, and the consequences of 
doing/not doing so?
Is the pa t ient /c l ient  aware of and understands the 
reasons why and when confidentia li ty  may be breached? 
The overriding reasons for breach of confident ia l i ty  
are for example:
i )  Auto Immune Deficiency Syndrome
i i )  Child abuse
i i i )  Serious crime
iv) Drug t raf f ick ing
Is the nurse aware of and prepared to manage the 
p o s s i b l e  d e t r i m e n t a l  e f f e c t s  i n  t h e  
n u r s e /p a t i e n t /c l i e n t  relationship when a breach of 
confident ia l i ty  could/has occur/occurred?
Has the nurse made the appropriate arrangements to give 
the information in a c o n f id e n t ia l  pr ivate  manner 
(place; time spent; who present;)?
At the appropriate time, is the information received by 
the pat ien t /c l ien t  in a confidential private manner 
(place; time spent; who present/giving information)?
Once the confident ia li ty  information is given, is the 
nurse prepared  to manage the s i tu a t io n  i f  the 
p at ien t /c l ien t  waives the confidential ity?
Once the confidential information is received, w i l l  the 
pat ien t /c l ien t  waive the conf ident ia l i ty ,  i f  necessary 
so to do?
Though this may appear time consuming i t  is considered 
of the p a t i e n t ' s / c l i e n t ' s  r ig h t s ,  and therefore  
to ethical decision-making.
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The pa t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  right to refuse treatment is 
based on the r ight to self-determination which is i t s e l f  based 
on the respect that is owed an individual as choosing beings. 
The concept of rights, such as the right to l i f e ,  to choose, to 
the truth, is a concept which is in the moral sense impervious 
to public power.
To say that an individual pat ient /c l ient  has a right  
clearly  subsumes that other individuals have a responsibil i ty  
not to interfere with that individual obtaining, possessing, or 
using that r ight .  In this context the author wishes to stress 
that i t  is the moral rights (page 76) not the legal r ights, of 
the individual with which these issues are concerned.
Moral rights are grounded in general opinion, good 
reason, or both (Jameton 1984: 139), and do not necessarily have 
legal overtones. C lear ly  there are instances when the 
pat ien t /c l ien t  w i l l  have a moral right  to something, and there 
should morally be also a legal right to i t .  Rights are thus 
contingent on another individual f u l f i l l i n g  the responsibil i ty  
to meet that r ight and this reciprocity of action is balanced 
for example in cases where patients/c l ients have a r ight to know 
the  t r u t h  about t h e i r  i l l n e s s ,  and the nurse has a 
responsibil i ty  to explain the truth.  However, pat ients/c l ients  
also have a duty to t e l l  the truth (or not to l i e )  to the nurse, 
just  as the nurse has a right to know the truth (or not to be 
l ied to) from pat ients /c l ients .  Most rights are not considered 
absolute,  that is ,  they may be overridden by other rights
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(Jameton 1984: 139). As a case in point, i f  a nurse does not 
deliver  what patients consider to be adequate care, as in the 
notion of trusteeship (page 113) then patients may refuse this  
seemingly inadequate care. Thus a pat ient's refusal of care may 
override a nurse's right to uphold her professional judgement of
adequate care. But, the nurse has a right to refuse to t reat  or
partic ipate in the care of some pat ients/c l ients. However, 
appropriate c r i te r ia  for a refusal to be ju s t i f ia b le  is required 
and Johnstone (1988: 147-157) has outlined these. For a refusal 
to be ju s t i f ia b le  i t  requires a respect for individuals as ends 
in themselves or out of respect for  the ir  in tr ins ic  moral worth; 
upholding the principles of non-maleficence and/or beneficence; 
the bringing about of equal distr ibut ion of harm and benefits;  
being chosen on the basis of "autonomous" and c r i t i c a l l y  
re f lec t ive  moral thinking; and, the nurse is required to give 
notice of intention to refuse to care /treat  with reasons.
(e) The Principle of Justice or Fairness and notions of
Equality/Equity in the allocation of resources
The c la s s ic a l  dilemmas, which involve rights and 
claims, arise in issues of just ice or fairness or what is
owed an ind iv id ua l  by another individual or society, and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  in the a l lo c a t io n  of scarce resources, an 
"e th i c a l  quest ion tha t  in te rsec ts  a l l  s o c ia l , p o l i t i c a l , legal  
and economic issues fac ing  soc ie ty  and nursing as p a r t  o f  tha t  
s o c i e t y "  (A ro s k a r  1979: 3 5 -4 4 ) .  Fromer (1982: 15-21)
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challenges the fa irest  method of determining the receipt of 
benefits of such scarce resources, such as the use of equipment, 
costly drugs, and the time of health care professionals. Trying 
to meet competing needs of patients/clients addresses the notion 
of the principle of just ice. Distributing scarce resources in a 
f a i r  way involves matching individual needs to the resource. As 
in a l l  evaluative concepts, there exists the d i f f i c u l t y  in 
obtaining consensus about appropriate c r i te r ia  by which needs 
can be ranked re la t ive  to one another in a hierarchy. This is 
further compounded by the varying interpretations of need, and 
the meanings t h a t  r e c i p i e n t s  p lace  on t h e i r  p l i g h t .  
Technically, i t  is possible to identify  absolute need - a state 
in which survival of human organism is not threatened (Jones et 
al 1983: 26) by itemising the biological requirements as the 
c r i t e r i a .
Caplan (1983: 312) noted that when asked by an American 
hospital to assess an issue of micro-allocation of resources and 
ethics, found that most philosophers proffered predictable and 
defens ib le  c r i t e r i a  such as merit, medical need, societal
u t i l i t y  or social worth, p a r t ia l i ty ,  a rb i t ra ry / lo t te ry  or random 
choice,  and maximisation of w e l fa re .  Caplan (1983) in
in v e s t ig a t in g  the source of the scarcity of the product,
discovered that in some cases of efficacious ethical action, his 
problem solving lay in ameliorating the source of the scarcity,  
and was not dependent on "a n a ly t i c a l  r ig o u r  or  th e o re t ic a l
moral soph i  s t i c a t i o n " . According to Caplan (1983) ethical
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theory would have been the wrong place to turn for a solution,  
as:
"Scarce resources do not al low  
prov is ion  o f  the care which would 
be in the p a t ien ts  "best in te re s ts " .
(Melia 1987: 48)
In emergency s i tua t io ns  the patient is unable to
exercise autonomy for varying reasons (pages 97-99) and the
interest of one pat ient's needs may confl ic t  with another, thus
questions of just ice and fairness arise.
The concepts of justice and fairness are sometimes used
interchangeably, but according to Rawls (1981: 292) they are
d i f fe rent  concepts, very roughly:
"Jus t ice  to a p rac t ice  in  which there 
i s  no opt ion whether to engage in i t  or  
n o t , and one must p lay ;  fa i rness  to a 
p ra c t ice  in which there is  such an opt ion,  
and one may decl ine the i n v i t a t i o n "
(Rawls 1981: 292)
Thus justice applies to practices in which there is no 
choice whether or not to part ic ipate , such as with systems of
government where the individual has no option but to partic ipate  
by the nature of the situation they are in. However, fairness 
applies to practices where individuals are in competition one
with another, such as in collect ive bargaining and games, and by
that very nature the individual is allowed a choice as to
whether or not to bargain, play, or the l ik e .  In this thesis
p r a c t i c e  is  taken to  mean "a s o r t  o f  t e c h n ic a l  term  
meaning any form o f  a c t i v i t y  spec i f ied  by a system o f  ru les
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which def ines o f f i c e s  and ro le s , r ig h ts  and d u t i e s , pena l t ies
and defences   and which gives the a c t i v i t y  i t s  s t ru c tu re "
(Rawls 1981: 293).
For Rawls (1981) though ju s t ic e  and fairness are 
di f fe rent  concepts they share a fundamental element in common, 
which he , calls  the concept of reciprocity. According to Rawls 
(1981: 308-309) the question of reciprocity arises when two 
individuals are partic ipating in a jo in t  a c t iv i ty ,  are sharing 
in i ts  benefits and i ts  burdens, and need an interest  in the 
outcome of the ac t iv i ty .  The principle of reciprocity requires 
a mutual acceptance of the circumstances and conditions, and the 
individuals would be seen to conform to this notion i f  neither  
individual feels that they are taken advantage of or forced to 
do things which are not legitimate. So for Rawls (1981):
" I t  is  t h i s  requirement o f  the p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  mutual acknowledgement o f  p r in c ip le s  by 
f ree  and equal persons who have not a u th o r i t y  
over one another which makes the concept o f  
r e c ip r o c i t y  fundamental to both j u s t i c e  and 
f a i r n e s s " .
(Rawls 1981: 309)
Rawls (1981) does not however give consideration to
children and mentally subnormal people.
The p r i n c i p l e  of  j u s t i c e ,  often re fe r re d  to as
" d i s t r i b u t i v e  j u s t i c e " .  (Downie and Caiman 1987: 55;
Frankena 1973: 49) applies to our dealings with individuals or 
groups and is embodied in the pr inc ip le  of autonomy and
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o b l ig a t io n .  D is tr ibu t ive  just ice implies a notion of the 
comparative treatment of individuals such as "you ought to 
t r e a t  l i k e  cases a l i k e ", and that any discrimination for or 
against must be ju s t i f ie d .
To i l lu s t r a te  this point two individuals require a 
renal haemodialysis machine and treatment. The presumption is 
that both individuals should be treated s imilar ly . However, one 
w i l l  be chosen in preference to the other on ju s t i f ia b le  
grounds, such as a promise of treatment, or that due to age or 
prognosis, so one is seen as having more " u t i l i t y "  than the 
other. Thus, when medical resources are scarce some form of 
just  distr ibut ion of these resources must be achieved f a i r l y  and 
e f f i c i e n t l y .  This principle plainly is concerned with who 
r e c e i v e s  the b e n e f i t s ,  and who bears the  burden of  
decision-making in the concept of need, equality of opportunity, 
equity or desert. In addition, how does the pa t ien t /c l ien t  
ensure they are receiving the ir  f a i r  share of the resources.
Ostensibly, there seems to be f ive main theories of 
just ice  which arise for consideration. F i rs t ly ,  Libertarian  
theor ies  of ju s t i c e  emphasise that  individuals should be 
accorded maximal respect for the ir  personal l ib e r ty .  Secondly, 
U t i l i t a r ia n  theories of just ice, such as Hare (1981: 147-168) 
emphasise th a t  in d iv id u a ls  deserve to have th e ir  welfare 
maximised. Thirdly, Marxist theories of just ice emphasise that  
individuals deserve to have the ir  needs met, meaning " to  each 
acco rd ing  to h is  needs". Fourthly, Rawls'(1976) theory of
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just ice is a blend of u t i l i t a r ia n  and marxist theories coupled 
with a respect for autonomy. Rawls' f i r s t  principle espouses 
that "people should have the maximal l i b e r t y  compatible w i th  
the same degree o f  l i b e r t y  f o r  everyone". Rawls' (1976) 
second p r in c ip le  asserts that "de l ibe ra te  in e q u a l i t i e s  were 
unjust  unless they worked to the advantage o f  the least wel l  
o f f " .  Rawls (1976) views the moral personality as the basis 
of equality which is a mutually contractual agreement. The 
d i f f i c u l t y  with Rawls' (1976) theory is that he assumes that all  
humans are moral, and he appears to dismiss the varying degrees 
of morality that exist in humans. Finally , Ross' (1930: 26-27) 
theory of ju s t i c e  is e s s e n t ia l ly  a matter of reward for  
individual merit.
The process of nursing clearly  involves just ice ,  that  
is the caring of and caring for patients/c l ients in a just way. 
To take care of an individual assumes the notion of verbal and 
non-verbal communications, and caring for an individual implies 
a commitment, honesty and empathy. This therefore implies* an 
allocation of benefits in regard to nursing care which is in 
fa c t  d i s t r i b u t i v e  ju s t i c e .  C lear ly  r ights  or " j u s t i f i e d  
cla ims"  (Beauchamp and Childress 1983: 50) and duties emerge 
from the contracts and commitments embodied in nursing, and this  
involves truth t e l l in g .
A number of c r i t e r i a  have been proposed by varying 
ph i lo so phers  in deciding what rules of d i s t r ib u t io n  or 
comparative treatment that individuals are required to act on.
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According to Frankena (1973: 49) some of these c r i t e r i a  include 
meting out just ice according to desert or merit; distr ibuting  
good and e v i l  equa l ly ,  except in c e r ta in  cases such as 
punishment; and t r e a t in g  people according to the ir  needs, 
a b i l i t ie s  or both. Frankena (1962: 19) holds that a ll  men are 
to be treated as equals on the grounds that they are all  
humans, with emotions and desires, and who think.
The cr iter ion of desert or merit, advanced by Aris tot le  
(384-322 BC) is based on the notion of proportional equality 
which implies that justice is distributing the good, such as 
happiness in accordance with virtue or other c r i t e r i a .  In other 
words, i t  means that individuals are given benefits depending on 
the ir  attributes and which are of part icular importance to the 
community. Ar is to t le 's  (384-322BC) formal principle saw just ice  
as a re la t ive  concept in terms of what an individual is owed or 
ent i t led  and what is deserved. Those who deserved the same were 
owed the same, so that those who deserved more were owed more, 
and conversely those who deserved less were owed less. Thus, 
what individuals are owed is in s t r ic t  proportion to the ir  
deserts, and l ike  cases should be treated a l ike ,  echoed by 
Aris to t le  (1131) as:
"Equals should be t reated equa l ly  
and unequals unequally in p ropor t ion  
to the re levant in e q u a l i t ie s "
(Aristotle  1131: 22-25)
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C lear ly  the d istr ibut ion of benefits then must be 
ju s t ly  determined on the basis of merit or demerit, though there 
are some instances, such as i l lness, in which there is no merit.
A generally acceptable substantive position to ensure 
f a i r  ad judicat ion between competing claims is f i r s t l y  to 
dis t ingu ish  the method for  j u s t i f y i n g  the cla ims. The 
preliminary d ist inct ive claims must be presented in an impartial 
way and ju s t i f ie d  on ethical grounds. For instance, nursing 
s ta f f  cannot decide that body size is a method for allocation of 
resources, because this is not a relevant moral characteristic .
What c r i te r ia  arise for consideration w i l l  depend on 
the effic iency of the ethical argument, however, once they have 
been established they are rule-bound or bound by laws. In other 
words these c r i te r ia  cannot be changed for a long period of 
time, as i t  would be clearly unjust i f  they were changed for  
each individual.  As the c r i te r ia  chosen are related to the 
nature of society i t  is evident that d i f ferent  societies w i l l  
have d i f fer ing c r i te r ia ,  that is, they w i l l  be culture-bound.
Given the fervent disagreement about which c r i t e r i a  or 
moral values should take precedent; and given that medical need 
and medical success are plagued by moral evaluative problems, 
such as what c r i te r ia  are appropriate and how is success to be 
measured, i t  would be plausible to suggest that the most that 
any individual can do is to ju s t i f ia b ly  p r io r i t is e ,  rank or give 
weighting to the moral value, then justice is done and is seen 
to be done. The assertion of need however, entails  assertion of
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implied values, and how are these c r i te r ia ,  such as prolongation 
of l i f e ,  or improved quality of l i f e  to be ranked. Further to 
this what def init ions are to be accepted by these terms, and how 
do individuals choose between competing candidates agreed by 
some c r i t e r i a  to be in medical need.
I t  would seem plausible to suggest that a mixture of 
approaches, such as combining the cr iter ion of merit with the 
cr i ter ion of medical need, but there is a considerable amount of 
h is t o r ic a l  and sociological  evidence to suggest that " the  
a l lo c a t io n  o f  medical resources on the basis o f  a p a t ien ts  
non-medical mer i ts  is  wide ly  regarded as repugnant" (Gillon 
1986: 97).
In health care the allocation of resources is largely  
dependent on the medical success of the resource to be 
distributed.  For example, currently research into the Auto 
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) virus is being financed by the 
Government in an e f for t  to speed up the l ikelihood of f inding a 
vaccine. Money was also invested in a machine to process 
cervical smear specimens in the diagnosis of cervical cancer, 
and i ts  recent medical success demonstrates the p r io r i ty  given 
to the medical need c r i te r ia  in deciding resources.
At best any chosen c r i te r ia  must provide a practical  
way of  reso lv ing the dilemma of allocating scarce medical 
r e s o u rc e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i f  the moral values embody the 
fundamental moral values such as beneficence, non-maleficence, 
autonomy and pat ien t /c l ien t  rights. Furthermore, the system
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must include A r i s t o t l e ' s  (384-322 BC) formal principle of 
j u s t i c e  which includes equality, impart ia li ty  and fairness.  
However, treat ing people equally does not mean treat ing them 
i d e n t i c a l l y  or  j u s t l y ,  i t  m e r e ly  i m p l i e s  " m a k in g  
p ro p o r t i o n a l l y  the same con t r ibu t ion  to the goodness o f  t h e i r  
l i v e s "  (Frankena 1973: 51).
I t  could of course be reasonable to argue that the most 
egali tar ian way would be to conduct a lo t te ry .  A lo t te ry  at 
least does not discriminate on merit or a b i l i t y ,  age, or race, 
but i t  would be d i f f i c u l t  to apply, and may confl ic t  with the 
"do no harm" principle as others may consciously suffer.
Nurses have four obligations under the principle of 
d i s t r i b u t i v e  j u s t i c e ,  which g ives  them the power and 
responsibil i ty  to effect change. These obligations involve the 
obligation to do all  they can to meet the needs of the ir  
p a t i e n t s / c l i e n t s ;  to be competent whether or not the 
patients/c l ients pay for the ir  services; to improve standards 
and methods of health care by research and design; and to 
i d e n t i f y  i f  the system of health care is not meeting the 
fundamental health needs. The dilemma arises as to whether any 
resources are allocated to a pat ient /c l ient  who wishes to l iv e ,  
but cannot due to some terminal i l lness, especially when these 
resources could alternatively  be allocated to a p a t ien t /c l ien t  
who has a good chance of l iv ing/surviva l .
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J u s t i c e ,  however, may a lso be viewed from a 
re tr ibu t ive ,  reparative or corrective standpoint and Frankena 
(1973: 74) contends that i t  is just as important to apply
sanctions to those who have done wrong, as to those who have 
done well ,  though he further concedes a reluctance to do so 
unless the punitive sanctions are ju s t i f ie d .
" I t  is  poss ib le  to hold that the 
func t ion  o f  holding people responsible  
and applying sanctions is  not r e t r i b u t i o n  
but educat ion , re fo rmation , prevent ion and 
encouragement"
(Frankena 1973: 74)
However, to accept the view tha t  the th re a t  of 
punishment is a sanction in just ice, makes the argument a legal 
one, and not an ethical one, unless the sanction is l imited to 
blame.
Ostensibly, for justice and fairness to be meted out i t  
requires treat ing each other in a beneficent and non-maleficent 
manner, that is,  distr ibut ing goodness and preventing harm, on 
the basis of merit or desert; needs, a b i l i t i e s ,  or both; or what 
appears to be the most egal itarian is to conduct a lo t te ry  
whereby a l l  individuals have an equal chance given and an equal 
chance to acquire.
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( f )  The Principle of Goodness or Rightness (Beneficence),
N o n -m a le f ic e n c e ,  and the concepts of  Acts and 
Omissions, Double effect ,  Ordinary and Extra-ordinary 
means
( i )  Beneficence and Non-maleficence
These principles imply that individuals such as nurses 
promote goodness over harm; cause no harm; and prevent harm. 
Beneficence is the active provision or promotion of good, 
encompassing all  direct and indirect action, but not i f  the 
provision of that good also produces an equal greater harm. 
Non-mal e f  i cence is  the ob l igat ion  not to harm another  
individual e ither by deliberate means, or by harm caused by 
being at r isk ,  or, by harm that occurs during the performance of 
beneficial action, such as treatment. Clearly the nurse would 
have to decide what degree of risk is e th ica l ly  permissible.
In order to respect a person as an "autonomous" being, 
that is to respect a person as an end, Downie and Caiman (1987: 
53) believe that the individual has to employ the principles of 
b e n e f ic e n c e  t h a t  i s ,  benevolence or compassion,  and 
non-maleficence.
Frankena (1973: 45) holds that beneficence underlines 
the basic premise of u t i l i tar ian ism as he asserts that in order 
to do good that is,  beneficence, and to prevent or avoid doing 
harm, that  is ,  non-maleficence, the individual has a duty to t ry  
to real ise the greatest balance of good over e v i l .  So for
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Frankena (1973) the p r in c ip le  of u t i l i t y  presupposes the
principle of beneficence, and according to him:
'We have a prima fac ie  o b l iga t ion  to 
maximise the balance o f  good over e v i l  
only i f  we have a p r i o r  prima fac ie  
ob i ig a t io n  to do good and prevent 
harm"
(Frankena 1973: 45)
In everyday discourse 'good' implies commendation or a 
s a t is fa c to r y  degree of c h a r a c te r is t ic  qual it ies which are 
admirable or useful for some purpose (Oxford English Dictionary 
1972: 1173); and ' e v i l '  being the antithesis of good, denoting 
doing or tending to do harm, pain or discomfort (Oxford English 
Dictionary 1972: 909-910).
Frankena (1973: 79-83, 89) gives a whole range of
points of view of good, such as u t i l i t y  values, in t r ins ic  values 
and f inal values. He stresses that individuals ought to look 
for both good and evil values, as some things may be good in one 
sense and bad in another. However, Frankena (1973) seems to 
p re fe r  the notions of in tr ins ic  value whereby the good is 
performed because of the ir  own in tr ins ic  properties, and the 
u t i l i t y  value whereby things are good because of  t h e i r  
usefulness for some purpose.
According to Frankena (1973) individuals do not have a 
duty or obligation to be beneficent, though praiseworthy and 
virtuous i t  may be. I f  by being beneficent then just ice results 
then that is a l l  that morality demands. Frankena (1973: 45-48) 
then sees non-maleficence as merely an aspect of beneficence, as
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both are weighed together and assessed in the l igh t  of respect 
for autonomy and justice.
Gillon (1985c: 44) outlines Buchanan's (1982: 33-62)
rigorous argument that there is no such moral obligation as 
doing good for others, and outlines three main constraints to 
beneficence. Primarily, Gillon (1985c: 44) espouses that the
duty of beneficence has to be tempered with the duty of respect 
for autonomy, on the grounds that consideration must be given to 
what the p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  wants depending on whether the 
pat ien t /c l ien t  is viewed as an "autonomous" rational agent or as 
a human being. Secondly, beneficence has to be tempered with 
the duty of non-maleficence as both good and harm have to be 
given equal consideration in the assessment, as the benefits and 
harm to the pat ient /c l ient  that results have to be clearly  
stated. Thirdly, the duty of beneficence has to be tempered
with ju s t ic e  (page 146), on the grounds that cost benefit 
analysis are considered in terms of distribut ion of resources, 
and in order to do good one has to be just  or f a i r  in the 
distr ibution of goods (Mooney 1980: 177-179). A cost benefit  
analysis may be a f a i r  way of allocating resources but i t  is not 
necessarily just ice .
B enef icence  im p l ie s  prevent ion  of  harm to the
pa t ie n t /c l ie n t  or removal of harmful conditions. Pla inly, the 
goal is to benefit  others, but is i t  a moral good or a moral 
duty? For i t  to be a moral duty then certain c r i t e r i a  must be 
met. The nurse must be in the position of preventing the harm
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or loss and wi l l  in fact prevent the harm or loss. At the same 
time the pat ient /c l ient  must be at risk of harm or loss. The 
pat ien t /c l ien t  must be at minimal r isk and outweigh any harm to 
the nurse for any benefit  to be gained. I f  this is so, then 
nurses c learly  have a duty of beneficence. The principle of
beneficence does not prescribe how individuals are to distr ibute  
goods and evi ls ,  i t  only advocates that individuals produce the 
one end and prevent the other. When confl ic t  arises i t  is the 
principle of just ice which is required to enter the interplay.
Non-maleficence implies the non-inf l ic t ion of harm on
other persons, including intentional harm or r isk of harm. For 
example, the nurse who fa i ls  to administer a prescribed drug may 
be causing as much harm by this omission, though i t  may be
unintentional.  Were the nurse to administer the prescribed 
drug, then the administration is intentional as the nurse is in 
the fu l l  knowledge that the pat ient /c l ient  may be at r isk from 
the side effects of that drug. In both cases the p a t ien t /c l ien t  
is at r isk from harm though the motive seems to be one of
intent.
Whilst i t  seems plausible that we owe non-maleficence 
to a l l ,  i t  does not follow from the premise that avoidance of 
non-maleficence takes p r io r i ty  over beneficence, on the grounds 
that i t  is impossible to ta lk  of a duty which the individual may 
not be able to f u l f i l .  Simpl i s t ic a l  l y ,  the beneficent, 
non-maleficent principles require an individual to str ive to be 
'good' human beings, as opposed to bad, thus promoting good over
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bad; and to strive to perform the right action, as opposed to 
the wrong, carefully causing no harm/badness, and preventing 
harm/badness where i t  can be foreseen.
( i i )  Acts and Omissions Doctrine
The second theme concerning intervention into health 
status is one about k i l l in g  and le t t ing die or not striving to 
keep alive, that is,  about acts or omission.
"A simple omission to act may bear 
a d i f f e r e n t  construc t ion  than an 
emphatic neglect o f  an act ion"
(Harris 1985: 29)
To i l lu s t ra te  th is, a nurse may treat  a pa t ien t /c l ien t ,  
or may fa i l  to omit to treat  them. The acts and omissions
doctrine implies that " in  ce r ta in  con tex t , f a i l u r e  to perform 
an a c t ,  w i t h  c e r t a i n  fo reseen bad consequences o f  t h a t  
f a i l u r e ,  is  mora l ly  less bad than to perform a d i f f e r e n t  act
which has the i d e n t i c a l  foreseen bad consequences" (Glover 
1984: 92). Glover (1984) holds that the variet ies of omission 
range from ignorance that is negligence, to conscious omission 
due to a variety of motives. For example, sending money to aid 
famine victims could be conceived as reducing misery for those 
victims, yet to fa i l  to do so would be an example of the 
omission part of the act - omission doctrine.
For Foot (1978: 26-27) the acts and omission doctrine
is a d ist inct ion between what we do and what we allow, and on
some occasions both are equally morally wrong. On this basis
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she proposes a doctr ine of positive and negative duties; 
positive duties implies helping people, such as acts of charity; 
whilst negative duties are designed to refrain from injuring or 
harming people, which are seen as more important than positive 
duties. Thus, for Foot (1978: 28) i t  is not permissible to 
commit a murder or to steal in order to provide food for an 
in d iv id u a l 's  s tarv ing chi ldren.  Arguably, not to provide 
starving children with food could mean their  death, as great a 
harm as had the individual murdered or stolen in the f i r s t  
instance.
According to Harris (1985: 42) the important difference 
between p o s i t iv e  acts and omissions is that "blame f o r  a 
p o s i t i v e  act seldom depends on how d i f f i c u l t  not ac t ing  would 
have been", though according to Harris (1985) this is the 
exception to the rule. Clearly, some omissions create just  as 
much a probabi l i ty of death as their  corresponding acts. As a 
case in point, i f  a doctor and nurse decide to turn o f f  a l i f e  
support machine i t  makes death no more certain than having put 
the patient on i t ,  they fa i l  to turn i t  on (Glover 1984: 98).  
From a u t i l i t a r i a n  standpoint the individual is required to 
ensure that "an act and an apparent ly corresponding omission 
r e a l l y  do have the same consequences" (Glover 1984: 102). For 
many individuals there are double standards for in not giving 
generously and regularly to aid people dying of starvation is 
tantamount to murder, by virtue of the acts and omissions 
doctrine.
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There is an argument that arises from this doctrine, 
and that is to put all  the arguments before the individual and 
then le t  the individual make the choice. However, this would 
depend on the nature of the present health status of the 
p at ien t /c l ien t ,  and whether they were competent, that is capable 
ra t iona l ly ,  to make that choice.
( i i i )  Double Effect; Ordinary and Extraordinary Means
There is a clear dist inction, however, between using 
means for the r e l i e f  of suffering which may shorten l i f e ,  and 
actively ending an individual's l i f e  and this principle is known 
as double-effect .  This principle or doctrine implies that  
" i t  is  always wrong in te n t io n a l l y  to do a bad act f o r  the sake 
o f  good consequences that w i l l  ensue, but that i t  may be 
permi s s i  b l  e to do a good act in  the knowledge that bad 
consequences w i l l  ensue" (Glover 1984: 87).
The p r i n c i p l e  is often c lose ly  associated with 
s i d e - e f f e c t s  as i t  contends t h a t  i f  an i n d i v i d u a l  
consciously administers a treatment, then they are just  as 
responsib le  fo r  i t s  desired e f fects  as they are for the 
undesired or unwanted e f fe c ts .  Simply, what is i t  the 
individual does, and what was the intended outcome, foreseen or 
not? As a case in point, a nurse in the administration of care 
such as relieving pain may cause the death of an individual by 
v ir tue of the analgesia or p a in -k i l le r  prescribed. Thus the 
death caused by the analgesia, may be a foreseen but unintended 
consequence, but in both cases the nurse is held responsible.
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Clearly there is a problem in deciding what kinds of foreseen 
but un intended consequences can be j u s t i f i e d  by the 
double-effect doctrine; or, where to draw the l ine between an 
act and i t s  consequences, that  is meaning, where is the 
d i s t i n c t io n  between the act from t h e i r  consequences, or 
distinguishing intended means from foreseen consequences.
To a l l  appearances i t  is "sometimes permiss ib le  to 
b r ing  about by obl ique in ten t ion  what one may not d i r e c t l y  
intend"  (Foot 1978: 20), meaning that some actions w i l l  bring 
about th a t  which was intended or aimed at, and an action 
foreseen but in no way desired. I t  seems to be a dist inction  
between what individuals do, as the intent is there, and what 
individuals allow, knowing that an undesirable effect  could 
deliberate ly  occur.
Traditional philosophers, such as Glover (1984: 155), 
have combined the doctrine of the sanctity of l i f e  with the 
doctrine of double-effect. Infanticide is ruled out as an 
intended act, as new born babies have no conception of death and 
so cannot have a preference of l i f e  over death, but a course of 
action r e s u l t in g  in death as a foreseen consequence is 
acceptable. Yet another modification is the principle of 
ordinary and extraordinary means. This principle implies that  
individuals are "ob l iged to use a l l  o rd inary  means to save 
l i f e , bu t  are no t  o b l i g e d  to  go to  except ional lengths"  
(Glover 1984: 156). How these exceptional lengths are measured 
is not quite clear.
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In th is  context ordinary implies normal medical 
intervention whereby the health team is not required or obliged 
to go to exceptional lengths, thus ordinary means of preserving 
l i f e  include "a l l  medicines, treatments and operat ions which 
o f f e r  a reasonable hope o f  bene f i t  to the p a t i e n t , and which can 
be obtained and used without excessive expense, pain or other  
means" (Soane 1983: 42). According to Dunstan (1983: 15)
ordinary means the doctor is under obligation to offer  and the 
p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  to accept. Extraordinary is taken to mean 
" the degree to which they [ the  means] are expensive, unusual, 
d i f f i c u l t ,  p a i n f u l  o r  dangerous" (Glover 1984: 196); thus
e x traord inary  means of preserving l i f e  are " a l l  medicines,  
t re a tm e n ts  and operat ions which cannot be obtained w ithout  
excessive expense, pain or other  inconvenience, or which, i f  
used, would not o f f e r  a reasonable hope o f  b e n e f i t "  (Soane 
1983: 42). For Dunstan (1983: 15) extraordinary means are thus 
voluntary or elective in which the pat ien t /c l ien t  may decline 
care i f  i t  is judged to impose a physical, social or f inancial  
burden, more than the pat ient /c l ient  is prepared or w i l l ing  to 
bear for the sake of  prolonging l i f e .
Glover (1984: 196) debates the inclusion of the word 
" u n u s u a l " in the notion of extraordinary means and argues 
th a t  i f  the "unusua l"  treatment is "cheap, easy, pa in less  
and r i s k  f r e e " ,  then who wi l l  object to i t  because of i t  being 
unusual.
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Harr is  (1985: 39) further develops the meaning of
extraordinary means which he declares is not obligatory, but 
" involves great  c o s t , pain or inconvenience, or is  being a 
great burden to the p a t ien t  or  others, without a reasonable hope 
tha t  the treatment w i l l  be success fu l " .
How a means is defined in a part icular case depends on 
objective and subjective circumstances such as time, place, age, 
personal qual it ies of the pat ient /c l ient ,  general health status, 
and hope of benefit .
The centra l  themes seem to be one of  degree in 
treatment, the extent to which the outcome is sat isfactory, and 
the relevance and worthwhileness of the l i f e .  Simply, does the 
l i f e  to be preserved ju s t i fy  the energy that is expended in 
* saving i t ,  and what effects wi l l  the preservation have on the 
pat ien t /c l ien t  and family? The answers seem to l i e  in one of 
p r io r i t ie s .
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SUMMARY
This Chapter examined specific conflicts in ethical 
princ ip les  which resulted in the ethical dilemmas faced by 
nurses, to see whether these conflicts affect  the interpretation  
of ethical practice.
The ethical principles, such as the sanctity of l i f e ,  
l ib e r ty ,  honesty and just ice were discussed as a basis and to 
give meaning to the terminology and concepts in Chapter Four.
The concepts of autonomy, paternalism, advocacy, 
t ru s te e s h ip ,  informed consent, beneficence, non-maleficence, 
a c ts  and om iss ions ,  d o u b l e - e f f e c t ,  and o r d i n a r y  and 
extra-ordinary means were also examined to i l lu s t r a te  that all  
these notions are inherent in the nurses role. These concepts 
w il l  be presented in the Model to be proposed by the author in 
Chapter Four and so wi l l  need to be addressed in the selection 
and u t i l is a t io n  of ethical models on which nursing practice is 
based.
The commonest recurrent ethical dilemmas seem to be: 
balancing the rights and interests of the pa t ien t /c l ien t  and the 
rights and interests of the nurse, family or s ignif icant other; 
decisions between accepting the responsibil ity for t r u th - te l l in g  
and sharing in the re s u l t in g  consequences; between fu l l  
disclosure of information and fiduciary care or responsibil i ty;  
and between what is ju s t  and f a i r  in decisions between 
allocat ing resources for pa l l ia t iv e  and therapeutic treatment.
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I t  emerged that the ethical principles discussed in 
this chapter govern the decision-making that w i l l  be used in the 
c l in ica l  and community setting and so w i l l  need to be included 
in the author's proposed ethical model.
The ethical dilemmas which present for both nurses and 
patients/c l ients require nurses to examine the ir  own motives, 
values and bel iefs so that in the undertaking of certain ethical  
actions they may act professionally and as objectively as 
possible.
The author now wishes to present an ethical model, 
u t i l is in g  the issues and ethical principles which have arisen 
from discussion in Chapter Two and Chapter Three respectively. 
The author's proposed Framework and Model wi l l  be referred to as 
the Ethical Analysis Framework and Model, so that a clear  
dist inction may be made when referring to nursing models or 
models of care.
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ENDNOTES (C hap te r Three)
1. The term right to l i f e  is misleading on the grounds 
that homo sapiens can only have a right to l i f e  i f  i t  possesses 
the concept of se lf ,  that is self-consciousness/awareness. I t  
may be argued that things that lack consciousness cannot have 
r ights, as rights are dependent on desires and an understanding 
of what is desired. For example, i f  individuals have a r ight to 
l i f e  and are unable to have a corresponding desire due to 
disease or i l lness then until  they are able to express desire 
there is no r ight to l i f e .  The argument seems to l i e  in one of 
po ten t ia l i ty .  Legally, however, animals have a r ight not to be 
i l l  treated.
Thus the concept of the right to l i f e  presupposes that  
an individual is capable of desires, but i f  there is no se lf  
conscience or there is i l lness then there is no right  to l i f e ,  
and so would be an adequate defence fo r  abortion and 
euthanasia. The achievement of certain characteristics such as 
being viable does not give an individual the r ight to l i f e ,  as 
in the case of a foetus' dependence on the mother.
2. Some philosophers such as Brody (1971: 357-358);
Wertheimer (1981:69); and Thomson (1986:37) use the expressions 
human l i f e ,  human being, and person as interchangable terms and 
this gives support to those who are anti-abortion. There are 
essentia lly  two arguments here:
1. Foetuses are not considered as human.
2. What properties does the foetus possess which 
makes them a person.
3. Thiroux, J. (1986:125) has also argued this view.
4. The Association of Nursing Students (ANS) B i l l  of
Rights (Appendix 4) has met with some resistance from Schools of 
Nursing who though they agree with the concept in principle  
disagree with the wording, and have rejected a league table of 
responses to the B i l l .  Acceptance or rejection of this B i l l  is 
dependent on how these rights are interpreted, the constraints 
on these r ights, that is,  the parameters and conditions involved 
in accepting or denying these rights. I f  r ights are not 
absolute (page 33) then c la r i f ica t ion  is required as to what 
conditions and instances can the rights of nurses override those 
of the ir  colleagues, and vice versa.
Currently the Association of Nursing Students (ANS) are
enlist ing the help of the Royal College of Nursing (RCN) in 
promoting the B i l l .
A further call for a B i l l  of Rights for the elderly was 
endorsed by the Health Visitors Association (HVA) at the ir  
annual conference in May 1988.
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5. There are, however, a number of assumptions underlying
these ethical positions:
( i )  that what a person wants can be a reason for  
i t  being done
( i i )  that the consequences as judged by an outside
agent is relevant to deciding what is r ight
( i i i )  that the ethical weight given to what the person
wants is a function of the persons competence
to make a choice
( iv )  that the ethical weight given to the consequences
is a function of the gravity of those
consequences as judged by an outside agent
(v) that the ethical weight given to the persons
own wishes and given to the consequences are to
be put into the balance at the same time
(Eastman and Hope 1988:53)
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C H A P T E R  F O U R
'We have, in f a c t , two /c/nc/s 
o f  m o ra l i t y  side by s ide; one 
which we preach but do not 
p r a c t i c e , and another which we 
p ra c t ice  but seldom preach"
Bertrand Russell, 
Sceptical Essays, 
1928.
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C H A P T E R  F O U R  
INTRODUCTION AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE ETHICAL ANALYSIS
FRAMEWORK AND MODEL
In this Chapter the author presents an Ethical Analysis 
Framework (Figures 4a, 4b) and an Ethical Analysis Model (Figure 
4c) for the application of ethical principles in the c l in ica l  
and community setting. The Ethical Analysis Model is intended 
for generalisation to all  models used internationally  in guiding 
nursing practice. The content for the Ethical Analysis Model 
and the e th ic a l  constructs/components are derived from the 
issues and ethical principles in Chapter Two and Chapter Three 
respectively.
I t  seems evident from the issues in Chapter Two and 
Chapter Three that  considerat ion be given to nurses and 
p a t i e n t s / c l i e n t s  to f a c i l i t a t e  an understanding of ethics,  
ethical dilemmas, and the process of making informed decisions. 
Ideal ly ,  the Ethical Analysis Model is building on the work 
which has already been done in ethics education by nurse 
theorists/educators and the Statutory bodies (page 34). The 
author hopes that some degree of ethics education w i l l  have 
occurred prior to the use of the Ethical Analysis Model, and 
that changes in the training of nurses at a ll  levels, such as 
advocated by Project 2000, wi l l  be taking place concerning the 
in terpre ta t ion  and application of nursing models in guiding 
nursing practice.
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What emerges for consideration for the Ethical Analysis 
Model is that there appears to be varying interpretations of the 
ethical principles, and so c la r i f ica t ion  of the concepts related
to the rights of individuals would need to be included in this
Model.
S im i la r l y ,  specific attention needs to be directed
towards identifying the specific ethical principles relevant to
nurses and pa t ien ts /c l ien ts ,  and training in ethics and/or 
discussion time may need to be arranged prior  to the use of the 
Ethical Analysis Framework and Model.
In addition, some validation c r i te r ia  would need to be 
adopted to ascertain whether the rights of pat ients/c l ients and 
nurses are given consideration, and to check to see i f  the 
appropriate nursing model is being ut i l ised to re f le c t  ethical  
practice. Without some validation c r i te r ia  i t  may be d i f f i c u l t  
to translate the ethical principles into practice.
At the outset of this Chapter, the mutual expectations 
between nurses and patients /c lients in nursing are examined to 
enhance an understanding of active part icipation (page 28); 
secondly, the ethical agents who may need to part ic ipate, and 
t h e i r  e f f e c t i v e  use in underpinning the Ethical Analysis 
Framework and Model are ident i f ied.  Thirdly, the Ethical 
Analysis Framework and Model are introduced, and the essential 
elements or the basic assumptions underlying the Ethical 
Analysis Framework and Model are detailed to ensure the mutual 
expectations and interaction between nurse and pa t ie n t /c l ie n t
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are realised. The f ive phases of the Ethical Analysis Framework 
w i l l  be presented in diagrammatic form and discussed. The 
validation c r i t e r i a ,  which were adapted from Guion (1977: 1-10),
and ut i l ised  as a basis for the Ethical Analysis Model are
presented, and how these c r i te r ia  are ut i l ised to assess the
proposed nursing model and the ethical constructs/components are
d e t a i l e d .  Fourth ly ,  the author examines the curriculum  
considerations; f i f t h l y ,  presents the implementation guidelines; 
and f in a l ly  presents the implications for research, education and 
practice.
1. MUTUAL EXPECTATI ONS BETWEEN NURSES AND
PATIENTS/CLIENTS
Ethics is concerned with mutual expectations, of what 
p r o f e s s i o n a l s  expect of t h e i r  p a t i e n t s / c l i e n t s ,  and the 
appropriate  expectations of those patients/c l ients from the 
professional. The task of educating patients /c l ients and nurses 
in expectation, commitment, and co-operation is paramount in the 
ethical relationship.
T h is  r a i s e s  many q u e s t i o n s  as to whether  a 
pat ie n t /c l ie n t  ought to act on a nurse's information, and the 
freedom that individual has in rejecting that information; or for  
that matter, what freedom or choice do nurses have in refusing to 
meet the p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  wishes, and protecting the ir  own 
r i g h t s .  These are e t h i c a l  qu es t io ns  and assumptions
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which can only be argued on moral philosophical grounds, in 
r ig o r o u s  debate in a l l  se t t ings ,  as then personal and 
professional bel ie fs  and the convergence and divergence in 
ethical traditions and religions may emerge.
The knowledge and sk i l l  for which nurses are trained 
invests them with the attributes of medical/nursing knowledge, 
which in turn gives them "exper t " power and authority over 
patients /c l ients .
The basic assumption here is that a successful, that 
is ,  a mutually rewarding, relationship between pat ien t /c l ien t  
and nurse is conditional on the mutual expectations being met. 
Thus both pat ient /c l ient  and nurse may need to be aware of the 
expectations of each other , and what each can provide.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many patients/c l ients take the 
nurses advice which is attributed to trust in the nurse, which 
arises from a tradit ion of respect for all  nurses, rather than 
any specific a ttr ibute  of the nurse.
The evidence suggests that an attempt has been made to 
f a c i l i t a t e  these mutual expectations by the development of 
interactive and inter-personal systems. Kuhn (1974: 81-103), 
Anderson (1978: 25-26) and Steckel (1980: 1596-1599) have a ll  
developed in terac t ive  or inter-personal systems whereby the 
nurse contracts with the pat ient /c l ient  col laboratively desired 
behaviours. These behaviours may re f lec t  the pat ien t /c l ien t  
p r i o r i t i e s  and the n u rses '  s p e c i f i c  p r e s c r ip t io n  fo r  
accomplishing these desired behaviours. Inherent in this
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contractual arrangement are pat ient /c l ient  selected reinforcers  
for adhering to the contract in order to materialise the desired 
behaviours. These interactive or inter-personal models provide 
a framework f o r  communication and negot ia t ion  between 
pat ien t /c l ien t  and nurse of behavioural outcomes in terms of 
t h e i r  values, and establish a plan of care which ideally  
supports those values and preferences.
Brody (1981: 336-337) describes three models of practice 
that may have some relevance for how nurses structure the ir  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  p a t i e n t s / c l i e n t s .  F i r s t l y ,  the  
" e n g in e e r in g  model"  emphasises the giving of usually only 
" s c i e n t i f i c  f a c t s ", and allowing the p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  to 
decide. An involvement in pat ient /c l ient  values is considered 
improper in this model, and the evidence suggests that nurses 
are unaware of how th e i r  values influence the situation.
Se c ond ly ,  Brody (1981:  3 3 6 -3 3 7 )  o u t l i n e s  the
" p r i e s t l y  m o d e l "  which is p a t e r n a l i s t i c  (page 102) in 
nature, thus an ultraprotective stance is advocated, the nurse 
giving directions which the pat ient /c l ient  is c learly expected 
to follow.
The t h i r d  model by Brody (1981: 37-39) is the
" c o n t r a c t u a l  model"  which appears to be the most suitable 
for the nurse-patient relationship given nursing's primary goals 
as i t  advocates " e s t a b l i s h i n g  c o n t ra c tu a l  arrangements by 
mutual consent".  I t  involves the disclosure of values, covert 
and e x p l ic i t ,  and both nurse and pa t ien t /c l ien t  are aware that
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i n t e r p r e t e d  f a c t s  and values are brought i n t o  t h e i r  
in te r a c t io n s ,  and compares with Aroskar's (1982: 24,28-29)
fourth mind-set or characteristic (page 56) which favours an 
interactive process.
These interactive and inter-personal models give some 
consideration to the personal values of pat ients /c l ients ,  but
there is no evidence to suggest that  they are put into 
practice. I t  has already been seen (page 24) that the author 
has examined the l i te ra tu re  on models and found that models are 
not used judiciously and that i t  appears that nurses have 
d i f f i c u l t y  in interpretation and translation.
2. ETHICAL AGENTS
Ethical agents in this thesis are those persons who are
involved in the analysis  of the proposed nursing Ethical
Analysis Framework and Model for use in pa t ien t /c l ien t  care. 
Those involved may include the pa t ien t /c l ien t ,  nurses, the 
family of the pa t ien t /c l ien t ,  and doctors. In many instances, 
the e th ic a l  agent parameters may be extended to include
physiotherapists, community nurses, d ie t i t ians ,  social workers, 
spir i tua l  advisors, and the appointed pa t ien t /c l ien t  advocate or 
trustee,  as some or all  of these individuals may be involved at 
some stage with the p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  care.
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3. THE ETHICAL ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 
AND MODEL
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3. INTRODUCTION TO THE ETHICAL ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK AND
MODEL
E t h ic a l  frameworks and models which aid in the
application of ethical principles, such as the one advocated by 
the author, are useful tools in analysis as they aid in 
ident ifying key factors which are v i ta l  for making a decision in 
clar i fy ing  specific principles.
This proposed Ethical Analysis Framework and Model is 
only one method of guiding the action that may precede the 
choice of a model of care which guides nursing practice. The 
Ethica l  Analysis Framework and Model wi l l  hopefully enable 
ethical principles to be given greater consideration so that  
they may be included in the context of nursing theories and
models of care.
The Ethical Analysis Framework comprises Figures 4a and
4b, and the Ethical Analysis Model is presented in Figure 4c.
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1. Ini t i  a Overview
p i . »Prellminary review 
(Figure 4b) 
(Assessment)
- ^ 3 .  Analysis 
of proposed 
nursing model 
(Planning)
V
4. Ethical Analysis Model 
(Figure 4c) 
explained to 
pa t ien t /c l ien t
5. Implementation 
and 
Evaluation
Figure 4a : The Ethical Analysis Framework:
Used in Assessment phase of Nursing 
Process
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( i i i )  Incongruence ( i i )  Incongruence( i )  Congruence
Analysis of 
nursing modelsState which?
Further 
explanations
Another
nurse
Ethical
Committee
YES
4. Ethical Analysis 
Model (See Figure 4c)
1. In i t i a l  Overview
2. Preliminary Review
Referral to relevant 
professional Team
Implementation
Evaluation
Health care 
expectations can 
be mutually agreed
Select appropriate 
plan to resolve 
issue
Go no further  
-accept pa t ien t /c l ien t  
has rights 
-follow-up 
in Community
The health care needs 
are refused, does not 
warrant or refuses 
r e f e r r a l , or person­
al i t y  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
have arisen; expecta­
tions cannot be met
The health care needs 
can only be met by a 
professional in 
another f ie ld  such 
social worker, d i e t i ­
t ian ,  c l in ica l  nurse 
specia list ,  or 
physiotherapi st
Figure 4b : The Ethical Analysis Framework:
Flow Chart demonstrating 
Preliminary Review outcomes
P r io r  to the u t i l i s a t i o n  of  the Ethical Analysis 
Framework and Model there are three significant points i t  is
important that the care-giver u t i l is ing  the Ethical Analysis
Framework and Model understands. An understanding of these 
points may manifest depending on how effec t ive ly  the Ethical
Analysis Framework and Model are ut i l ised in the practice
s e t t in g ,  and also when care is evaluated formatively and 
summatively. A lack of understanding of these points may 
jeopardise  decisions made in the "best interests" of the 
p a t i e n t / c l i e n t .  In addition, the necessary support, such as 
counselling or the use of the ethical agents (page 178) may be 
denied the pat ient /c l ient  and/or the nurse.
F i r s t l y ,  p a t i e n t s / c l i e n t s  may be u n a b le  to  
part ic ipate in the realisation of the ir  maximum health potentia l,  
because they may not have the capacity or the a b i l i t y  to 
comprehend information relevant to decisions and to deliberate  
about choices; or they may not be competent, that is rational and 
capable, perhaps due to mental i l lness. In this case, the ir  
advocate or trustee, who may or may not have been appointed 
previously, may need to be fu l ly  involved in the discussions and 
decision-making to effect  what is in the "best interests" of the 
p a t ie n t /c l ie n t .  In some instances the nurse may have d i f f i c u l t y  
in interpreting the pa t ien ts ' /c l ien ts '  true feelings as nurses 
are guided g e nera l ly  by subject ive  observations. These 
subjective observations may overrule the true feelings of the 
p a t i e n t s / c l i e n t s ,  especially i f  the pat ients/c l ients  are not
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able to ar ticu late  the ir  feelings. In this case, nurses may
need to intervene and act as/appoint an advocate who can act in 
the p a t ien ts ' /c l ien ts '  "best interest". This intervention (page 
120) ,  i t  may be argued, is an in tegra l  part of ethical  
decision-making, at which the nurse wi l l  become more sk i l led ,  
and i t  has already been seen how d i f f i c u l t  acting in the
p a t ie n ts ' /c l ie n ts '  "best interests" may prove (page 102).
Secondly, the pat ient /c l ient  may choose to consider 
the nurse as the 'expert'  and wish to transfer the decision to 
the nurse. I f  the nurse is the p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  appointed 
advocate then this decision would be undertaken by the nurse, in 
respecting the pa t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  needs. I f  the nurse is not
the appointed advocate the pat ient /c l ient  may choose to appoint 
the nurse at that moment. However, the pat ien t /c l ien t  may need 
to be encouraged to share in the responsibil ity (page 27). 
F a i l in g  t h i s ,  the nurse accepts the responsibil i ty as the
appointed advocate and i f  there is a conf l ic t  of in terest ,  or 
the nurse refuses to act as advocate then the other ethical 
agents (page 177) may be involved.
T h i r d ly ,  there may be circumstances in which the 
nurse may not wish to be involved with caring for a part icular  
p a t ie n t /c l ie n t ,  perhaps due to a confl ic t  of interests or a 
personality d i f f i c u l t y .  In this situation the rights of the 
nurse are respected on the grounds that the nurse's rights are
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considered to be equally important and counselling support may 
be required for the nurse. ,
The essentia l  elements and aims of the Ethical 
Analysis Framework and Model are presented f i r s t ;  and the phases 
of the Ethical Analysis Framework incorporating the Ethical 
Analysis Model are outlined.
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3( i ) Essential elements or assumptions and
aims of the Ethical Analysis Framework and Model
In addition to the ethical constructs/components and
the validation c r i te r ia  in the Ethical Analysis Model to be 
proposed by the author there are other essential elements which 
must be incorporated to f a c i l i t a t e  the mutual interaction  
between pa t ien t /c l ien t  and nurse. In this way paternal ist ic  
attitudes from the nurse may be diminished, as the nurse and 
p at ie n t /c l ie n t ,  where possible, shares in the responsibil i ty  for
th e ir  care, but the final informed decision is made by the
p a t ie n t /c l ie n t .
The Ethical Analysis Framework and Model for practice 
are based on four basic assumptions. F i rs t ly ,  that the
i n d i v i d u a l  p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  is  "autonomous", tha t  is ,  a 
self-determining person who has the right  and freedom to choose 
to partic ipate in selecting his/her health care needs, via the 
nursing model to be selected, or, may have an advocate or 
trustee acting in his/her "best interests". Secondly, that 
the nurse - p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  relationship is one of mutual 
in te r a c t io n  or re c ip ro c a t io n .  T h i r d ly ,  that the nursing 
model chosen w i l l  have been validated using the c r i t e r i a  in the 
Ethica l  Analysis Model. Fourthly, that the p a t ien t /c l ien t  
accepts or shares in the responsibil i ty, where possible, for  
improving the ir  personal health status.
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The Ethical Analysis Framework and Model incorporates 
the essent ia l  domains in nursing, that is ,  the cognitive, 
affect ive and effective elements, and these domains have already 
been demonstrated in Figure 2a (page 49).
The author hopes that the u t i l isa t ion  of the Ethical 
Analysis Framework and Model w i l l  be evaluated at each 
phase/stage informally by the nurse and f a c i l i t a t o r  in the f i r s t  
i n s t a n c e .  La te r  a more formal eva lua t ion ,  perhaps by 
action-research, may be conducted. In this way, the nurse w i l l  
know whether the aims have been achieved.
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The three main aims for the nurse and f a c i l i t a t o r  in the use of 
the Ethical Analysis Framework and Model are:-
a) To foster understanding in the use of the
concepts of the Ethical Analysis Framework 
and Model.
b) To f a c i l i t a t e  increased independence and
i n i t i a t e  the t r a n s i t i o n  process from 
dependence on either  educational or c l in ica l  
f a c i l i t a t o r s ,  a n d /o r  s u p e r v is o r s ,  to  
independent use of the Ethical Analysis 
Framework and Model thus enabling effect ive  
application by the nurse at the bedside, and 
in the community.
c) To f a c i l i t a t e  and undertake an experiential
and self-directed approach to learning.
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3 ( i i ) Phases o f  t he  E t h i c a l  Ana l ys i s  Framework
incorporating the Ethical Analysis Model
(Figure 4a/4b)
The Ethical Analysis Framework (Figure 4a) consists of 
f ive  phases, is to be used in conjunction with Figure 4b, and 
guides the care-giver in the process. The Ethical Analysis 
Framework and Model w i l l  hopefully become an integral part of 
the assessment phase of the Nursing Process (page 37).
Stage 1 : In it ia l Overview (Cognitive perspective)
This phase/stage is concerned pr im a r i ly  with the 
educative aspects thus ensuring that  the nurse is fu l ly  
cognisant with the:
a) Assessment of need for the Ethical Analysis Model.
b) Aims for the nurse and fa c i l i t a t o r  in the use of
the Ethical Analysis Framework and Model
c) Content of the Ethical Analysis Framework and Model
d) Use of the Ethical Analysis Framework and Model.
A fu l l  understanding of the validation c r i t e r i a ,  which w i l l  be 
detailed la te r ,  is a primary requirement before assessment of 
the p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  can commence. An understanding of the 
educative aspects in this phase/stage can only be measured when 
the formative assessments are being done as part of the Nursing 
Process, and by the effective use of the Ethical Analysis Model.
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Stage 2; Preliminary review stage - Assessment Phase
(Figure 4b)
This phase/stage is concerned with establishing a
mutual relationship or rapport between the pa t ien t /c l ien t  and 
nurse in order to gain both subjective and objective information
of each other through verbal and non-verbal communication
methods. The expectations of both pat ien t /c l ien t  and nurse are 
discussed in terms of such things as the general overview of
nursing models - the ir  purpose, function/role, advantages and 
disadvantages; and the beliefs , values and aspirations of the 
p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  and nurse. I t  is at this point that the 
p at ien t /c l ien t  may need to understand that a nursing model has 
to be selected to meet the ir  specific health care needs, and i t  
is up to the nurse to ensure i t  is valid by using the validation  
c r i t e r i a .
At the end of these preliminary discussions with the 
p a t ie n t /c l ie n t  three possible outcomes exis t .  F i rs t ly ,  the 
p a t ie n t /c l ie n t  may be in harmony with the nurse. The rapport
established has been congruent, and both are aware that the 
expectations on either side (page 174) can be met, and both 
parties wish to proceed with meeting the health care needs of 
the pa t ie n t /c l ie n t  (Figure 4b 2 [ i ] ) .
Secondly, incongruence exists and the health care needs 
can only be met by another professional such as a social worker, 
or c l in ica l  nurse specialist such as a stoma therapist,  and so 
the appropriate referral would have to be made in conjunction
with the health care team (Figure 4b: 2 [ i i ] ) .
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T h i r d ly ,  the p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  re la t io n s h ip s  may be
incongruent for a number of reasons. The pat ien t /c l ien t  may 
quite simply not establish a rapport with the nurse conducting 
the preliminary review; or, he/she may refuse treatment, or 
r e fe r ra l ;  or, his/her expectations cannot be met. The necessary 
options fo r  coping with this problem are detailed in the 
flowchart (Figure 4b: 2 [ i i i ] ) .
As a result  of incongruence the pa t ien t /c l ien t  and 
nurse may need further time for support and counselling. This
would be in i t ia ted  by the member of the health care team to
which the pa t ien t /c l ien t  would be referred (Figure 4b: 2 [ i i ] ) ;  
or following discussions in health care team meetings, then an 
appropriate member w i l l  be chosen to counsel the pat ien t /c l ien t  
and nurse. In spite of a l l  these options i t  may s t i l l  be
d i f f i c u l t  to know i f  the decision that the pa t ien t /c l ien t  makes 
is a rational one. I f  there is a doubt then intervention seems 
appropriate and this has already been highlighted (page 182).
Stage 3: Analysis of  proposed nursing model -
Planning Phase
As argued in Chapter One (page 24) i t  is hoped that the 
appropriate environment, a change in attitudes brought about by 
training (page 172), and the use of validation c r i t e r i a  may 
overcome the injudicious use of models in general and may 
enhance the use of the Ethical Analysis Framework and Model. 
This is paramount as how nurses interpret  and analyse nursing 
models may aid in the u t i l is a t io n  of the author's Model (Figure 
4c).
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Providing tha t  the p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  and nurse are 
congruent/compatible then a more specific analysis (Figure 4a 
[3]) can occur. The nurse e l ic i ts  the general theme of nursing 
model which may most appropriately suit the pa t ien t /c l ien t  in 
meeting his/her health care needs. For example, a nurse may 
establish with the pat ient /c l ient  that his/her basic health care 
needs are educative, such as a diabetic who requires some 
education about how to se lf  administer a drug such as Insulin,  
before discharge into the community. They may decide to use a
self -care model, such as Orem (1985) on (page 26) and this
requires fu l l  understanding of this nursing model and how i t  is 
used by the nurse and pat ient /c l ient .  I f  the nursing model 
selected does not appear to have any ethical principles with 
guidelines for practice, then the ethical constructs/components 
and validation c r i te r ia  in the Ethical Analysis Model may be 
u t i l is e d .  I t  is this validation c r i te r ia  which w i l l  f a c i l i t a t e  
the e ffect ive  use of the Ethical Analysis Model.
An assessment of available resources, the environment, 
and the mutual goal-setting which occurs at this stage is
effected. This is done as part of the Nursing Process (page 37)
during the assessment phase. However, the author includes these 
areas here to demonstrate where in the Ethical  Analysis 
Framework (Figure 4a) this assessment of resources occurs and 
b r ie f ly  outlines the content of these areas.
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a) Resources
The r e s o u r c e s  in  te rm s o f  t im e ,  equipment,  
personnel/staff input, and finances required and/or anticipated 
to  f a c i l i t a t e  meeting the h e a l th  care  needs o f  the  
pat ien t /c l ien t  are assessed. This assessment requires u t i l is in g  
management techniques, such as setting p r io r i t ie s  and key task 
analyses of workloads, and for which the nurse may need some 
further t raining. This assessment knowledge is shared with the 
health care team as every member w i l l  need to know the ir  part or 
r o l e  in the  care of  th is  p a t i e n t / c l i e n t .  The health  
care/mult i-disciplinary team meetings may serve as a forum for  
discussion and decision-making taking a ll  the facts about the 
pat ien t /c l ien t  into consideration. For example, the d ie t i t ia n  
may need to know the nature and significance of her role in 
educating the p a t i e n t / c l i e n t ,  in relation to the specific  
nursing model chosen. Moreover, the health care team may be 
required to ensure the pat ient /c l ient  receives the ir  share of 
the scarce allocation of resources.
b) Environment
The individuals concerned with meeting the health care 
needs of this pat ien t /c l ien t  wi l l  need to know the setting(s) in 
which the care w i l l  occur, and generally the expectations of the 
setting. Again, to use the same i l lu s t ra t io n ,  the d ie t i t ia n  
w i l l  need to share in deciding whether i t  is more beneficial for  
the pa t ie n t /c l ie n t  to be taught about diets in a department, or 
the pat ients' home setting, especially i f  the diabetic is part 
of a large family and prepares the family meal.
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c) Mutual goal-setting
Mutual g o a l - s e t t i n g  h i g h l i g h t s  the  r e c ip r o c a l  
relationship of nurse and pat ient /c l ient .  The process involves 
identify ing the behavioural goals, but this would be inherent in 
the Nursing Process and is not within the scope of this thesis.
What is of importance is that the p a t ie n ts ' /c l ie n ts '  
beliefs and values are e l ic i ted  at this stage, as matching or 
correlation with the chosen nursing model is important. As the 
nurse w i l l  hopefully be u t i l is ing  the Nursing Process and may 
possible even be the primary nurse then there may be some 
f i r s t - h a n d  knowledge o f  the p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  and t h e i r  
asp ira t ions .  For example, in the assessment phase of the 
Nursing Process (page 37) which may in the future hopefully 
embody the Ethical Analysis Framework and Model, discussions 
w i l l  take place between nurse and p a t ien t /c l ien t ,  and the 
content of this discussion is already highlighted (page 189). 
I t  may also be discussed in an informal way in health care team 
meetings, or i t  may even be documented in the Nursing Care plan.
The primary nurse is the named nurse to whom the 
p a t i e n t  is  a l l o c a t e d ,  and who has tw enty  fo u r  hour 
responsib il i ty  for and accountability to the patient for the 
whole period in which the patient requires nursing care. The 
primary nurse is responsible fo r  assessing, planning and 
evaluating of care with other relevant members of the health 
care team, and coordinates implementation of care with associate 
and support nurses. The Nursing Care plan is  a legal
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record/document of the mutual goals to be achieved by the 
p a t ie n t /c l i e n t  and care-giver, and the care delivered. I t  
demonstrates that an effective assessment has occurred, guides 
the  implementation of  care and forms the basis of the 
evaluation.
Stage 4: The Ethical Analysis Model (Figure 4c)
The nursing model selected fo r  use w i l l  now be
subjected to this analysis, and i t  is this validation which
makes the author's  approach to the use of nursing models 
d i f fe ren t .  Some of the att itudinal and practical problems of 
adopting this analysis wi l l  be discussed la te r .  I f  the nursing 
model f u l f i l s  the validation c r i te r ia ,  then the nursing model 
and the e th ic a l  constructs/components are explained to the 
pati  e n t /c l  ie n t . I f  the nursing model does not f u l f i l  the 
val idation c r i te r ia  then i t  may not be an appropriate nursing 
model to use. Or, i t  may be that i t  lacks the ethical
constructs/components and so the Ethical Analysis Model's 
constructs/components may be ut i l ised to complement the nursing 
model.
This stage is then one of information sharing with the 
pat ie n t /c l ie n t  about the effectiveness of the nursing model as a 
basis for nursing practice. I t  is also at this stage that the 
nurse ensures t h a t  the p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  has a d e ta i le d
explanation, where possible, of the ir  rights contained within 
the E th ica l  Analysis Model, and planning of  appropriate  
strategies in the event of the pat ien t /c l ien t  taking negative 
in terest in th e ir  care (page 183).
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Further details  of how the validation c r i t e r i a  are 
ut i l ised  w i l l  be discussed la te r .
Stage 5: Implementation and Evaluation of the Ethical
Analysis Model
At this stage the nursing model has been selected, 
v a l id a ted  and the e th ica l  constructs/components have been 
explained to the pa t ient /c l ient .
Throughout the implementation of the selected ethical 
nursing model continuous/formative or on-going assessment is 
occurring. These assessment processes are already inherent in 
the Nursing Process (page 37), but what is of importance is that 
the nursing model used is judged to be effect ive in real is ing  
t h e  goals  set  by p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  and n u rse ,  and the  
p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  rights are respected, and this w i l l  emerge 
from the formative assessments done.
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USING THE ETHICAL ANALYSIS MODEL
The v a l id a t io n  c r i t e r i a ,  d e ta i le d  l a t e r ,  w i l l  be 
ut i l ised  in the Ethical Analysis Model f i r s t l y  to guide the 
nurse in choosing an appropriate nursing model, and then the 
c r i t e r i a  w i l l  be used t o  v a l i d a t e  t h e  e t h i c a l  
constructs/components presented in the Ethical Analysis Model 
(Figure 4 c ) .
The nursing model to be u t i l ised w i l l  be validated 
using the c r i t e r i a  outlined (pages 199-202); then the ethical  
constructs/components  w i l l  be va l idated  (pages 203-214)  
u t i l is in g  the same c r i te r ia  as used for the nursing model.
Some problems of adopting this Analysis
( i )  Att itudinal problems
One of the main reasons for nurses not believing or 
accepting research findings is l i k e ly  to be refusal of the 
individual to change existing attitudes or beliefs  (Hunt 1981: 
189-194). This resistance to a new idea may be generalised in 
adopting this  Analysis. The underlying values, att itudes and 
e th ica l  positions which produce positive adjustments to new 
ideas may however be enhanced i f  a new idea, such as this  
Analysis, is presented in a simple way with guidelines for  
practice.
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( i i )  Practical problems
This Analysis requires a time frame which may present 
some d i f f i c u l t y  for the nurse, as i t  requires additional time in 
the assessment phase.
The V a l id a t io n  C r i t e r i a  U t i l i s e d  in the Ethical
Analysis Model
There are varying ways of establishing the v a l id i ty  of 
nursing models or models of care and ethical models which guide 
nursing practice, and all  of these ways are interrelated as they 
seek to c o l l e c t  c e r ta in  kinds of evidence. V a l id i ty  is
" the degree to which the i  nstrument measures what i t  is  
intended to measure" (Phi l l ips 1986: 465).
According to Phil l ips (1986: 351) a study is judged to 
be v a l id  by assessing the p r e d ic ta b i l i ty  of variables or 
attr ibutes, the content, the association of variables, and the 
s t a t i s t i c a l  support fo r  the predicted s t ru c tu re  of  the
variables.
Guion (1977: 1-10) has ident if ied f ive  main c r i t e r i a  
for assessing content, and these w i l l  be adapted by the author 
and used as validation c r i te r ia .  Content Va l id i ty  means the
" d e g r e e  t o  w h i c h  t h e  d e s i r e d  domai n  i s  a d e q u a t e l y
represented"  (Phi l l ips  1986: 219). These five c r i t e r i a  are
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now discussed under sub heading for convenience v iz : -  
C ri te r ia  1 : Knowledge base 
C ri ter ia  2 : C lar ity  of def in i t ions / l ingu is t ic  
interpretation 
C ri te r ia  3 : Measurable behaviour ( inferred)  
C ri te r ia  4 : Adequate sampling 
C ri te r ia  5 : Content consistently presented
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USING THE VALIDATION CRITERIA IN THE ETHICAL ANALYSIS MODEL
TO ASSESS A PROPOSED NURSING MODEL
The author has examined nursing models, which are 
purported to guide nursing practice, and has established that  
past and current nursing models do not appear to contain any 
c r i t e r i a  for validating these models (page 24). The validation  
c r i t e r i a  adapted from Guion (1977) for use by the author is the 
main focus of the Ethical Analysis Model, and is the key to 
enabling the effect ive u t i l isa t ion  of ethical nursing models in 
the future.
C r i te r ia  1: Knowledge base
F i rs t ly ,  the content domain is rooted in behaviour with 
a generally acceptable meaning. For example, the content domain 
of a proposed nursing model is based on what the nurse knows 
about the use of nursing models generally and that knowledge is 
d irec t ly  related to the ir  knowledge of the theory behind the 
model. More specif ica l ly ,  the nurse w i l l  need to know the 
underlying theory of the proposed nursing model, and the 
training advocated by the author prior to u t i l is in g  the Ethical 
Analysis Model has already been highlighted (page 172). Thus 
the philosophical background is of paramount importance in the 
content domain and includes the values, beliefs and assumptions 
upon which the specific nursing model to be used is based. 
Assumptions are c l e a r l y  explained and the concept and 
propositions comprehensive.
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C ri te r ia  2: Linguistic interpretation
Secondly, the content domain is clearly defined in order 
to judge whether each item f i t s  into the boundaries. For 
example, the proposed nursing model would have to include all  
the notions, im p l i c i t  and e x p l i c i t  assumptions and values 
advocated, in order to be tru ly  valid as a nursing model on which 
to base practice. The c la r i ty  of the assumptions stated and how 
these assumptions relate one to another, the central components 
and concepts and the ir  re la t ive  importance are to be expressed in 
o p e r a t io n a l  d e f in i t io n s .  In other words the l i n g u i s t i c  
interpretat ion must be clearly expressed for the content domain 
to have any meaning.
C r i te r ia  3: Measurable behaviour ( inferred)
Thirdly, the content domain is related to the purpose of 
measurement in the design. For example, i f  the concept of 
'autonomy' is included in the underlying theory of the proposed 
n u rs in g  model,  then the expected outcome is th a t  the 
p at ien t /c l ien t  and nurse would need to demonstrate behaviour that  
r e f l e c te d  s e l f -d e te rm in a t io n ,  such as the a b i l i t y  to make 
decis ions.  The e th ica l  principle of autonomy can only be 
inferred from this behaviour, and the inference may not be a 
correct one. However, the u t i l is a t io n  of the chosen/selected 
nursing model may be measured by the way in which the nurse and 
p a t ie n t /c l ie n t  assesses, plans and implements the nursing model.
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Criteria 4: Adequate sampling of qualified staff
Fourthly, the content domain is judged to be adequately 
sampled by qual if ied individuals - whose qual if ications to judge 
is based on a degree of knowledge of the content under study. 
In other words the content of the nursing model may be ut i l ised  
by nurses who are appropriately competent and knowledgeable 
about the nursing model to be used and who are able to translate  
the nursing model into practice. The nurse w i l l  also be 
required to ar t iculate  answers about the nursing model to be 
u t i l ised .
Criteria 5: Content consistently presented
F i f t h l y ,  the communication of the content requires 
consistency, that is,  the same facts are presented at a l l  times 
to the p a t ien t /c l ien t .  In other words, the health care team 
w i l l  need to dec ide  on the information given to each
p at ien t /c l ien t  at health care team meetings. Thus a l l  health
care team members may ensure consistency of information to the
p a t i e n t / c l i e n t .  This may be achieved by the e f f e c t i v e
u t i l is a t io n  of the Nursing Care plan by recording the facts that  
the p a t ien t /c l ien t  has been told, and the effect ive use of the 
hand-over of patient care reports play an important role . Thus 
a consistent or re l iab le  method of validation can be achieved 
which can be generalised or transferred easily to other aspects 
or perspectives. Inherent in any model also is the capacity for  
change, and so the nursing model may need to have a certain  
amount of  f l e x i b i l i t y  to allow for the changes which are
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constantly occurring, and the health care team need to be aware 
of any changes made so the information to the pa t ien t /c l ien t  can 
also be changed accordingly.
All the concepts, whether they be nursing model or 
ethica l ,  which are defined operationally w i l l  need to be defined 
co n s is te n t ly  or used in consistent ways throughout. The 
underlying assumptions need to be seen to be consistent with the 
concepts advocated.
At th is  stage the nurse has used the validation  
c r i t e r i a  to judge the appropriateness of the nursing model which 
w i l l  guide nursing practice. The next stage is to discuss with 
the pa t ie n t /c l ie n t ,  where possible, the ir  rights and this is 
achieved by u t i l is in g  the ethical constructs/components and the 
validation c r i te r ia  in the Ethical Analysis Model (Figure 4c).
The Ethical Analysis Model (Figure 4c) presents a 
matrix which embodies the ethical constructs/components which 
are depicted v e r t ica l ly ,  and the f ive c r i t e r i a  of validation  
which are depicted horizontally.
At the bottom of the Ethical Analysis Model (Figure 4c) 
are the preferred cognitive, effect ive and affect ive outcomes. 
This is one way in which the nurse can assess the behaviour the 
pa t ie n t /c l ie n t  demonstrates.
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VALIDATION CRITERIA C rite r ia  1 C rite ria  2 C rite ria  3 C rite r ia  4 C rite ria  5
ETHICAL
CONSTRUCTS
Use/knowledge o f 
model and constructs
L inguistic
in terpreta tion
Measurable
behaviour
(in fe rred)
Adequate sampling by 
q u a lif ie d , experi­
enced personnel
Content consistently 
presented
a)
Respect fo r 
Person
Sanctity and 
Quality o f l i f e
C apability o f in d i­
vidual as a person. 
Assumptions about 
sanctity  and qua lity  
o f l i f e .  What does 
individual know?
Sanctity o f l i f e  
Quality o f l i f e  
Person
Can p a tie n t/c lie n t 
understand in fo r­
mation, and ask 
relevant questions
Is nurse qua lified
and experienced to :
t
i )  A rticu la te  answers 
and explanations 
to procedures and 
treatments
i i )  Act as advocate 
with strategy 
formation fo r 
positive  and 
negative choices 
made by pa tien t/ 
c lie n t
i i i )  Be assertive 
w ith in  health 
care team
iv) Be Knowledg­
eable o f health 
care resources 
and to a rt ic u ­
la te  on the 
p a tie n t/c lie n t 
behalf
!
b) Liberty/Freedom
Choice
Individuals have 
option to choose 
based on personal 
values.
What does individual 
know?
Liberty/Freedom
Values
P a tie n t/c lie n t/ 
advocate/trustee 
responsible fo r 
fin a l choice.
What does in d iv i­
dual want?
Are Information and 
a ttitudes from nurse 
and health care team 
presented:
i )  Consistently, to
c) Autonomy 
Respect fo r 
persons 
Individual righ ts  
Paternal ism 
Advocacy 
Trusteeship
Individuals not 
treated as means to 
an end. Sharing of 
perceptions. What 
does individual 
know?
Autonomy
Self-determination
Rights
C onfiden tia lity  
Privacy 
Paternal ism 
Advocacy 
Trusteeship
Individuals given 
opportunity to 
ta lk , with evid­
ence of lis ten ing  
s k il ls  by nurse, 
with appropriate 
responses. What 
does individual 
want?
interesl,s.
d) Truth te l l in g  
or honesty 
Personal 
in te g r ity  
Informed consent
Individual is fa c i- 
1ita ted  to set 
re a lis t ic  goals as 
a ll facts known.
What does individual 
know?
Honesty/Truth 
te l 1ing 
In te g rity  
F id e lity  
Informed consent
P a tien t/c lien t 
must demonstrate 
partic ipa tion  in 
informed decision­
making.
e) Justice
Fairness
Equality
Individual must be 
ensured fa i r  share 
o f resources.
What does individual 
know?
D is tribu tive  
jus tice  
Fairness 
Equality/Equity 
Resources
Can p a tie n t/c lie n t 
id e n tify  the 
resources to which 
they are e n title d  
to meet th e ir  
health care needs?
>f >f
Outcome or 
Assessment
- Cognitive
- E ffective
- A ffec tive
P a tie n t/c lie n t/ 
advocate/trustee 
realises maximum 
health po te n tia l.
D efin itions c lear­
ly  a rticu la ted  and 
understood by 
p a tie n t/c lie n t/ 
advocate/trustee.
Desired changes 
realised and 
inferred from 
p a tie n t/c lie n t/ 
advocate/trustee.
Pat i e n t/c li  ent/advo­
cate/trustee is  fa c i­
l ita te d  to p a r t ic ip ­
ate in  health care 
decisions.
P atien t/c lien t/advo­
cate/trustee accepts 
consistent 
information.
Figure 4c : The Ethical Analysis Model
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USING THE VALIDATION CRITERIA IN THE ETHICAL ANALYSIS
MODEL TO ASSESS THE ETHICAL CONSTRUCTS
T h e  a u t h o r  now d e t a i l s  t h e  e t h i c a l  
constructs/components and how they may be u t i l ised .  Each 
construct/component or ethical principle is taken in turn and 
discussed using the validation c r i t e r i a .
(a) Sanctity and quali ty of l i f e
The tradit ional cultural value of saving l i f e  at all  
costs, with medical research directed toward time, e f fo r t  and 
e n e r g y  in  c r e a t i n g  new 1 i f e - p r o l o n g i n g  drug s  and 
techniques/procedures is the current trend. This, according to 
Benoliel (1983: 211) has contributed to the "development o f  a 
system in which the care o f  the person is  secondary to the 
diagnosis and treatment o f  disease."
In ensuring that patients/c l ients and/or the ir  families 
or s ignif icant others, have a fu l l  understanding that the nurse 
respects the ir  r ight to l i f e  and the quality of that l i f e ,  then 
i t  is paramount that the model of care advocated for use c learly  
delineates these aspects. For example, the model of care w i l l  
need to incorporate e th ica l  principles and guidelines for  
practice, and so w i l l  need to incorporate assumptions about 
intervention measures to prolong/preserve l i f e ,  or the measures 
to ensure a "good" qual ity  of l i f e .  I t  may also need to include 
assumptions about the consideration given to "special" (page 86)
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people who are unable to participate in decision-making. I f  i t  
does not, then the Ethical Analysis Model is u t i l ised .
Some understanding by both pat ien t /c l ien t  and nurse, 
where possible, is required (Cri ter ia  1) and a sharing of 
the ir  views about the mutual expectations concerned within this  
principle . What exactly does the pat ient /c l ient  know about the 
sanctity of l i f e .  The values, beliefs and assumptions upon 
which the nursing model is based defines (C r i te r ia  2) what 
the individual is capable of, and the assumptions about the 
s a n c t i ty  and q u a l i ty  of l i f e .  Inherent in this are the 
assumptions about what a "person" is, for only then can the
pat ien t /c l ien t  be fu l ly  informed about the care they are to 
receive and the consent required of them.
C le a r ly ,  the e th ica l  p r in c ip le s  may be validated
( C r i t e r i a  3) in terms of behaviour by observing i f  the 
principles are applicable to each individual and so the model 
for care fa c i l i ta te s  ac t iv i ty  which enables the nurse to observe 
and in fer  the pat ient /c l ient  behaviour. In addition, a nurse 
who is competent and knowledgeable, and who is able to give
a p p r o p r i a t e  answers and e x p la n a t io n s  ( C r i t e r i a  4) to 
p a t i e n t s ' / c l i e n t s '  enquir ies is e s s e n t ia l .  F i n a l l y ,  the 
information, which has been decided upon by the health care 
team, is consistent when i t  is presented to the pa t ie n t /c l ie n t  
(C r i te r ia  5) .  I f  a conf l ic t  of interest arises, such as the 
nurse caring for a re la t ive  or friend, then this must be
declared to enable clear decision-making by a ll  members of the
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health care team and the pat ient /c l ient .  The pat ient /c l ient  
is required to recognise and realise where possible his/her  
maximum health potential and i f  this is not possible then 
advocacy is required (page 107).
(b) Liberty/Individual freedom,and Choice
As d iscussed p r e v io u s l y  (page 9 0 ) ,  l i b e r t y  or 
individual freedom may be considered an essential aspect in the 
exercise of rights, though some individuals may not have the 
freedom to exercise th e ir  rights, the mentally i l l .  The 
p at ien t /c l ien t  is given the opportunity and option to choose 
(C r i te r ia  1) from competing st imuli,  based on the ir  personal 
values, and what they know about t h e i r  freedoms/liberty.  
Clearly, those patients/c l ients who are unable to make a choice 
fo r  reasons, such as mental i l lness, are protected. The
terminology used (C r i te r ia  2) may again be articulated for  
the pa t ie n t /c l ie n t ,  and terms such as "l iberty" and "values" 
wil l  require discussion.
The nurse w i l l  not be able to measure whether
pat ients/c l ients f u l ly  understand the freedom of choice, but by 
the responsib il i ty  they accept for the f inal choice/decision
taken (C r i te r ia  3 ) ,  i t  may be inferred that they have some
understanding. I t  may be that the pat ien t /c l ien t  makes a choice 
which, in the opinion of the nurse is the wrong choice, or the 
p a t ie n t /c l ie n t  may decide that the nurse is the 'expert'  and so 
transfers the responsibil i ty  of  the decision to the nurse (page
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183). Discussion and the appropriate referrals  have already 
been discussed (page 189).
Again i t  is v i ta l  that the nurse is competent and
knowledgeable to make a decision as to whether to act as a 
p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  advocate  ( C r i t e r i a  4 ) ,  and to i n i t i a t e  
strategies in the event that the pa t ient /c l ient  makes a choice 
of refusing treatment or care. The nurse may need to ensure 
that the information communicated by the nurse on each occasion 
is consis tent  ( C r i t e r i a  5 ) ,  so the pa t ien t /c l ien t  is not 
confused with di f fer ing information on each occasion.
I t  may be necessary for the nurse to assume the role of 
advocate, or trustee, in the event that the pa t ien t /c l ien t  is 
unable to make a decision and accept the f inal responsibil i ty  
for the ir  care, and any decisions made for/on behalf of the 
pat ien t /c l ien t  must be ju s t i f ie d .
(c) Respect for  persons; Autonomy; Individual rights and
notions of paternalism, advocacy and trusteeship
The notions of autonomy, paternalism, advocacy and
trus teesh ip  are the basis of many ethical principles and
concepts. The nurse is required to direct care " toward the 
good o f  p a t ie n ts  and lo y a l t y  to co-workers" which are both 
ways of showing this respect (Jameton 1984: 125).
Respect for persons incapsulates two main concepts. 
F i rs t ly ,  individuals ought not to be treated as means to an end 
( C r i t e r i a  1 ) ,  t h a t  i s ,  p a t i e n t s / c l i e n t s  must not be 
exploited, and the ir  "autonomy" or self-determination must be
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respected.  Any research t r i a l s  or human experimentation 
techniques requires the pat ient /c l ient  to be fu l ly  informed of 
a l l  the aspects concerned (page 131). What do they know about 
these aspects?
Secondly, the nurse is required to understand what the 
terms "person", "autonomy", "se l f -determ inat ion",  "rights" 
"advocacy", " trusteeship"  and "paternalism" mean (C r i ter ia
2) ,  as they have great significance for the health and the 
care of the pa t ien t /c l ien t .  This is evidenced by the varying 
health care decisions that are concerned with issues such as 
abortion and euthanasia.
The concept of "autonomy", a non-achievable state (page 
96), assumes that the pat ient /c l ient  is ra tional,  able to govern 
the ir  own l ives,  and free to express the ir  views. For example, 
i f  a nurse should prevent a suicide i t  may be viewed as
interfer ing with the pa t ien ts ' /c l ien ts '  r ight to choose to take 
the ir  l i f e .  Conversely, i f  a nurse leaves a potential suicidal 
ind iv id ua l  to carry out the suicide, i t  may be viewed as
r e s p e c t in g  the p a t i e n t s ' / c l i e n t s '  p r ivacy ,  choice,  or
"autonomy". Both these examples may be viewed as notions of
respect for the pa t ien ts ' /c l ien ts '  welfare, and respect for
th e ir  freedom to choose, respectively, and both involve the
notion of paternalism (page 102), as the nurse is seen to be
acting in the pa t ien ts ' /c l ien ts '  in terest.  Arguably, a nurse 
who is concerned for the health and welfare of a pa t ien t /c l ien t  
may be said to be acting pa terna l is t ica l ly ,  and i t  may be a
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morally acceptable form of paternalism, that is acting in the
"best in te re s ts"  of  the person, i f  a suicide attempt was
averted, as a suicidal attempt/intent is not an exercise of 
p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  "autonomy", but ra ther  may be due to an 
underlying psychiatric disorder.
When an individual becomes i l l ,  certain assumptions are 
made which undermine the pat ient /c l ient  "autonomy" and increase 
the dominant role of the nurse and further legit imise that 
role . These assumptions are that the individual becomes a 
patient by name, that patients in turn depend on the nurse for  
advice and care, and that the patient is obliged to comply with 
the advice given. This is based on the be l ie f  that only the
nurse has the knowledge there fo re  to make the resulting
decisions fo r  the p a t ie n t ,  and so all  decision-making is 
relinquished to the nurse.
The pat ient /c l ient  is given the opportunity, therefore, 
to be l istened to, be understood (C r i ter ia  3 ) ,  and the nurse 
is required to respond empathically. This clearly  for the nurse 
means being empathic, that is,  the a b i l i t y  to put oneself in 
another 's  place, which involves emotional and in te l lectual  
s e ns it iv i ty ,  and a common regard for the subjective accounts of 
the p a t ien t /c l ien t  at a l l  times. Nurses also need to be able to 
j u s t i f y  and be challenged on any of the issues being discussed.
C l e a r l y  t h i s  c o l l a b o r a t e  approach to mutual 
goal-sett ing is based on the knowledge of competent personnel 
( C r i t e r i a  4 ) ,  and t h e  r e s u l t i n g  p a t i e n t / c l i e n t
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self-determination w i l l  include the rights (page 74) to which 
the individual is ent i t led .  The ideology of pat ient /c l ient  
"autonomy" results in rights for the individual,  such as the 
r ig h t  to c o n f id e n t ia l i t y  and privacy, the r ight to refuse 
treatment, the right  to informed consent, and the r ight to die 
with dignity , however that may be interpreted by the individual.
U l t i m a t e l y ,  w h a t e v e r  d e c i s i o n  the nurse or  
pat ien t /c l ien t  takes there is consistency in the information
presented (C r i te r ia  5),  across the health care team.
(d) Truth te l 1ing/Honesty/Personal in tegr i ty  
and informed consent
Truth te l l in g  or honesty is central to good human
r e la t io n s ,  and the nurse shares in the responsibil i ty for
t e l l i n g  or not te l l in g  the pat ien t /c l ien t  the truth as i t  
f a c i l i t a te s  more re a l is t ic  goal-setting by the pat ien t /c l ien t  i f  
a l l  the facts are known (C r i ter ia  1).
"Good human re la t io n s  are the 
basis o f  good nu rs ing , and tha t  
such re la t io n s  ought to be based 
on t r u s t "
(Sheehan 1985: 334)
The ro le  of  the nurse in the process of giving
information is not clear.  How much information is the nurse 
obliged to of fer  the p a t ien t /c l ien t ,  or ent i t led to t e l l  them, 
and what s o r t s  o f  adv i ce  can they  give or withhold?
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Tradit ional ly ,  the nurse is only allowed to give information 
which has already been given by the doctor, thus any new 
information constitutes amplifying or re-stating the information 
already given by the doctor.
T h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  of  the nur ses '  r o l e  may be 
unacceptable, as often doctors do not have the time to explain 
the procedures or the ir  consequences to the p a t ien t /c l ien t .
The author has argued for honesty to pat ients/c l ients  
and re le va n t  d isclosure of  information to them, and has 
presented re levan t  questions to ensure t h i s  (page 144). 
Non-disclosure cannot be ju s t i f i e d  simply by showing that  
disclosure does some harm (Jameton 1984: 175) especially when 
the harm cannot be measured (page 137). Nurses need to adopt an 
assertive stance whereby they can give information on equal 
t e r m s ,  b u t  i n  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  h e a l t h  
care /mult i-disciplinary team to ensure pat ients /c l ients receive 
accurate information so that they may partic ipate in health care 
decisions ( C r i t e r i a  4 ) .  This can be asserted on several 
grounds. F i rs t ly ,  at the core of pa t ien t /c l ien t  education is 
the disclosure of information. Secondly, as possible advocates 
of pat ients /c l ients ,  nurses may need to prove themselves as 
"autonomous" e n t i t ies ,  perhaps by gaining professional status, 
and the a b i l i t y  to disclose information as of r ight .  Thirdly,  
nurses generally spend more time with the pa t ien t /c l ien t  and so 
have more time to discuss issues, and to judge when and what to 
say w i l l  arise out of these discussions.
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Despite the grounds described e a r l ie r ,  nurses s t i l l  
appear to doctors to be less capable of understanding and 
explaining the diagnosis and this raises two issues. I f  the 
nurse has less authority than the doctor then the patient-nurse 
relationship may be affected when a judgement has to be made by 
the pa t ien t /c l ien t ;  and how wi l l  the pat ien t /c l ien t  judge i f  a 
confl ic t  in opinion arises between doctor and nurse.
The nurse needs to f a c i l i t a t e  the pa t ie n ts ' /c l ie n ts '  
understanding of  the terminology used such as " integr i ty" ,  
" tru th  t e l l i n g " ,  and "informed consent" (C r i te r ia  2),  and 
tha t  the information is consistent when presented to the 
pat ien t /c l ien t  (C r i ter ia  5).
Whatever the decision in t ru th - te l l in g ,  the nurse needs 
to  f a c i l i t a t e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of  the p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  in 
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  ( C r i t e r i a  3 ) ,  as i t  i s  onl y  t h i s  
part icipation that the nurse can use to adequately in fer  the 
required behaviour.
(e) Justice, fairness and equality
Distr ibutive just ice, fairness and equality are clearly  
s ignif icant  for the nurse on the grounds that the nurse ensures, 
as f a r  as able, the f a i r  allocation of resources for the 
p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  ( C r i t e r i a  1 ) .  Resources in t h i s  thesis  
includes time, finances, personnel, care and equipment, and in 
each case the nurse ensures appropriate c r i t e r i a  for the 
allocat ion of these scarce resources (page 151). Clear policies
- 212 -
and guidelines are required which are f lex ib le  enough to take 
into consideration the individual needs of each pat ien t /c l ien t ,  
that each pat ien t /c l ien t  gets equal consideration, and that the 
decisions and subsequent actions are ju s t i f ia b le .  However, as 
not a ll  humans act morally, and there are varying degrees of 
morality, the nurse may need to adopt a non-judgemental stance 
when a choice is taken by the pa t ient /c l ient .
A l l  the terminology used (Cr i ter ia  2) in the text  
requires c le a r  definit ions, such as "distr ibutive just ice" ,  
"fairness", "equality", and "resources". What exactly does the 
pat ien t /c l ien t  know?
With the help of the nurse patients/c l ients  may be able 
to ident ify  the resources to which they are ent i t led  (C r i te r ia
3) ,  and in so doing may meet the ir  health care needs. The 
problems of ensuring a f a i r  share of resources has already been 
highlighted (page 147).
The health care resources require a well informed 
competent nurse (C r i te r ia  4) ,  able to aid the p a t ien t /c l ien t  
in ident ifying the ir  share of the resources, and be able to 
art icu la te  for/on the p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  behalf i f  required to 
do so.
F i n a l l y ,  c o n s i s t e n c y  ( C r i t e r i a  5)  i n t h e  
information presented is important, and this w i l l  be manifested 
in what the p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  does. Nurses may need to be
cognisant of the fact that the expectations of the consumer and 
health care-givers are increasing and ever changing, as health
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care is perceived d i f fe rent ly  by nurses and patients/c l ients  
alike (pages 51-57). Any ethical action taken in the allocation  
of scarce resources requires ju s t i f ica t ion  and so the ethical 
enquiry which underpins the ethical decision as to how resources 
are to be allocated requires rigorous discussion in order to 
satisfy public opinion.
( f )  Beneficence and Non-Haleficence
These p r in c ip le s  are subsumed in a l l  the other  
principles throughout this Chapter. The active provision or 
promotion of good, or beneficence, and the obligation not to 
harm other individuals, or non-maleficence, is an integral part 
of a l l  the ethical principles (page 23).  For example, in the 
principle of the sanctity of l i f e  the nurse is faced with 
weighing the potential harm against the benefits in cases of the 
prolongation and preservation of l i f e ,  and in both cases the 
nurse needs to be cognisant of the "do no harm" principle .
In the exercise of l iberty/freedom the nurse may need 
to ensure that this principle does not conf l ic t  with another 
principle , thus causing harm to the pa t ie n t /c l ie n t .  I t  has been 
argued (page 91) that in using freedom r igh t ly  i t  may be used to 
promote good, such as the promotion of health, and this  
c o r r e l a t e s  w i t h  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  b e n e f i c e n c e  and 
non-maleficence.
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In the principle of autonomy the individual may need to 
employ the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence as 
consideration needs to be given to what the pat ient /c l ient  
wants, but the nurse has to be careful that in acceding to the 
wishes of patients/c l ients and respecting the ir  "autonomy" that 
patients /c l ients  do not come to any harm.
The p a t ien ts ' /c l ien ts '  r ight  to know the truth includes 
knowing a l l  the benef i ts  and the harms of the treatment 
proposed. Withholding the truth from a pa t ien t /c l ien t  may 
vio late  the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence i f  the 
pat ie n t /c l ie n t  suffers as a result of the truth being withheld.
In the  d i s t r ib u t io n  of scarce resources in the 
just ice / fa irness principle, the beneficent and non-maleficent 
principle may again be violated i f  individuals are not given the 
same consideration and treated f a i r l y .
The author now turns to the curriculum considerations.
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4. CURRICULUM CONSIDERATIONS
The Ethical Analysis Model bridges the gap between 
theory and practice and thus the focus for intervention in 
curriculum planning is for  nurse educators to move from 
theoretical considerations to the active incorporation of the 
Ethical Analysis Model in all  nurse educational programmes. The 
author proposes to modify the current curriculum to include the 
Ethical Analysis Model, and in so doing wi l l  be suggesting la te r  
how the Ethical Analysis Model may be implemented. This 
i n c l ude s  aims,  suggested t e a ch i ng  s t r a t e g i e s / l e a r n i n g  
opportunities and resources, and the assessment approaches which 
may be employed.
Theoretical basis for the Ethical Analysis Model
Education is an ac t iv i ty  which takes place at d i f ferent  
levels, that is, in the theoretical setting and in the practical  
setting. Both are interdependent thus the theory of education 
is dependent on the practice. The theory of education is a 
series of directions and is not descriptive, and is an attempt 
to find a ra t iona l ly  defensible basis for educational practice,  
or a way to ju s t i f y  rational principles for practice (Hirst  
1969: 29 - 58 ) .  Educational theory generally has a certain
structure comprising a major premise or aim, a minor premise or 
method, and a conclusion or end. To be a valid theory i t  must 
have this  structure and be well corroborated. This structure 
culminates in ra t iona l ly  ju s t i f ie d  principles for educational 
practice. These principles state what ought to done in a range
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of practical a c t iv i t ie s .  The Tyler (1950) methodological model 
is used to guide curriculum development in this thesis.
Aims and Objectives
The aims for the nurse in the use of the Ethical 
Analysis Framework and Model is detailed (page 187), but i t  is 
up to the fac i l i ta tor /educator  to develop individual objectives 
and l e a r n i n g  exper i e nc es  f o r  each phase/stage in the 
introduction of the Ethical Analysis Model. For example, in 
phase/stage Four (Figure 4a) the specific objectives which wi l l  
enhance the p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  understanding of the validation  
c r i t e r i a  and the ethical constructs/components w i l l  need to be 
developed by the nurse and fa c i l i t a t o r .
Teaching and Learning Strategies
As the author is presupposing th a t  some eth ics  
education precedes or is used as a foundation to the Ethical 
Analysis Model, then some of the teaching methods and learning 
strategies such as detailed in Appendix 9 may be u t i l ised  in 
this  Ethical Analysis Model.
Assessment Approaches
For the purposes of research Schools of Nursing may 
need to know what factors are said to influence the application 
of e th ic a l  p r i n c i p l e s ,  such as the concern the nurse may 
demonstrate towards p a t i e n t s / c l i e n t s  in respecting t h e i r  
r ights. The f a c i l i t a t o r  introducing the Ethical Analysis Model 
may also need to know the performance of the nurse in applying 
the Model (Figure 4c). Thus i t  becomes important to know the 
content to be assessed and the assessment techniques.
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Hard quantif iable data and s ta t is t ica l  results are not 
appropriate  in ethics education on two grounds. F i rs t ly ,  
ethical principles cannot be measured, and secondly, by reason 
of the predictive nature of these assessment techniques the 
results f a i l  to c la r i fy  dist inct  characteristics or the reason 
for  certain behaviours.
The author has already outlined assessment techniques 
and t h e i r  l i mi t a t i o n s  in ethics education (Rodmell 1985: 
117-118) in the cognitive and affective domains. Some of these 
include ambiguity in def init ions and interpretations used in 
assessment, and the d i f f i c u l ty  in assessing rational behaviour 
and the individual's  reasons, rules and principles underlying 
the action. The results may only be induced or inferred,  
especially i f  the behaviour to be assessed is specified.
The evidence suggests that a ho l is t ic  approach, such as 
one which appraises the teacher, the learner and the situation,  
be adopted. For example, the use of competencies to evaluate 
behaviour and reactions in situations may be used, and this is 
detailed la te r .
The author now turns to the implementation guide!ines:-
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5. IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES FOR PRACTICE
The author now presents the implementation guidelines 
for  the Ethical Analysis Model proposed by the author (Figure 
4c)
For convenience and c la r i ty  sub-headings w i l l  be used.
(a) Educational strategies
( i )  Assessment perspectives
The educational perspectives cannot be addressed nor 
can they be materialised unless all  those nurses responsible for  
the supervision of s ta f f  and students assume a f a c i l i t a t o r  role,  
or act as role-models in the c l i n i c a l  advising of these 
individuals in the Ethical Analysis Model. In order for the 
Ethical Analysis Model to gain acceptance i t  is important that 
the environment and the attitudes are appropriate (page 24).  
This can only be achieved by discussions with s ta f f  at a ll  
levels using the knowledge nurses have of implementing change. 
In addition, an assessment of need for the Ethical Analysis 
Model is required, and this is now detailed.  This assessment is 
a requirement in a l l  se t t ings  whether i t  be hospital or 
community.
Assessment of need for the Ethical Analysis Model
A clear assessment of the needs of these individuals is 
made as to:
i )  Why, t h a t  i s ,  the r a t io n a le  underlying the
Ethical Analysis Framework and Model. In other words, why is
this Model needed?
i i )  What , t h a t  i s ,  the  knowledge base th a t  is
required to f a c i l i t a t e  the introduction of the Ethical Analysis
Framework and Model, advocated by the author (Figure 4a and 4c).  
What are the aims for the nurse in the use of the Model (Figure 
4c)?
- 219 -
i i i )  Where, t h a t  i s ,  the se t t in g  in which the 
teaching w i l l  be carried out, and what resources are available.
iv) How, that is,  the teaching methods to be used, 
and the benefits/advantages and disadvantages to pa t ien t /c l ien t ,  
the nurse and health care team, and any improvements in standards 
and qual ity  of care.
v) When, that is, the timing of the sessions and 
the exact placement in the curriculum where the teaching will  
occur, both in the pre-registrat ion and post-registration and 
continuing education/professional development programmes. A 
clear implementation programme wi l l  need to be developed.
v i )  Who, that is,  the nurse f a c i l i t a t o r ,  educator 
or theorist who is very familiar  with the use of the Ethical 
Analysis Framework and Model and can apply i t  to d i f fe r ing  
situations.
I t  may enhance the introduction of the Ethical Analysis 
Model i f  a l l  concerned fu l ly  understand the strategies and 
rationale so that continual reinforcement and consolidation of 
material is occurring in a l l  scenarios.
(b) Teaching strategies, learning opportunities and 
experiences
The t e a c h i n g  methods or  s t r a t e g i e s  to enable  
understanding of the Ethical Analysis Model w i l l  be derived from 
the discussions of the rationale, purposes/aims and objectives 
of the material to be presented in the assessment phase. These 
w i l l  obviously vary to achieve the goals intended. As already 
mentioned (page 214) each fac i l i ta tor /educator  using the Ethical 
Analysis Model w i l l  set the goals for each phase/stage within 
the broad framework provided.
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Any teaching strategy (Appendix 9) such as group 
d i s c u s s i o n s ,  semi nars ,  l e c t u r e s ,  and r o le -p la y in g  and 
role-taking, w i l l  require thorough preparation as timing and the 
degree/depth of information imparted is of utmost importance in 
increasing motivation for the effect ive u t i l is a t io n  of  the 
Ethical Analysis Framework and Model (Figure 4a,4c) .  However 
the Ethical Analysis Framework and Model is presented, then the 
c la r i ty  and simplicity of the Model are stressed, the benefits 
to p a t i e n t / c l i e n t ,  and the possible improved standard and 
qua!ity of care.
(c) Evaluation of the Ethical Analysis Framework and
Model
Whatever tool is used to improve, expand, or heighten 
the awareness and the learning potential of the individual,  w i l l  
vary, and every e f fo r t  by nurse facil i tators/supervisors w i l l  be
i
made to:
( i )  Ensure p a r t i  ci pat i  on of i ndi v i dua l s  in the 
educational setting using t r ied  and tested techniques such as 
enquiry-based, information-based and creative methods such as 
experient ia l,  awareness and/or sk i l ls  training/modell ing as in 
role-playing and role-taking,  as advocated by Davies and Gibson 
(1967: 40).  This may increase the individuals understanding of 
the Ethical Analysis Framework and Model, using a f a c i l i t a t i v e  
model and a model based on the concepts of  andragogy. 
Andragogy is the “ i d e o lo g y  about te a c h in g  and l e a r n in g
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w i t h  a d u l t s  t h a t  may lead a d u l t  educators to produce art 
environment tha t  enhances a d u l ts '  learn ing processes" (Jarvis 
and Gibson 1985: 46).
( i i )  Ensure understanding of the Ethical Analysis 
Framework and Model (Figure 4a, 4c) by the presentation of case 
studies and role-playing and role-taking in a controlled setting 
wi t h  a f a c i l i t a t o r  present .  Ind iv idua ls  are afforded  
opportunities to share cl in ical  experiences, to share the ir  
knowledge of current research, published and unpublished. This 
heuristic strategy is aimed at discovering knowledge, rather  
than v e r i f y i ng  i t ,  otherwise "ecolog ica l f a l l a c i e s "  arise,  
that is,  trying to in fer  something about the behaviour of one 
individual or group, of analysis from the observed behaviour of 
anotner individual or group (Robinson 1950: 351-357).
( i i i )  Observe the n u rs e -p a t ie n t /c l ie n t  interaction  
to ensure the Ethical Analysis Framework and Model (Figure 4a, 
4c) is being ut i l ised  e f fect ive ly  and confidently.
Part ic ipat ion in the use of,  understanding of, and 
interaction in the use of the Ethical Analysis Model may only 
be judged by the inferred behaviour of the individuals concerned 
(page 200). I t  may be that the use of a set of competencies 
whereby nurses and fa c i l i ta to r s  rate themselves in situations,  
or are rated by others in the health care team, in the ir  
competency in s k i l l  related to practice may prove benefic ial .  
For example, the s k i l l ,  such as whether the nurse upholds the
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c o n f id e n t ia l  r ights of pat ients/clients in given situations 
would be graded. The nurse judges or is judged on that graded 
hierarchy, and moves up the levels as competency in the sk i l l  
improves.
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6. THE ETHICAL ANALYSIS MODEL;THE IMPLICATIONS FOR
RESEARCH, EDUCATION AND PRACTICE 
INTRODUCTION
As an assessment for the future the author now wishes 
to examine the implications nationally and local ly  for research,
education and pr ac t i ce .  These implications may serve to
h i g h l i g h t  the problem areas which may occur  in the  
implementation of the Ethical Analysis Model proposed by the 
author.
For convenience and c la r i ty  sub-headings w i l l  be used.
1. NATIONAL LEVEL
a) Research, Education and Practice (Policy
imp!ications)
i ) Statutory Policy statements
S p e c i f i c  gui del i nes may need to be issued from 
S ta tu to ry  organisations such as the United Kingdom Central 
Council (page 79) and the English National Board (page 79) to 
guide curriculum content and programme development/curriculum 
planning. The author hopes to translate these guidelines into 
nursing education philosophy, the philosophy of nursing, and the 
phi losophies of  nursing models. Further to th is ,  ethics 
education discussions may need to form part of the Statutory 
requirement for continuing nursing practice and incorporated 
into Statutory refresher courses.
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i i )  Union organisation policy statements
The Royal College of Nursing Professional Services 
Committee has reaf f i rm ed i t s  commitment to improving the 
pr act i ce  of  Nursing, in p a r t ic u la r  in the awareness of  
p a t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  rights arena (Gartside and Wright 1987: 5). 
The six main themes include the pa t ie n t 's /c l ie n t 's  r ight to:
1. Skil led nursing to meet his needs,
working in partnership with him to
achieve health and happiness.
2. Know how and why he is being treated
and what is being done to help him 
and what alternatives are available.
3. Be given enough information and 
s k i l l s ,  i n l a n g u a g e  he can 
comprehend, to enable him to be as 
independent of nursing as possible 
in health care.
4. Have choice in his care, with the
obl i gat i on that nursing w i l l  give 
him knowledge on which to base a
rational decision.
5. Be t rea ted  as an indiv idual and 
accorded respect, dignity and equal 
quality of care regardless of age, 
sexual orientation, re l ig ion, race 
or beliefs .
6 . Have total nursing support with the 
nurse acting as his advocate and in 
his "best i n t er est s"  when he is 
unable to make such choices himself.
These rights are made exp l ic i t  on admission to hospital 
to both pa t ie n t /c l ie n t  and re lat ives. However, these rights are 
controversial on the grounds that the dilemmas that arise for
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the nurse are not easily solved. For example, the r ight to have 
a choice in care (item 4) is paramount, but what decisions are 
made when the pat ient /c l ient  refuses a choice because care is 
rejected. In addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that what 
"ought" to happen and what does happen in practice, that is,  the 
re a l i t y  gap, is of continuing concern, and c la r i f ic a t io n  may be 
required before use can be made of these guidelines for  
practice. I t  has already been argued (page 124) that nurses may 
need some training in advocacy roles. This question of rights 
may imply that the nursing philosophy be created by team s ta f f  
in the c l in ica l  or community setting, and not imposed from some 
h ie ra rc h ic a l  nursing structure above this practical setting 
level .
( i i i )  Specific Policy statements
Sta tu tory  organisations may need to issue specific  
policy statements e x p l ic i t ly  stating the role and training of 
nurse advocates, including advice on how to handle suspected 
mal pract i ce by col leagues may be required. The National 
Association of Health Authorit ies (NAHA) in England and Wales 
(1985) has a lready issued guidel i nes fo r  handling s ta f f  
complaints, and the subsequent investigations and support to 
pat ients /c l ients ,  complainants and accused.
In addition to th is ,  appropriate policies which re f lec t  
the proper se l ect i on of  an e t hi ca l  nursing model may be 
required, and the use of an ethical model such as advocated by 
the author (Figure 4c) is suggested.
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More s t r ic t  adherence to the Research policy statements 
regarding p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  experimentation (Appendix 6) and 
informed consent may be required, and monitoring of this by the 
Ethics Committee at a National and Local level may be required.
Some guidance for nurses in the ir  role of aiding in 
research is required.
b) Research implications
( i )  Nursing Research experiment candidates
The p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  requiring advocacy is usually a 
vulnerable individual,  for one reason or another, and i t  would 
therefore be unethical to use these individuals in research 
techniques, as in drug t r i a ls ,  as the ir  rights may not be 
protected by informed consent.
Pa t i e n t s / c l i e n t s  who are unable to give the ir  own 
informed consent may not to be used as research subjects, i f  
o t h e r  s u b j e c t s  can be used.  C l e a r l y ,  the less able 
patients /c l ients  are at protecting themselves, the more v ig i lan t  
the nurse becomes in protecting them.
A c r i t ic a l  look at the mandate for nursing and the 
ethical and legal implications could be the forerunner of the 
research, which may prove that the nurse might encompass the 
informing and supporting role of the pat ien t /c l ien t  advocacy and 
leave the pleading of the ir  cause in the ir  "best interests",  
whatever they may be, to other health care professionals.
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( i i )  Future Research
Future research in ethics may require the nurse to have
a basic knowledge of ethics before research in this area is
undertaken. The type of research wi l l  be detailed la te r .
( i i i )  Ethical Committees
Based on the need to improve the sk i l l  of the nurse in
applying ethical principles, i t  may be that a National body to
whom the local  e thi ca l  committee can r e f e r ,  and who is
responsible for detail ing the terms of reference and membership 
status of the local committees wi l l  need to be formed. I t  would 
also have a watchdog/monitoring and research remit. This may 
already be the role of the recently formed Standards and Ethics 
Group of the United Kingdom Central Council, but to date the ir  
terms of reference have not been published (page 34).  All 
nurses could be afforded the opportunity of attending national 
e t h i c a l  commi t tee meet i ngs in order  to improve t h e i r
understanding of the national machinery.
c) Education implications
( i ) Nurse teacher and specialist  training
Nurse teacher t raining courses may be required to
incorporate the experience of recognising ethical dilemmas in
a l l  s e t t i ngs ;  u t i l i s a t i o n  of hypothetical situations using
c r i t i c a l  incident techniques and discussion; a knowledge of the
remit  o f  a l l  support groups such as Ethical Committees; a 
knowledge of teaching ethics by way of such methods as case 
studies, or the use of an ethics education model such as the
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Moral Education Model proposed by Rodmell (1985: 119-131) in a 
Masters Degree dissertation; and u t i l isa t ion  of the Ethical 
Analysis Framework and Model proposed in this thesis (Figures 
4a,4b,4c) .
( i i )  Theory development
I t  has emerged that  nursing models appear to be 
defic ient in ethical principles and so nurse theorists may need 
to look to developing nursing models for the future which give 
greater emphasis to the philosophical content.
( i i i )  Health Education/Prevention
As heal th education/promotion now has primacy in 
nursing, recently emphasised by the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) dictum "Health for a ll  by year 2000", (1984) then nurses 
may need to c o n c e n t r a t e  on a nt i c i pa t i ng the needs of  
patients /c l ients ,  as is the ir  r ight ,  identify  the vulnerable 
individuals, and by so predicting these vulnerable groups, then 
appropriate and timely intervention can reduce the need for  
advocacy in c r is is  situations.
(iv) Ethics education
The study of philosophy for nurses seems to have been 
borrowed or adapted for specific usage in nursing, and many 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations have occurred at the 
expense of the philosophers original meaning or thoughts. This 
may be due to a lack of ethics education, or i t  may be due to 
poor c r i t i c a l  analysis s k i l l s .  Nursing theorists have bu i l t  
t h e i r  nur s i ng  models on these sometimes misunderstood
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foundations, and i t  is these weak foundations on which i t  is 
purported that nursing care is directed.
d) Clinical/Practice implications
The implementation of the Ethical Analysis Model has 
implications for s ta f f  in the c lin ical and community setting.  
I t  may requ ire  changes in a t t i tu d e s ,  and further  s k i l ls  
t ra ining, such as in communication techniques, to e ffect  the 
Model (Figure 4c ) .
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2. LOCAL LEVEL
a) Research implications
( i )  Policy statements
The National Research policies wi l l  be disseminated to 
local settings in the hospital and community, and these policies  
w i l l  be effected local ly .  This may require researchers to 
record and ut i l i se  research findings by demonstrating that the 
use of  e t h i ca l  models of care may contribute to improved
communications and r e l a t i onshi ps  wi th the p a t ie n t /c l ie n t ,  
improved s t andards of  ca r e ,  and the secur ing of  the 
pa t i e n t s ' / c l i e n t s '  and nurses' rights. The results of the 
research may prove to be negative, and so nurses may have to
search for other ways to improve patient care standards. This 
may require a look at consumer surveys, patient satisfaction  
questionnaires, and audit techniques used in evaluating, for  
example, the quali ty of nursing intervention. Such approaches 
l i nk practit ioner involvement with quality improvement.
( i i ) Ethical Committees and future research
Research at a local level is required and monitored by
the national group. Such research may include research into 
ethics educational theory and how principles are applied in the 
c l in ica l  settings; the effectiveness of the u t i l is a t io n  of the 
Ethical Analysis Model advocated by the author in this study; 
the role and contribution of nurses in Ethical Committees; and 
the n u r s e - p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  in terac t ion  when ethical dilemmas 
arise.
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b) Education implications
( i )  Ethics education
I t  would seem appropriate to suggest that nurses who 
intend to embark upon any aspect of theorising for other nurses, 
ought f i r s t l y  to study, discuss, debate, analyse, and simplify  
philosophical intentions with philosophers of some repute, or 
with medical and nurse ethicists with an applied knowledge of 
ethics and ethical theories, and to continue to do so once they 
have u t i l i s e d  the ethical theories. I t  is this constant 
d ia lo g u e  which g ives  credence and c r e d i b i l i t y  to the 
professional, and which enhances the professional's chance at 
being a recognised authority in the ir  chosen f ie ld .  Further to 
th is ,  continued debate increases understanding, adds to the body 
of nursing knowledge, and so keeps abreast of the societal and 
ethical changes as they occur.
( i i )  Continuing education
Provided the Sta tu tory  requirements are e x p l ic i t ly  
stated then i t  may be necessary for a ll  nurses to keep abreast 
of current developments in ethics education. I t  may be that 
this w i l l  form part of the Statutory refresher programme or part 
of the hospital or community post-registration or Continuing 
Education programme, or both. These programmes may need to 
incorporate specific workshops on change strategies and att itude  
t ra in ing.
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Highly developed communication sk i l ls  are required, as 
provid ing answers to p a t i e n t s ' / c l i e n t s '  questions is not 
enough. Some patients/c lients do not know what questions to 
ask.
Accepting the role of pat ient /c l ient  advocate requires 
a professional assertive (page 123) stance, whereby the quali ty  
of  care and the r igh ts  of these in d iv id ua ls  and public 
accountabil ity outweighs loyalty to the internal bureaucracy. 
For the Ethical Analysis Model to be accepted the need has to be 
ident i f ied and this may only be possible i f  there are the 
appropriate attitudes and an environment which fosters enquiry.
c) Practice implications
( i )  Clinical perspectives
Kippels and Perry (1978: 107-108, 110) has already
suggested alternative models of advocacy in specially appointed 
independent counsellors or hospital administrators, and with the 
increasing threat of l i t ig a t io n  in the United Kingdom the need 
fo r  a B i l l  of Rights for  p a t i e n t s / c l i e n t s ,  students and 
q u a l i f i e d  nurses is urgent. Alike the American Hospital 
Association Pat ients '  B i l l  of Rights (Appendix 5) i t  must 
include rights to considerate and respectful care, to complete 
c u r r e n t  in fo rm a t io n ,  c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y ,  and to reasonable  
continuity of care. I t  may be that to f a c i l i t a t e  most of these 
changes restructuring of the p a t ien ts ' /c l ien ts '  day in hospital 
may be necessary.
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The speciality areas w i l l  now be discussed:
Primary care
Education of the public about the role of the nurse as 
pa t ien t /c l ien t  advocate is of paramount importance, u t i l is in g  
the media as a source of information.
Terminal i l lness and care
Advocacy for the terminally i l l  is a central part of 
p a l l ia t iv e  nursing care, in the absence of a cure. The quali ty  
of l i f e  for the dying pa t ien t /c l ien t ,  improving the act of
dying, and the environment in which the individual w i l l  choose
to die, is well within the remit of the nurse and care-givers 
and may be improved with pat ient /c l ient  advocacy. The nurse may 
well be advocating for an unconscious individual and may be
required to art icula te  the previously discussed verbal and/or 
written views of the pat ient /c l ient  and family. I t  is crucial 
that the "best interests" of the pat ien t /c l ien t  be served.
( i i )  Nursing Process implications
The effectiveness of the care delivered at the bedside 
may be increased i f  exp l ic i t  contracts are agreed during the 
assessment phase, provided the pat ien t /c l ien t  is competent, that 
is ,  rational and capable, so to do. The agreement would include 
the identifying of expectations (page 174) f le x ib le  enough to 
allow fo r  behavioural changes when continuous review and
evaluation occurs.
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The agreement incorporates all  the f ive elements as 
outlined in the goal-setting process o f J the Nursing Process 
(page 3 7 ) ,  such as who is  to undertake  the  des ired  
outcome/behaviour; the actual behaviour; the relevant conditions 
or circumstances, level of assistance required to undertake 
behaviour, and where i t  is to be performed; the standard or 
c r i t e r i a  fo r  success; and the timing, that is ,  when the 
agreement starts, review and outcome dates. These f ive  elements 
are r e a l is t ic  or achievable and simple, that is ,  within the 
capabil ity  of the pat ient /c l ient  to perform; comprehensive or 
easi ly understood by a l l ;  measurable, that is ,  those concerned 
in deciding i f  the outcome has been realised must be able to 
observe the specific behaviour. I t  is preferable that the goals 
or agreements are wri tten,  so the health care team part ic ipating  
are aware and involved in real is ing, the mutually expected 
goals. I t  also implies a commitment, as each pat ien t /c l ien t  
agreement is specific to that indiv idual.
The re v ie w  or evaluat ion of  the goals must be 
renegotiated i f  circumstances change and the p a t ien t /c l ien t  and 
relevant health care team members must be involved and informed.
In the case of a child, or a p a t ien t /c l ien t  who is 
unable to part ic ipate in decision-making, such as a mentally i l l  
individual,  then an advocate may be appointed for and on behalf 
of the p a t ie n t /c l ie n t ,  or a trustee may already be cognisant of 
what has to be done.
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This approach to mutual goal-setting fa c i l i ta te s  the 
advantage o f  making the p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  a n d /o r  t h e i r  
t ru s te e /a d v o c a te / fa m i ly  responsible fo r  health care , and 
according to Wallace (1987: 34) "reduces unwarranted demands
on s t a f f  ........................ and the apparent ly manipulat ive  behaviour
o f  p a t i e n t s , and fo rce s t a f f  to plan treatments and communicate
aspects o f  t reatments to a l l  concerned ........... and provide an
oppor tun i ty  f o r  the c o l le c t io n  o f  ob jec t ive  data".
Ostensibly, i t  is the assessment process that is of 
paramount importance in sensitively interpreting or translating  
the facts communicated to the nurse from the pat ien t /c l ien t  
and/or re la t ive .  Through identifying the problem, measuring the 
depth or scale of the problem, c lar ify ing the pattern of the 
problem and any variances, explaining or judging the meaning of 
the problem, is the problem structured and given shape. The 
method of assessment is pat ient /c l ient  - specific and embodies 
a l l  the communication sk i l ls  of observation, l istening, and 
c la r i f ic a t io n ,  in an e f fo r t  to enable the p a t ien t /c l ien t  to 
express, where possible, the ir  own image, and not that of the 
nurse.
( i i i )  Nursing model perspectives
Future nursing models used by nurses to set standards
of care and on which practice is based or guided, w i l l  need to
include validation c r i te r ia  such as in the Ethical Analysis 
Model advocated by the author (Figure 4c) to ensure the basic 
human needs of a l l  pat ients /c l ients are being met and the ir  
rights are respected.
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Kitson (1987: 2) in addressing the Research Society 
emphasises the need to include patient autonomy, recognition of 
the need to respect the individuals dignity, whether the ir  
environment is aesthetical ly pleasing, and an attempt to measure 
the qual ity  of the l i f e  of the pa t ien t /c l ien t ,  by comparing 
t h e i r  a d m is s io n  l i f e - s t y l e  w i th  t h e i r  d is c h a rg e  or  
post-discharge l i f e s ty le .
The choice of a nursing model plays an important role  
in this Model advocated by the author (Figure 4c). Choosing a 
nursing model whether i t  is derived deductively, that is ,  a 
theoretical model, or inductively, that is,  a conceptual model 
is measured against i ts  social usefulness, significance and 
congruence (Johnson 1974: 376). Johnson's (1974) c r i t e r i a  for  
evaluat ing a nursing model is useful, and addresses three 
questions. F i r s t l y ,  wi l l  educators, researchers and nurse 
p r a c t i t io n e r s  f ind  the model clear and complete enough to 
u t i l i s e  in curriculum planning, identifying research problems 
and providing nursing care. Secondly, w i l l  the model make a 
signif icant impression to benefit nursing; and th i rd ly ,  does 
society expect the kind of nursing suggested from the model.
Smith (1982: 120-121) has noted the relationship
between nurse training and actual nursing practice highlighting  
that models tended to be selected to support the prevail ing  
beliefs  about nursing functions, and curriculum are subsequently 
devised. This would seem to be in keeping with the inductive 
approach to the development of a conceptual model which purports 
to arise from practice.
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Adam (1983: 41) and Aggleton and Chalmers (1986: 4-10) 
have also advocated guidelines for building and choosing a
nursing model respectively. What has emerged for consideration 
is that these theorists have common themes. Clearly the model 
must be a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  unders tand ing  the p a r t i c u la r  
patients/c l ients and the ir  needs. I f  the assumptions, values, 
and beliefs about nursing in the nursing model are e x p l ic i t ly  
sta ted ,  are reasonable, that is,  acceptable to the patient  
Darbyshire (1987: 28), are amenable to ver i f ica t ion by other 
nurse theorists, re f lect  the value system of a larger society 
that nursing serves, then, according to Adam (1983 : 44), these 
elements are the building blocks of a nursing model. Moreover, 
i f  the ideal and l imited goals of nursing are stated, such as 
broadly, to promote health and prevent health problems or 
educate to adjust to those problems which are d i f f i c u l t  to 
a l le v ia te ,  but discrete enough to distinguish the contribution
from that of other disciplines, then the concepts are further
consolidated.
Furthermore, i f  the b e n e f ic ia r ie s  of  nursing are
i d e n t i f i e d  and viewed as bio-psychosocial individuals, and 
considers the s p i r i t u a l / r e l i g i o u s ,  p o l i t i c a l  and economic 
aspects of these individuals; the social role of the nurse is 
defined; the source of pat ient /c l ient  problems ident i f ied;  the 
focus and mode of  nurses in terven t ion  and the intended  
consequences of nursing care are e x p l ic i t ly  stated, then these 
"building block" elements w i l l  be formalised into a theory.
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Thus t h i s  " c o h e s i v e  s u p p o r t i v e  l i n k a g e  o f  s e l e c t e d ,  
i n t e r r e l a t e d  concep ts "  (Santora 1980:3) provides the basic 
structure for the curriculum.
Aggleton and Chalmers (1986: 105) have offered clear 
guidelines to ensure that following selection of a model the 
nurse must evaluate how well i t  has f u l f i l l e d  the expectations. 
For example:
(a) D i d  t h e  n u r s i n g  model p r o v i d e  g u i d e l i n e s  on 
assessment tha t enable the p a t i e n t ' s  problems to be c l e a r l y  
i d e n t i f i e d ?
(b) Did the planning o f  care and the s e t t i n g  o f  goals match 
the p a t i e n t ' s  expectat ion o f  care?
(c) Did the model suggest a range o f  nurs ing in te rven t ions  
which were p ra c t i c a l  in tha t p a r t i c u l a r  care se t t ing?
(d) Did the nursing in te rven t ions  ca r r ie d  out enable the 
nurse to  p ro v id e  a s tandard  o f  care a cce p ta b le  both to 
h e r /h im se l f  and the pa t ien t?
(Aggleton and Chalmers (1986: 105)
The author would add one further guideline:
(e) Does the n u rs in g  model enable  the r i g h t s  o f  the 
p a t i e n t / c l i e n t  to be i d e n t i f i e d ,  c l a r i f i e d ,  and t h e i r  choices 
determined?
( iv )  Role-modelling in the c l in ica l  setting  
As in any new experience or learn ing  s i tu a t io n  
role-modell ing by peers w i l l  enable positive attitudes towards 
p a t ie n t /c l ie n t  and a resulting improvement in the delivery of 
care.
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(v) Preparation of the health care team in the 
c l in ica l  setting
The nurse theor is t /superv isor / fac i l i ta tor  must expect 
some resistance to the concept of the Ethical Analysis Framework 
and Model as an inevitable phenomena which occurs when change is 
imminent. To this end, a knowledge of change theories and 
coping strategies may be bu i l t  in so that eventually with 
pra c t ic e  and increasing experience, the u t i l is a t io n  of the 
Ethical Analysis Framework and Model proposed in this thesis 
(Figures 4a,4b,4c) becomes a familiar  and effect ive tool in the 
everyday l i f e  of the practit ioner .
(v i )  Supervision/Support systems
Because of the transient or constantly changing nature 
o f  t h e  n u rs e s  w o rk ,  w hereby  n u rs e s  move between  
wards/units/departments, and hospitals, then i t  is essential 
th a t  the nurse at the bedside and in the community, be 
supervised in ethical decision-making, and be aware of and have 
access to the support systems available loca l ly .  Supervision is
not intended " to  measure success .....................  but ra th e r  to
ra ise  open-ended q u e s t i o n s   to develop in s ig h t  in to  the
s k i l l s  and q u a l i t i e s "  (Rodmell 1985: 140-141) required and
possessed.
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SUMMARY
This Chapter presented an Ethical Analysis Model for  
practice which w i l l  aid nurses in u t i l is in g  and applying ethical 
principles when models which guide nursing practice are used.
As nursing is an interdependent discipline with ethical  
r e la t io n s h ip s ,  the mutual expectations between nurse and 
pat ien t /c l ien t  were examined and i t  emerged that reciprocity of 
commitment is essential for the nurse-patient /client  relat ions,  
in a c l im ate  of  cooperation and freedom. C le a r ly  the 
"exper t "  knowledge with which the nurse is invested may be 
e x e r c i s e d  in an environment whereby both nurse and 
pa t ien t /c l ien t  are fu l ly  cognisant, informed and able to make 
rational decisions for the shared responsibil ity (page 27) of 
the outcome of the pat ient /c l ients health status. I f  these
mutual expectations (page 174) are met or are congruent then a 
mutually  rewarding experience for pa t ien t /c l ien t  and nurse 
evolves. Evidence was presented as to the contractual  
agreements being c u r re n t ly  p rac t ised ,  whereby nurse and 
pat ie n t /c l ie n t  interacts successfully (page 175) to achieve the 
agreed desired behavioural outcomes. Models, such as the 
engineering, p r iest ly  and contractual models were outlined to 
demonstrate varying viewpoints of how nurses structure the ir  
nurse-pat ient /c l ient  relationships.
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Consideration was given to the individuals or ethical 
agents involved in the Ethical Analysis Model. The essential 
elements and phases of the Ethical Analysis Framework and Model 
(Figures 4a, 4b and 4c) were presented in detail  and the author 
makes clear that i t  is only one method of guiding action that  
may need to precede the choice of a nursing model, i f  greater  
consideration to the inclusion of ethical constructs/components 
are to be ensured in the content and delivery of nursing care. 
The four basic elements or assumptions that of autonomy, mutual 
interaction,  validation and shared responsibil ity were detailed  
to ensure th a t  mutual expectat ions and in te r a c t io n  are 
realised. In this way consumer needs may be e f fec t ive ly  met. 
These elements/assumptions were set against the background of 
the cognitive, affect ive and effect ive domains. The phases of 
the Ethical Analysis Framework (Figure 4a and 4b) and i ts  
ut i l is a t io n  are self-explanatory.
Finally , the guidelines for implementing the Ethical 
Analysis Framework and Model were presented and i t  was seen that 
the enthusiasm engendered and the motivation required is 
necessary i f  fu l l  commitment to the Ethical Analysis Model is to 
be real ised.
The author now turns to the conclusions, and raises 
discussion and recommendations for the thesis.
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C H A P T E R  F I V E
"Experience without theory is  b l i n d , 
but theory without experience is  mere 
i n t e l l e c tu a l  p lay"
Kant,
1781.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE THESIS
INTRODUCTION
This thesis  has presented a new ethical model to 
encourage the safeguarding of p a t ie n ts ' /d  ients' r ights and 
nurses' rights by improving the process of the application of 
ethical principles. I t  provides a basis for further debate in 
eth ics  education and the decision-making s k i l ls  required in 
ethical dilemmas. In so doing the implementation of the Ethical 
Analysis Model may be effected in pre-registration and post 
registrat ion and continuing education programmes/curriculae, and 
may prove to provide more sensitive nursing care.
F i rs t ly ,  the author ident if ies the general conclusions 
of the study, followed by the specific conclusions that emerge 
from each chapter; secondly, the recommendations are presented, 
and f in a l ly  dissemination of the findings are discussed.
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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
This study has shown that in the present system of nurse 
education and practice in England there is a case for the 
introduction of an Ethical Analysis Model, as advocated by the 
author, as i t  may enhance the application of ethical principles.
The data strongly emphasises the need for a partnership 
approach between nurse and pat ient /c l ient ,  nurse education and 
c l i n i c a l  s t a f f ,  nurse and medical s t a f f ,  and nurse and 
para-medical s ta f f .  This wi l l  hopefully aid in the u t i l is a t io n  
and eventual acceptance of the author's proposed model.
There are many factors, such as the ethical perspective 
of nursing, the ethical knowledge base of nursing, and research 
influences which indicate a case for the application of ethical 
principles in the c l in ica l  and community setting. As ethics 
education is a recent phenomena in nursing education curriculae,  
nurses may need to reconcile the ir  approaches to results which 
are appropriate  in in te g ra t in g  the appl ication of ethical 
principles in the ir  dai ly  l ives.
I t  has emerged from this study that i t  may only be 
possib le  to u t i l i s e  the Ethical Analysis Model w i th in  a 
philosophical framework, such as one which gives consideration to 
the p a t ien t /c l ien t  as a rational,  self-determining agent capable 
of understanding, where possible, and making informed decisions.
Certain principles may be asserted i f  applied ethical 
principles are to be ut i l ised in the c l in ica l  and community 
setting. I t  is clear that a ll  nurses and pat ients /c l ients  may
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need to be involved, certain strategies or approaches used, and 
guidelines for the implementation of the model have been made 
e x p l ic i t  (page 219). From the arguments presented i t  would seem 
tha t  the Code of Professional Conduct (Appendix 1) may be 
l im it ing for the future. I t  has emerged that nurses who do not 
adhere to this Code may be disciplined (page 61) and this may 
have implications for nurses in the wider legal setting. The 
present reliance on the Code may give nurses a false sense of 
security when exposed to criminal or c iv i l  action.
The author now proposes to examine the conclusions which 
arise specif ica l ly  from each chapter.
Chapter Two investigated the issues which contribute 
to the development of the Ethical Analysis Model, in the absence 
of ethical constructs/components in current nursing models which 
are reputed to guide nursing practice.
The author concluded that  a knowledge of  ethical  
theories are important i f  the ethical choices to be made are to 
be grounded in theory and reasoned argument. Ethics is concerned 
with how the individual uses morality in l i f e  situations, and 
three concepts which serve as a philosophic foundation for  
nursing ethics knowledge emerges for consideration. F i rs t ly ,  the 
Code of  Ethics fo r  nurses which guides ethical standards; 
secondly, the formal agreement or contract which outlines the 
parameters for ethical practice; and, th i rd ly  the context in 
which the ethical standards and practice occurs. The author 
concludes that the conf l ic t  with the nurses Code of Professional
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Conduct (Appendix 1) which results in the nurse's blind obedience 
to the Code at the expense of acting unethically towards the 
p at ien t /c l ien t  may also be at the expense of the nurse's personal 
and professional in tegri ty .
The characterisations, mind-sets of nurses or how health 
care is perceived by nurses, have clear implications for ethical  
practice, though this is only one theory. The f i r s t  three 
mind-sets on views of health care demonstrated that nursing 
pra c t ic e  which is congruent with the goals of employing 
authori t ies, doctors, or patients /c lients is seen to be engaging 
in demeaning and 1imi ted ethical practice, as i t  uses other 
in d iv id u a ls  as means to an end. The fourth mind-set or 
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n ,  which focuses on the responsible and 
accountable nurse, does not give any consideration to care 
receivers/givers as means to the ends of others, and thus creates 
a paradigm for ethical decision-making and practice. From the 
varying in te r p r e ta t io n s  of human r ig h ts  can be drawn two 
conclusions. F i rs t ly ,  not enough consideration has been given to 
c l o s i n g  t h e  r e a l i t y  gap bet ween c o n c e r n  f o r  t he  
p a t ie n ts ' /c l ie n ts '  r ights in the theoretical setting and the 
c l in ica l  setting; and secondly, often the nurses' rights are 
s a c r i f i c e d  fo r  the p a t i e n t s ' / c l i e n t s '  r ights. The author 
concludes that the implementation of the Ethical Analysis Model 
may help the nurse and pat ient /c l ient  to bridge this r e a l i t y  gap 
and to give consideration to the rights of both nurse and 
p a t ie n t /c l ie n t  a l ike.
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Chapter Three revealed that  nurses are faced with 
in terdisciplinary team decision-making that characterises the use 
of advanced health care technology and are often faced with the 
ethical conf l ic t  involved in balancing potential benefits against 
potential harm. A judgement is required as to who exercises 
r ights, bearing in mind the mental and physical capacity of the 
p a t ie n t /c l ie n t .  This research/study has tr ied  to ident ify  a 
method of identifying the relevant ethical principles and how 
they may be applied.
By the ir  very nature not all  ethical dilemmas can be 
c la r i f ie d ,  as often moral principles do conf l ic t ,  as in the 
p r i n c i p l e  " t e l l  t he  t r u t h "  versus "do no u nnecessa ry  
harm", and there are obvious d i f f i c u l t i e s  when some principles 
take precedence over others. I t  may be important therefore, for 
nurses to recognise that these principles , are culture-bound and 
even vary between social groups within a culture or sub-culture, 
and that  confl ic t  arises when pa t ien t /c l ien t  p r io r i t ie s  are not 
the same as the nurse.
Discussion on the preservation, sanctity or valuing of 
l i f e  pr inciple  (page 84) revealed that decisions reached by 
nurses would depend on the moral judgement of each individual but 
only following rigorous debate and reasoned argument. The nurse 
is s t i l l  l e f t  with the confl ic t  of respecting pa t ien t /c l ien t  
"autonomy" and respecting the moral imperative of not k i l l in g ,
and together with the ordinary and extraordinary means principle  
(page 165) i t  is concluded that the preservation of l i f e  w i l l  j
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depend on the degree, outcome, relevance and worthwhileness of 
that l i f e .  The concept of l iberty  or individual freedom (page 
90) embodies the notion that individuals make choices based on 
th e ir  values, and the nurse must therefore be prepared to accept 
the responsibil i ty  for the resulting consequences.
The honesty or truth te l l in g  (page 128) inherent in 
communicating on a daily basis is fundamental to ethics. The 
arguments for te l l in g  the pa t ient /c l ient  the truth outweighs not 
doing so, in order not to violate the ir  r ights. In daily  
practice arguments may be advanced for deception and examples may 
be provided for just i fy ing deceit, especially i f  the end result  
is a u t i l i t a r i a n  (page 53) view. However, the author concludes 
that the important issue is that what each pat ien t /c l ien t  wants 
in a part icular  situation must be fa c i l i ta te d  by the nurse i f  the 
nurse-patient/c l ient relationship is to be based on t rus t .  The 
overlap of the role of the doctor and nurse in informing the 
p a t ie n t /c l ie n t  of the ir  diagnosis remains on emotive issue as 
both are accountable to the pa t ien t /c l ien t  for care given. 
However, the author concludes that c la r i f ic a t io n  in terms of the 
ethical position, is required from the relevant Statutory bodies 
which gives the nurse equal authority with the doctor, and less 
of a deferent role , so that information neglected, consciously or 
otherwise by the doctor, may be supplemented by the nurse. The 
parameters of information to be given to the p a t ien t /c l ien t  would 
have f i r s t  been discussed with the health care team.
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The principle of d istr ibut ive justice (page 146) was 
examined and c o n c lu s iv e ly  the author believes tha t  the 
competitive aspect between need and merit is problematical, and 
the varying interpretations of the acts and omissions doctrine 
revealed that double standards are practised. Procedures for  
resolving these problems may be within the remit of Ethical 
Committees, and may require a universalising of standards and 
ju s t i f ic a t io n  for the actions taken.
In Chapter Four, the Ethical Analysis Model was 
presented to ensure the application of ethical principles in the 
c l in ica l  and community setting. I t  emerged that collaborative 
systems of care which support the personal preferences and values 
of the p a t ie n t /c l ie n t  may be realised or effected with the 
u t i l is a t io n  of the Model. A major tenet of the Ethical Analysis 
Model presented by the author (Figure 4c) is that through 
discussion the nurse and the pat ien t /c l ien t  can arrive at a 
compromise, or a congruent view. I f  this is not possible then 
nurses ought not to impose t h e i r  views or values on the 
pat ients /c l ients ,  but rather w i l l  need to decide the relevant 
action, which may be to act as advocates or trustees to enable 
r e a l is t ic  outcomes which are in the "best interests" of the 
p a t ie n ts /c l ie n ts .  However, this behaviour would have to be 
ju s t i f i e d .
The increasing use by nurse education programmes in 
integrating nursing models into the ir  curriculum, which re f le c t  
the philosophies of the insti tut ions and of learning, may provide
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a sound basis for curriculum content and learning strategies.
Similarly, in the c l in ica l  and community setting a nursing model 
can improve the nurses' practice by fa c i l i ta t in g  the organisation 
of observations and the interpretation of data.
I t  w i l l  be assumed that the choice of nursing model 
selected to give the required purpose and direction to nursing
care, and which aids in the organisation of observations and 
interpretation of data, wi l l  f a c i l i t a te  the discipline to emerge 
as a "profession". To date, this has not been the case but the 
author believes that i f  philosophical content is introduced or 
supplemented to these nursing models, then more sensitive nursing 
care may emerge. This can only happen i f  consideration has been 
given to the congruency between the values and assumptions 
inherent in the selected model, and the philosophies of the
nursing school, learning, and course purpose.
However meaningful the selected nursing model may 
appear, and however meaningful the assessment phase of the
Nursing Process (page 37) is,  i t  requires the nurse and the 
pat ie n t /c l ie n t  to identify  the ir  expectations, so that care can 
be e f fec t ive ly  and r e a l is t ic a l ly  planned, with a l l  the knowledge 
concerned, and which is acceptable to both participants in the 
in teractive process. The real isat ion of the Ethical Analysis 
Model is dependent on a number of factors such as the attitudes  
and derivation of the morals of both nurse and p a t ie n t /c l ie n t ,  
the needs of the individual,  the resources avai lable, and the 
competence, motivation and sk i l l  of the health care team.
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The author does not accept that ethics in nursing is 
simply appl ied e th ics  or the a p p l ic a t io n  of philosophical 
principles to the ethical dilemmas that arise. Rather i t  is a 
complex relationship between the ethical principles in nursing 
practice and philosophy; the formation and meaning of theories;  
and the nature of philosophical debate.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Changes in nursing c u r r ic u la e  are taking place to 
accommodate past and present innovations in health care, so i t  
would seem appropriate to r e f le c t  these changes in the way nurses 
are taught.
In order to l in k  the theory to practice, that is ,  the 
application of ethical principles in the c l in ica l  and community 
setting, and to encourage nurses and pat ients /c l ients  to share in 
the responsib i l i ty ,  where possible, for  th e i r  own health care, 
the following are recommended.
That:
The Ethical Analysis Model, or a similar model, 
be incorporated into pre-registration, post-registration and 
Continuing nurse education programmes.
2* The Ethical Analysis Model, or similar model, be 
implemented.
3. Research proposals in ethics form part of post­
registration and Continuing nurse education programmes.
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DISSEMINATION OF FINDINGS
As outlined in Chapter One (page 22) the author proposes 
to submit the Framework and Model from this thesis (Figures 
4 a , 4 b , 4 c )  to t he Uni t ed Kingdom S t a t u t o r y  bodies fo r  
consideration in national curriculum guidelines. Further to this  
the author intends to bring this study to the attention of the 
Ethics Advisory Sub-Committee of the Royal College of Nursing, 
the Nursing Professional Services Committee of the Royal College 
of Nursing, the Department of Health and Social Service (Research 
Abstracts), and the Standards and Ethics Group of the United 
Kingdom Central Council.
Copies of this study w i l l  be submitted to the Royal 
College of Nursing (Steinberg Collection); the Regional Office of 
the World Health Organisation/Pan American Health Organisation 
(WHO/PAHO), Commonwealth of the Bahamas; and the University of 
the West Indies (Mona Campus), Jamaica.
In her new job as Educational Consultant/Curriculum 
S p e c ia l is t  the author proposes to recommend and u t i l is e  the 
Ethica l  Anal ysi s Framework and Model for implementation and 
c l in ica l  practice in hospitals and community settings. This w i l l  
include formative and summative evaluations of the proposed 
Ethical Analysis Framework and Model in this thesis.
The author also hopes to disseminate the work done in 
this study to nursing periodicals national ly and in ternat ionally .
F.E.RODMELL
MSc SRN RCNT RNT
1988.
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APPENDIX 1
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
FOR THE NURSE, MIDWIFE AND HEALTH VISITOR 
UNITED KINGDOM CENTRAL COUNCIL, 2ND EDITION, 
NOVEMBER 1984.
Each registered nurse, midwife and 
health visitor shall act. at all 
times, in such a manner as to 
justify public trust and 
confidence, to uphold and enhance 
the good standing and reputation of 
the profession, to serve the 
interests of society, and above all 
to safeguard the interests of 
individual patients and clients. 
Each registered nurse, midwife and 
health visitor is accountable for 
his or her practice, and, in the 
exercise of professional 
accountability shall:
1. Act always in such a way as to 
promote and safeguard the well 
being and interests of 
patients/clients.
2. Ensure that no action or 
omission on his/her part or 
within his/her sphere of 
influence is detrimental to the 
condition or safety of 
patients/clients.
3. Take every reasonable 
opportunity to maintain and 
improve professional knowledge 
and competence.
4. Acknowledge any limitations of 
competence and refuse in such 
cases to accept delegated 
functions without first having 
received instruction in regard 
to those functions and having 
been assessed as competent.
5. Work in a collaborative and 
co-operative manner with other 
health care professionals and 
recognise and respect their 
particular contributions within 
the health care team.
6. Take account of the customs, 
values and spiritual beliefs 
of patients/clients.
7. Make known to an appropriate 
person or authority any 
conscientious objection which 
may be relevant to 
professional practice.
8. Avoid any abuse of the 
privileged relationship which 
exists with patient/clients 
and of the privileged access 
allowed to their property, 
residence or workplace.
9. Respect confidential 
information obtained in the 
course of professional 
practice and refrain from 
disclosing such information 
without the consent of the 
patient/client, or a person 
entitled to act on his/her 
behalf, except where 
disclosure is required by law 
or by the order of a court or 
is necessary' in the public 
interest.
10. Have regard to the environment 
of care and its physical, 
psychological and social 
effects on patients/clients, 
and also to the adequacy of 
resources, and make known to 
appropriate persons or 
authorities any circumstances 
which could place 
patients/clients in jeopardy 
or which militate against safe 
standards of practice.
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11. Have regard to the workload of 
and the pressures on 
professional colleagues and 
subordinates and take 
appropriate action if these are 
seen to be such as to 
constitute abuse of the 
individual practitioner and/or 
to jeopardise safe standards of 
practice.
13. Refuse to accept any gift, 
favour or hospitality which 
might be interpreted as 
seeking to exert undue 
influence to obtain 
preferential consideration.
14. Avoid the use of professional 
qualifications in the 
promotion of commercial 
products in order not to 
compromise the independence of 
professional judgement on 
which patients/clients rely.
12. In the context of the
individual's own knowledge, 
experience, and sphere of 
authority, assist peers and 
subordinates to develop 
professional competence in 
accordance with their needs.
NOTICE TO ALL REGISTERED NURSES,
MIDWIVES AND HEALTH VISITORS
This Code of Professional Conduct is issued by the United Kingdom Central 
Council for Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting.
It is issued for the guidance and advice of all registered nurses, 
midwives and health visitors.
Further explanatory notes, discussion papers or comments on specific 
points in the Code of Professional Conduct may be issued by the Council 
from time to time.
The Code will be subject to periodic review by the Council.
The Council expects members of the profession to recognise it as their 
responsibility (as well as the Council's) to re-appraise the relevance of 
the Code to the professional and social context in which they practice.
The Council will welcome suggestions and comments for consideration in 
its periodic review of the Code of Professional Conduct.
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STAGES CHARACTERISTICS
LEVEL 1: Preconventional 
moral 
reasoning
(Pre-operational 
or pre-logical 
thinking)
STAGE 1: Egocentric viewpoint, 
(obedience) Lacking in insight, Follows 
rules to avoid punishment.
STAGE 2: Awareness of conflicts of 
(Egoistic) opinion and interests.
Begins to compromise because 
"right" is perceived as an 
exchange that satisfies others 
interests.
LEVEL 2: Conventional 
moral 
reasoning
(Concrete 
thinking)
STAGE 3: Begins to fulfil others 
(Good- expectations and enjoys 
person) "being good", i.e. showing 
concern for others, loyalty 
and trustworthiness.
STAGE 4: Develops awareness that 
(Authority) social stability depends 
on adherence to rules.
LEVEL 3: Post conven­
tional moral 
reasoning
(Abstract
thinking)
STAGE 5: Realisation that values are 
(Contractual) not absolute but are based 
on principles and a commit­
ment to people and society.
STAGE 6: Commitment to a rational 
(Conscience belief in the validity of 
of principle) universal moral principles, 
i.e. they behave contrary 
to laws and customs they 
believe to be invalid as 
their commitment to justice 
and human rights is indepen­
dant of the values of any 
communi ty.
(after Kohlberg 1963)
"Moral Education and Identification" 
in Child Psychology
H. Stevenson (ed)
62nd Year Book 
National Society for the study of Education 
University of Chicago Press : Chicago
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AMERICAN CODE FOR NURSES
1. The nurse provides services with respect for human dignity and the
uniqueness of the client unrestricted by considerations of social 
or economic status, personal attributes, or the nature of health' 
problems.
2. The nurse safeguards the client's right to privacy by judiciously
protecting information of a confidential nature.
3. The nurse acts to safeguard the client and the public when health
care and safety are affected by the incompetent, unethical, or 
illegal practice of any person.
4. The nurse assumes responsibility and accountability for individual
nursing judgements and actions.
5. The nurse maintains competence in nursing.
6. The nurse exercises informed judgment and uses individual competence
and qualifications as criteria in seeking consultation, accepting 
responsibilities, and delegating nursing activities to others.
7. The nurse participates in activities that contribute to the ongoing
development of the profession’s body of knowledge.
8. The nurse participates in the profession’s efforts to implement and
improve standards of nursing.
9. The nurse participates in the profession's efforts to establish and
maintain conditions of employment conducive to high quality nursing 
care.
10. The nurse participates in the profession's effort to protect the
public from misinformation and misrepresentation and to maintain 
the integrity of nursing.
11. The nurse collaborates with members of the health professions and
other citizens in promoting community and national efforts to 
meet the health needs of the public.
[Adopted by the American Nurses' Association in 1976 and reprinted by
permission]
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i nursing student has the right to 
question educational methods and 
curriculum content.
. . , There should be clearly defined 
moans for student input into educa 
tional planning and for evaluation of 
both clinical and classroom experience.
The nursing student has the right to '  
say 'I don't understand'.
. . .  It is difficult for nursing students to 
acknowledge freely confusion or non­
comprehension and to ask for 
clarification.
The nursing student has the right to 
practise safely under supervision.
. . . Making a mistake does not infer 
some intrinsic flaw in one's character. 
Learning involves making mistakes 
which should be corrected by a 
responsible supervisor.
4  The nursing student hae the right to 
decline responsibility for managerial 
problems outside their sphere of 
practise or competence.
. . . Nursing students often shoulder 
the burden of guilt because of things 
like poor staffing levels, lack of 
resources.
0  The nursing student lias the right to 
bring to the attention of the 
appropriate authority any act of patient 
abuse or poor standard of can .
. . .  It must be made professionally 
essential for the nursing student to act 
as the patient's advocate and to receive 
support in pursuit of her complaint.
g  The nursing student has the right to be 
treated with respect as an equal human 
being.
. . Nursing students often feel that 
their statu* relegates them firmly to the 
bottom of the hierarchical heap.
The nursing student has the right to 
orivacy in respect of her personal life.
. . . Students are often subjected to 
gross invasion of privacy which would 
not be tolerated by other citizens. It is 
often in the arees of personal health, 
reporting sick, or restrictions attached 
to living in nurses' homes which give 
most cause for concern.
o  The nursing student has the right to
®  express her feelings, opinions and
values.
. . .  It is increasingly difficult for 
nursing students to identify and to 
verbalise their feelings without being 
labelled as hysterical, irrational, 
immature or inexperienced.
q  The nursing student has the right to 
state her own needs as a person 
independent of any other roles which 
may be assumed in her life.
. . . The role of nurse, learner, helper, 
partner, often clouds the needs of the 
person and encourages the individual I 
to sublimate her personal needs to 
function successfully in the system.
The nursing student has the right to 
question and to receive an informed 
answer.
. . . Nursing care is often shr ouded in 
myth and ritual. The student nurse has 
the right to know why care is being 
given out and how it benefits the 
patient/client.
Royal College of Nursing 
Association of Nursing Students (31) 
Bill of Rights 
Nursing Times, 83(34),
26 August 1987, pp 20
APPENDIX 5
A Patient's Bill of Rights: American Hospital Association,
1973*
T h e  A m e r i c a n  H o s p i t a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  p r e s e n t s  a  P a t i e n t ’ s  B i l l  o f  R i g h t s  w i t h  t h e  e x p e c ­
t a t i o n  t h a t  o b s e r v a n c e  o f  t h e s e  r i g h t s  w i l l  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  m o r e  e f f e c t i v e  p a t i e n t  c a r e  a n d  g r e a t e r  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  f o r  t h e  p a t i e n t ,  h i s  p h y s i c i a n  a n d  t h e  h o s p i t a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  A s s o c i a ­
t i o n  p r e s e n t s  t h e s e  r i g h t s  i n  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  b e  s u p p o r t e d  b y  t h e  h o s p i t a l  o n  
b e h a l f  o f  i t s  p a t i e n t s ,  a s  a n  i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  h e a l i n g  p r o c e s s .  I t  i s  r e c o g n i z e d  t h a t  a  p e r s o n a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e  p h y s i c i a n  a n d  t h e  p a t i e n t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  p r o p e r  
m e d i c a l  c a r e .  T h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  p h y s i c i a n - p a t i e n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t a k e s  o n  a  n e w  d i m e n s i o n  w h e n  
c a r e  i s  r e n d e r e d  w i t h i n  a n  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e .  L e g a l  p r e c e d e n t  h a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  t h e  
i n s t i t u t i o n  i t s e l f  a l s o  h a s  a  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  t h e  p a t i e n t .  I t  i s  i n  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e s e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  
t h e s e  r i g h t s  a r e  a f f i r m e d .
1 .  T h e  p a t i e n t  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  c o n s i d e r a t e  a n d  r e s p e c t f u l  c a r e .
2 .  T h e  p a t i e n t  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  o b t a i n  f r o m  h i s  p h y s i c i a n  c o m p l e t e  c u r r e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  
c o n c e r n i n g  h i s  d i a g n o s i s ,  t r e a t m e n t ,  a n d  p r o g n o s i s  i n  t e r m s  t h e  p a t i e n t  c a n  b e  r e a s o n a b l y  
e x p e c t e d  t o  u n d e r s t a n d .  W h e n  i t  i s  n o t  m e d i c a l l y  a d v i s a b l e  t o  g i v e  s u c h  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  
t h e  p a t i e n t ,  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  m a d e  a v a i l a b l e  t o  a n  a p p r o p r i a t e  p e r s o n  i n  h i s  
b e h a l f .  H e  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  k n o w  b y  n a m e ,  t h e  p h y s i c i a n  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  c o o r d i n a t i n g  h i s  
c a r e .
3 .  T h e  p a t i e n t  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  r e c e i v e  f r o m  h i s  p h y s i c i a n  i n f o r m a t i o n  n e c e s s a r y  t o  g i v e  
i n f o r m e d  c o n s e n t  p r i o r  t o  t h e  s t a r t  o f  a n y  p r o c e d u r e  a n d / o r  t r e a t m e n t .  E x c e p t  i n  
e m e r g e n c i e s ,  s u c h  i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  i n f o r m e d  c o n s e n t ,  s h o u l d  i n c l u d e  b u t  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
b e  l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  s p e c i f i c  p r o c e d u r e  a n d / o r  t r e a t m e n t ,  t h e  m e d i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  r i s k s  
i n v o l v e d ,  a n d  t h e  p r o b a b l e  d u r a t i o n  o f  i n c a p a c i t a t i o n .  W h e r e  m e d i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  a l t e r ­
n a t i v e s  f o r  c a r e  o r  t r e a t m e n t  e x i s t ,  o r  w h e n  t h e  p a t i e n t  r e q u e s t s  i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n c e r n i n g  
m e d i c a l  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  t h e  p a t i e n t  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  s u c h  i n f o r m a t i o n .  T h e  p a t i e n t  a l s o  h a s  
t h e  r i g h t  t o  k n o w  t h e  n a m e  o f  t h e  p e r s o n  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  p r o c e d u r e s  a n d / o r  t r e a t m e n t .
4 .  T h e  p a t i e n t  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  r e f u s e  t r e a t m e n t  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  p e r m i t t e d  b y  l a w ,  a n d  t o  b e  
i n f o r m e d  o f  t h e  m e d i c a l  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  h i s  a c t i o n .
5 .  T h e  p a t i e n t  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  e v e r y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  h i s  p r i v a c y  c o n c e r n i n g  h i s  o w n  
m e d i c a l  c a r e  p r o g r a m  C a s e  d i s c u s s i o n ,  c o n s u l t a t i o n ,  e x a m i n a t i o n ,  a n d  t r e a t m e n t  a r e  
c o n f i d e n t i a l  a n d  s h o u l d  b e  c o n d u c t e d  d i s c r e e t l y .  T h o s e  n o t  d i r e c t l y  i n v o l v e d  i n  h i s  c a r e  
m u s t  h a v e  t h e  p e r m i s s i o n  o f  t h e  p a t i e n t  t o  b e  p r e s e n t .
6 .  T h e  p a t i e n t  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  e x p e c t  t h a t  a l l  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  a n d  r e c o r d s  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  h i s  
c a r e  s h o u l d  b e  t r e a t e d  a s  c o n f i d e n t i a l .
7 .  T h e  p a t i e n t  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  e x p e c t  t h a t  w i t h i n  i t s  c a p a c i t y  a  h o s p i t a l  m u s t  m a k e  r e a s o n ­
a b l e  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  r e q u e s t  o f  a  p a t i e n t  f o r  s e r v i c e s .  T h e  h o s p i t a l  m u s t  p r o v i d e  e v a l u a ­
t i o n ,  s e r v i c e ,  a n d / o r  r e f e r r a l  a s  i n d i c a t e d  b v  t h e  u r g e n c y  o f  t h e  c a s e .  W h e n  m e d i c a l l y  
p e r m i s s i b l e  a  p a t i e n t  m a y  b e  t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  a n o t h e r  f a c i l i t y  o n l y  a f t e r  h e  h a s  r e c e i v e d  
c o m p l e t e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  e x p l a n a t i o n  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  n e e d s  f o r  a n d  a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  s u c h  a  
t r a n s f e r .  T h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  t o  w h i c h  t h e  p a t i e n t  i s  t o  b e  t r a n s f e r r e d  m u s t  f i r s t  h a v e  a c c e p t e d  
t h e  p a t i e n t  f o r  t r a n s f e r .
8 .  T h e  p a t i e n t  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  o b t a i n  i n f o r m a t i o n  a s  t o  a n y  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  h i s  h o s p i t a l  t o  
o t h e r  h e a l t h  c a r e  a r i d  e d u c a t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n s o f a r  a s  h i s  c a r e  i s  c o n c e r n e d .  T h e  p a t i e n t  
h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  o b t a i n  i n f o r m a t i o n  a s  t o  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a n y  p r o f e s s i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
a m o n g  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  b y  n a m e ,  w h o  a r c  t r e a t i n g  h i m .
9 .  T h e  p a t i e n t  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  b e  a d v i s e d  i f  t h e  h o s p i t a l  p r o p o s e s  t o  e n g a g e  i n  o r  p e r f o r m  
h u m a n  e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n  a f f e c t i n g  h i s  c a r e  o r  t r e a t m e n t .  T h e  p a t i e n t  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  r e f u s e  
t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  s u c h  r e s e a r c h  p r o j e c t s .
10 .  T h e  p a t i e n t  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  e x p e c t  r e a s o n a b l e  c o n t i n u i t y  o f  c a r e .  H e  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  k n o w  
i n  a d v a n c e  w h a t  a p p o i n t m e n t  t i m e s  a n d  p h y s i c i a n s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  a n d  w h e r e .  T h e  p a t i e n t  
h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  e x p e c t  t h a t  t h e  h o s p i t a l  w  i l l  p r o v i d e  a  m e c h a n i s m  w h e r e b y  h e  i s  i n f o r m e d  
b y  h i s  p h y s i c i a n  o r  a  d e l e g a t e  o f  t h e  p h y s i c i a n  o f  t h e  p a t i e n t ’ s  c o n t i n u i n g  h e a l t h  c a r e  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o l l o w i n g  d i s c h a r g e .
1 1 . T h e  p a t i e n t  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  e x a m i n e  a n d  r e c e i v e  a n  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  h i s  b i l l  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  
s o u r c e  o f  p a y m e n t .
1 2 .  T h e  p a t i e n t  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  k n o w  w h a t  h o s p i t a l  r u l e s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s  a p p l y  t o  h i s  c o n d u c t  
a s  a  p a t i e n t .
N o  c a t a l o g u e  o f  r i g h t s  c a n  g u a r a n t e e  f o r  t h e  p a t i e n t  t h e  k i n d  o f  t r e a t m e n t  h e  h a s  a  r i g h t  
t o  e x p e c t .  A  h o s p i t a l  h a s  m a n y  f u n c t i o n s  t o  p e r f o r m ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  p r e v e n t i o n  a n d  t r e a t m e n t  
o f  d i s e a s e ,  t h e  e d u c a t i o n  o f  b o t h  h e a l t h  p r o f e s s i o n a l s  a n d  p a t i e n t s ,  a n d  t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  c l i n i c a l  
r e s e a r c h .  A l l  t h e s e  a c t i v i t i e s  m u s t  b e  c o n d u c t e d  w i t h  a n  o v e r r i d i n g  c o n c e r n  f o r  t h e  p a t i e n t ,  
a n d ,  a b o v e  a l l ,  t h e  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  h i s  d i g n i t y  a s  a  h u m a n  b e i n g .  S u c c e s s  i n  a c h i e v i n g  t h i s  
r e c o g n i t i o n  a s s u r e s  s u c c e s s  i n  t h e  d e f e n s e  o f  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  t h e  p a t i e n t .
* Reprinted w ith  the perm ission o f the A m erican H ospita l A ssocia tion . C op yrigh t 1972.
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WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
Declaration of Helsinki
Recommendations guiding medical doctors in biomedical research involving 
human subjects.
Adopted by the 18th World Medical Assembly, Helsinki, Finland, 1964, and 
revised by the 29th World Medical Assembly, Tokyo, Japan, October 1975.
Introduction
It is the mission of the medical doctor to safeguard the health of the 
people. His or her knowledge and conscience are dedicated to the fulfilment of 
the mission.
The Declaration of Geneva of The World Medical Association binds the doctor 
with the words. "The health of my patient will be my first consideration,” and 
the International Code of Medical Ethics declares that, "Any act or advice which 
could weaken physical or mental resistance of a human being may be used only in 
his interest".
The purpose of biomedical research involving human subjects must be to 
improve diagnostic, therapeutic and prophylactic procedures and the 
understanding of the aetiology and pathogenesis of disease.
In current medical practice most diagnostic, therapeutic or, prohylactic 
procedures involve hazards. This applies a fortiori to biomedical research.
Medical progress is based on research which ultimately must rest in part on 
experimentation involving human subjects.
In the field of biomedical research a fundamental distinction must be 
recognized between medical research in which the aim is essentially diagnostic 
or therapeutic for a patient, and medical research, the essential object of 
which is purely scientific and without direct diagnostic or therapeutic value to 
the person subjected to the research.
Special caution must be exercised in the conduct of research which may 
affect the environment, and the welfare of animals used for research must be 
respected.
Because it is essential that the results of laboratory experiments be applied to 
human beings to further scientific knowledge and to help suffering humanity. The 
World Medical Association has prepared the following recommendations as a guide 
to every doctor in biomedical research involving human subjects. They should be 
kept under review in the future. It must be stressed that the standards as 
drafted are only a guide to physicians all over the world. Doctors are not 
relieved from criminal, civil and ethical responsibilities under the laws of 
their own countries.
-2 61 -
APPENDIX 6 (Cont'd)
I. Basic Principles
1. Biomedical research involving human subjects must conform to generally accepted 
scientific principles and should be based on adequately performed laboratory and animal 
experimentation and on a thorough knowledge of the scientific literature.
2. The design and performance of each experimental procedure involving human 
subjects should be clearly formulated in a experimental protocol which should be 
transmitted to a specially appointed independent committee for consideration, comment 
and guidance.
3. Biomedical research involving human subjects should be conducted only by 
scientifically qualified persons and under the supervision of a clinically competent 
medical person. The responsibility for the human subject must always rest with a 
medically qualified person and never rest on the subject of research, even though the 
subject has given his or her consent.
4. Biomedical research involving human subjects cannot legitimately be carried out 
unless the importance of the objective is in proportion to the inherent risk to the 
subj ect.
5. Every biomedical research project involving human subjects should be preceded by 
careful assessment of predictable risks in comparison with foreseeable benefits to the 
subject or to others. Concern for the interests of the subject must always prevail 
over the interests of science and society.
6 . The r ight of the resea rch subject to saf eguard his or her integrity mu st always
be respect ed. Every precauti on should be taken to respect the privacy of the subj ect
and to min imi ze the impact of the study on the subject's physical and mental integrity
and on the pe rsonality of the subj ect.
7. Doctors should abstain from engaging in research projects involving human 
subjects unless they are satisfied that the hazards involved are believed to be 
predictable. Doctors should cease any investigation if the hazards are found to 
outweigh the potential benefits.
8. In publication of the results of his or her research, the doctor is obliged to
preserve the accuracy of the results. Reports of experimentation not in accordance 
with the principles laid down in this Declaration should not be accepted for 
publication.
9. In any research on human beings, each potential subject must be adequately 
informed of the aims, methods, anticipated benefits and potential hazards of the study 
and the discomfort it may entail. He or she should be informed that he or she is at 
liberty to abstain from participation in the study and that he or she is free to 
withdraw his or her consent to participation at any time. The doctor should then 
obtain the subject's freely-given informed consent, preferably in writing.
10. When obtaining informed consent for the research project the doctor should be 
particularly cautious if the subject is in a dependent relationship to him or her or 
may consent under duress. In that case the informed consent should be obtained by a 
doctor who is not engaged in the investigation and who is completely independent of 
this official relationship.
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11. In case of legal incompetence, informed consent should be obtained from the
legal guardian in accordance with national legislation. Where physical or mental 
incapacity makes it impossible to obtain informed consent, or when the subject is a 
minor, permission from the responsible relative replaces that of the subject in 
accordance with national legislation.
12. The research protocol should always contain a statement of the ethical 
considerations involved and should indicate that the principles enunciated in the 
present Declaration are complied with.
II. Medical research combined with professional care (clinical research)
1. In the treatment of the sick person, the doctor must be free to use a new
diagnostic and therapeutic measure, if in his or her judgement it offers hope of saving 
life, reestablishing health or alleviating suffering.
2. The potential benefits, hazards and discomfort of a new method should be
weighed against the advantages of the best current diagnostic and therapeutic methods.
3. In any medical study, every patient - including those of a control group, if 
any - should be assured of the best proven diagnostic and therapeutic method.
4. The refusal of the patient to participate in a study must never interfere with 
the doctor-patient relationship.
5. If the doctor considers it essential not to obtain informed consent, the
specific reasons for this proposal should be stated in the experimental protocol for 
transmission to the independent committee (1,2).
6. The doctor can combine medical research with professional care, the objective
being the acquisition of new medical knowledge, only to the extent that medical 
research is justified by its potential diagnostic or therapeutic value for the patient.
-therapeutic biomedical research involving human subjects (non-clinical 
research)
1. In the purely scientific application of medical research carried out on a human 
being, it is the duty of the doctor to remain the protector of the life and health of 
that person on whom biomedical research is being carried out.
2. The subjects should be volunteers - either healthy persons or patients for whom 
the experimental design is not related to the patient's illness.
III. Non 
biomedical
3. The investigator or the investigating team should discontinue the research if 
in his/her or their judgement it may, if continued, be harmful to the individual.
4. In research on man, the interest of science and society should never take
precedence over considerations related to the well-being of the subject.
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The Hippocratic Oath
I swear by Apollo Physician and Asclepius and Hygieia and Panaceia and all the gods and 
goddesses, making them my witnesses, that I will fulfil according to my ability and 
judgment this oath and this covenant:
To hold him who has taught me this art as equal to my parents and to live my
life in partnership with him, and if he is in need of money to give him a share of
mine, and to regard his offspring as equal to my brothers in male lineage and to teach
them this art - if they desire to learn it - without fee and covenant: to give a share
of precepts and oral instruction and all the other learning to my sons and to the sons 
of him who has instructed me and to pupils who have signed the covenant and have taken
an oath according to the medical law, but to no one else.
I will apply dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick according to my 
ability and judgment; I will keep them from harm and injustice.
I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a 
suggestion to this effect. Similarly I will not give to a woman an abortive remedy.
In purity and holiness I will guard my life and my art.
I will not use the knife, not even on sufferers from stone, but will withdraw
in favour of such men as are engaged in this work.
Whatever houses I may visit, I will come for the benefit of the sick, remaining
free of all intentional injustice, of all mischief and in particular of sexual
relations with both female and male persons, be they free or slaves.
What I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of the
treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no account one must spread abroad. I
will keep to myself holding such things shameful to be spoken about.
If I fulfil this oath and do not violate it, may it be granted to me to enjoy
life and art, being honoured with fame among all men for all time to come; if I
transgress it and swear falsely, may the opposite of all this be my lot.
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THE WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION DECLARATION OF GENEVA
Physician's Oath
At the time of being admitted as a member of the medical profession:
I solemnly pledge myself to consecrate my life to the service of humanity:
I will give to my teachers the respect and gratitude which is their due;
I will practice my profession with conscience and dignity; the health of my 
patient will be my first consideration;
I will maintain by all the means in my power, the honour and the noble 
traditions of the medical profession: my colleagues will be my brothers;
I will not permit considerations of religion, nationality, race, party politics 
or social standing to intervene between my duty and my patient;
I will maintain the utmost respect of human life from the time of conception, 
even under threat, I will not use my knowledge contrary to the laws of humanity;
I make these promises solemnly, freely and upon my honour.
Adopted by the General Assembly of the World Medical Association, Geneva, 
Switzerland, September 1948 and amended by the 22nd World Medical Assembly, Sydney, 
Australia, August 1968.
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LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES OR EXPERIENCES 
AND TEACHING METHODS
CONCRETE 
"real"
10
ABSTRACT y  
"unreal"
REAL LIFE EXPERIENCES 
-Critical incident techniques
REVERSAL ROLE-PLAYING/TAKING TECHNIQUES
SIMULATION SITUATIONS 
-solving personal and moral problems
TAPE SLIDES or VIDEO TAPE RECORDINGS 
-recording discussions on moral arguments 
and playing back material for further 
di scus s ion
ACTING, DRAMA, PROJECT WORK
USE OF EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY 
-films, audio-visual aid material
DISCUSSION - small mixed groups 
-emotions and personal relationships discussed
DEBATES
ESSAYS
CREATIVE WRITING
or relevant moral questions
RELEVANT MATERIAL USAGE 
-encouraging students to bring relevant 
material for discussion e .g .Newspaper 
articles
DIRECT TEACHING 
-direct explanation of material
After J.H.Wilson (1975:42)
In: Progress and problems in Moral Education,
M.Taylor, ed., Slough: NFER.
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Bulletin of the History of Medicine
Canadian Nurse
Ethics
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Hospitals
Image
In s titu te  of Society, Ethics and Life Sciences 
International Journal of Nursing Studies 
International Journal of Psychological Medicine 
International Nursing Review
Journal of Advanced Nursing
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA)
Journal of Applied Philosophy
Journal of C linical Psychology
Journal of Curriculum Studies
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Journal of Medical Ethics
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Nursing Mirror
Nurs ng Outlook
Nurs ng Papers: Perspectives in Nursing
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Nurs ng Research
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Nursi ng Science
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Oxford Review
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